Description: The fiscal year of the data file obtained from the AOUSC
Format: YYYY
Description: The code of the federal judicial circuit where the case was located
Format: A2
Description: The code of the federal judicial district where the case was located
Format: A2
Description: The code of the district office where the case was located
Format: A2
Description: Docket number assigned by the district to the case
Format: A7
Description: A unique number assigned to each defendant in a case which cannot be modified by the court
Format: A3
Description: A unique number assigned to each defendant in a case which can be modified by the court
Format: A3
Description: A sequential number indicating whether a case is an original proceeding or a reopen
Format: N5
Description: Case type associated with the current defendant record
Format: A2
Description: A concatenation of district, office, docket number, case type, defendant number, and reopen sequence number
Format: A18
Description: A concatenation of district, office, docket number, case type, and reopen sequence number
Format: A15
Description: The status of the defendant as assigned by the AOUSC
Format: A2
Description: A code indicating the fugitive status of a defendant
Format: A1
Description: The date upon which a defendant became a fugitive
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which a fugitive defendant was taken into custody
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date when a case was first docketed in the district court
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which proceedings in a case commenced on charges pending in the district court where the defendant appeared, or the date of the defendant’s felony-waiver of indictment
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: A code used to identify the nature of the proceeding
Format: N2
Description: The date when a defendant first appeared before a judicial officer in the district court where a charge was pending
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: A code indicating the event by which a defendant appeared before a judicial officer in the district court where a charge was pending
Format: A2
Description: A code indicating the type of legal counsel assigned to a defendant
Format: N2
Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense committed which carried the highest severity
Format: A20
Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with FTITLE1
Format: N2
Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with FTITLE1
Format: A4
Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with FTITLE1
Format: A4
Description: A code indicating the severity associated with FTITLE1
Format: A3
Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense committed which carried the second highest severity
Format: A20
Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with FTITLE2
Format: N2
Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with FTITLE2
Format: A4
Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with FTITLE2
Format: A4
Description: A code indicating the severity associated with FTITLE2
Format: A3
Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense committed which carried the third highest severity
Format: A20
Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with FTITLE3
Format: N2
Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with FTITLE3
Format: A4
Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with FTITLE3
Format: A4
Description: A code indicating the severity associated with FTITLE3
Format: A3
Description: The FIPS code used to indicate the county or parish where an offense was committed
Format: A5
Description: The date of the last action taken on the record
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which judicial proceedings before the court concluded
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which the final sentence is recorded on the docket
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which the case was closed
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The total fine imposed at sentencing for all offenses of which the defendant was convicted and a fine was imposed
Format: N8
Description: A count of defendants filed including inter-district transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants filed excluding inter-district transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of original proceedings commenced
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants filed whose proceedings commenced by reopen, remand, appeal, or retrial
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants terminated including interdistrict transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants terminated excluding interdistrict transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of original proceedings terminated
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants terminated whose proceedings commenced by reopen, remand, appeal, or retrial
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants pending as of the last day of the period including long term fugitives
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants pending as of the last day of the period excluding long term fugitives
Format: N1
Description: The source from which the data were loaded into the AOUSC’s NewSTATS database
Format: A10
Description: A sequential number indicating the iteration of the defendant record
Format: N2
Description: The date the record was loaded into the AOUSC’s NewSTATS database
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: Statistical year ID label on data file obtained from the AOUSC which represents termination year
Alexander Mashinsky, Founder and Former Chief Executive Officer of Celsius, Charged with Defrauding Celsius Customers, and Mashinsky and Roni Cohen-Pavon, Former Celsius Chief Revenue Officer, Charged with Manipulating the Market for Celsius Crypto Token
Celsius Network LLC Accepts Responsibility and Pledges to Continue Cooperating
Damian Williams, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and Christie M. Curtis, the Acting Assistant Director in Charge of the New York Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), announced today the unsealing of an Indictment charging ALEXANDER MASHINSKY, the founder and former Chief Executive Officer of Celsius Network LLC and their affiliated entities (collectively, “Celsius”), with securities fraud, commodities fraud, and wire fraud for defrauding customers and misleading them about core aspects of the company he founded, including Celsius’s success, profitability, and the nature of the investments Celsius made using customer funds. MASHINSKY and RONI COHEN-PAVON, Celsius’s former Chief Revenue Officer, are further charged with conspiracy, securities fraud, market manipulation, and wire fraud for illicitly manipulating the price of CEL, Celsius’s proprietary crypto token, all while secretly selling their own CEL tokens at artificially inflated prices.
On June 12, 2022, Celsius announced it was halting all customer withdrawals from the Celsius platform, at which time hundreds of thousands of Celsius customers — many of whom were retail investors — still had approximately $4.7 billion worth of crypto assets on the Celsius platform, none of which they could access. On or about July 13, 2022, Celsius filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. MASHINSKY was arrested earlier today and will be presented this afternoon before U.S. Magistrate Judge Ona T. Wang. COHEN-PAVON, an Israeli citizen and resident, is currently abroad. The case has been assigned to U.S. District Judge John G. Koeltl.
U.S. Attorney Williams also announced today that the United States has entered into a non-prosecution agreement (the “Agreement”) with Celsius pursuant to which Celsius has agreed to accept responsibility for its role in the fraudulent schemes. In entering into the Agreement, the Office considered the fact that Celsius is in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings and is making efforts to maximize recovery for victims in connection with the bankruptcy, as well as the fact that Celsius dramatically improved its cooperation after the Government brought certain production failures to the attention of the Special Committee of Celsius’s Board of Directors.
U.S. Attorney Damian Williams said: “Exactly one year ago today, Celsius Network, a crypto platform that, at its height, managed approximately $25 billion in customer assets, filed for bankruptcy protection in the Southern District of New York. Over the course of the past year, we have worked quickly to get to the bottom of what led to Celsius’s collapse and to understand how a platform that advertised itself as the ‘safest place for your crypto’ could have left investors holding billions of dollars in losses. Today we have the answer. Today I am announcing the unsealing of an indictment charging Celsius’s founder and CEO, Alex Mashinsky, with orchestrating a scheme to defraud customers of Celsius through a series of false claims about the fundamental safety and security of the Celsius platform, and for participating in a scheme with Celsius’s Chief Revenue Officer, Roni Cohen-Pavon, to inflate the price of Celsius’s proprietary token, CEL. This case, like the others my Office has recently announced alleging fraud in the crypto economy, may appear complicated. But the message we send today is quite simple: if you rip off ordinary investors to line your own pockets, we will hold you accountable. Whether it’s old-school fraud or some new-school crypto scheme, it doesn’t matter one bit. It’s all fraud to us. And we’ll be here to catch it.”
FBI Acting Assistant Director in Charge Christie M. Curtis said: “As alleged in the indictment, Mashinsky and Cohen-Pavon knowingly engaged in complex financial schemes – deliberately misrepresenting the company’s business model and criminally manipulating the value of Celsius’s proprietary crypto token CEL – while serving in leadership roles at Celsius. The FBI will continue to ensure that anyone committing fraud and deceiving the public through the misrepresentations of a business’s financial standing or practice is held accountable.
According to the allegations in the Indictment unsealed today in Manhattan federal court and the stipulated facts in the Agreement:[1]
Celsius was a crypto asset platform that, among other things, allowed its customers to earn returns on their crypto assets in the form of weekly “rewards” payments, to take loans secured by their crypto assets, and to custody their crypto assets. Celsius billed itself as the “safest place for your crypto” and urged potential customers to “unbank” themselves by moving their crypto assets to Celsius. Celsius’s primary public offering was its “Earn” program, through which Celsius offered to deploy customers’ crypto assets to generate investment returns. In addition to its Earn program, Celsius offered retail investors a “Custody” program and a “Borrow” program, which allowed customers to receive retail loans in exchange for posting their crypto assets as collateral with Celsius.
MASHINSKY directly marketed Celsius to retail customers located in the United States and abroad. Throughout his tenure as CEO of Celsius, MASHINSKY repeatedly made public misrepresentations regarding core aspects of Celsius’s business and financial condition in order to induce retail customers to provide their crypto assets to Celsius and continue to use Celsius’s services. MASHINSKY misrepresented, among other things, the safety of Celsius’s yield-generating activities, Celsius’s profitability, the long-term sustainability of Celsius’s high rewards rates, and the risks associated with depositing crypto assets with Celsius.
As MASHINSKY falsely portrayed Celsius as a safe and secure institution, Celsius’s customer base grew exponentially. Many of those customers were retail investors rather than large institutions. By in or about the fall of 2021, Celsius had grown to become one of the largest crypto platforms in the world, purportedly holding approximately $25 billion in assets at its peak.
MASHINSKY, COHEN-PAVON, and others working at Celsius also orchestrated a yearslong scheme to mislead customers and market participants regarding the market value and interest in Celsius’s proprietary crypto token CEL. They did so by manipulating the price of CEL through causing Celsius to spend hundreds of millions of dollars purchasing CEL in the open market with the objective of artificially supporting and inflating the price of CEL. At various times during MASHINSKY’s tenure, MASHINSKY, COHEN-PAVON, and their co-conspirators also caused Celsius to use its own customer deposits to fund these market purchases of CEL in order to prop up CEL’s price, without disclosing this fact to Celsius’s customers.
Without Celsius’s aggressive and illegal price manipulation, the price of CEL would have been drastically lower. As COHEN-PAVON wrote to MASHINSKY in a private message exchanged during the scheme: “[T]he issue is that people are selling [CEL] and no one is buying except for us,” adding, “[t]he main problem was that the value was fake and was based on us spending millions (~8M a week and even more until February 2020) just to keep it where it is.”
To further the scheme to manipulate CEL, MASHINSKY also repeatedly made false and misleading public statements concerning the nature of Celsius’s market activity and the extent to which Celsius itself was responsible for artificially supporting and inflating the price of CEL. In certain instances, MASHINSKY and other Celsius executives also personally purchased CEL for the purpose of artificially supporting CEL’s price.
Artificially inflating the price of CEL allowed MASHINSKY, COHEN-PAVON, and other Celsius executives to sell their own CEL holdings for a substantial profit. MASHINSKY personally reaped approximately $42 million in proceeds from his sales of CEL, and COHEN-PAVON personally reaped at least $3.6 million in proceeds from his sales of CEL. At various times, MASHINSKY made false and misleading public statements about his own sales of CEL, claiming that he was not selling CEL, when, in reality, he was taking advantage of the upward price manipulation he had orchestrated by contemporaneously selling huge quantities of his CEL on the market, including, on occasion, to Celsius itself.
In the lead up to the June 12, 2022, “Pause” of Celsius customer withdrawals, MASHINSKY continued to assure Celsius customers that Celsius was in a strong financial position and had sufficient liquidity to meet all customer withdrawal demands. Even as he made these statements, however, MASHINSKY had removed approximately $8 million worth of his own non-CEL crypto assets from the Celsius platform.
* * *
A chart containing the names, ages, residences, charges, and maximum penalties for the individual defendants is below. The maximum potential sentences in this case are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendants will be determined by a judge.
Mr. Williams praised the outstanding work of the FBI. Mr. Williams further thanked the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, each of which today filed parallel civil actions against MASHINSKY.
This case is being handled by the Office’s Securities and Commodities Fraud Task Force. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Adam Hobson, Allison Nichols, and Noah Solowiejczyk are in charge of the prosecution.
The charges contained in the Indictment are merely accusations, and the defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.
Defendant
Age
Residence
Charges
Maximum Potential Sentences
MASHINSKY
57
New York, New York
Securities fraud
(Count One)
Commodities fraud
(Count Two)
Wire fraud
(Count Three)
Conspiracy to commit securities fraud, market manipulation, and wire fraud
(Count Four)
Securities fraud
(Count Five)
Market manipulation
(Count Six)
Wire fraud
(Count Seven)
20 years
10 years
20 years
Five years
20 years
20 years
20 years
COHEN-PAVON
36
Israel
Conspiracy to commit securities fraud, market manipulation, and wire fraud
(Count Four)
Securities fraud
(Count Five)
Market manipulation
(Count Six)
Wire fraud
(Count Seven)
Five years
20 years
20 years
20 years
[1] As the introductory phrase signifies, the entirety of the text of the Indictment and the description of the Indictment set forth in this release constitute only allegations, and every fact described should be treated as an allegation.
Geoffrey Berman, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and Melinda Plaisier, Associate Commissioner for Regulatory Affairs for the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), announced today the filing of a Complaint against defendants RAHSAN A. HAKIM (“Hakim”) and ADONIIAH A. RAHSAN (“Rahsan”) for repeated violations of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. HAKIM and RAHSAN do business as Sundial Herbal Products.
U.S. Attorney Geoffrey Berman said: “As alleged in the complaint, the defendants are the modern incarnation of snake oil salesmen, selling the unsuspecting public unapproved or misbranded drugs that they claim, without basis, will cure cancer, diabetes, and other serious illnesses. They have repeatedly been warned that their conduct violates the law, yet have continued to sell unapproved, adulterated, and misbranded drugs. Our lawsuit seeks an injunction preventing them from continuing this illegal conduct.”
FDA Associate Commissioner for Regulatory Affairs Melinda Plaisier said: “Dietary supplements pose a public health risk when they claim to treat medical conditions, such as asthma, diabetes or cancer, which puts them into the category of misbranded and unapproved drugs. The FDA will continue to take action to protect the public when companies violate the law.”
The Complaint, filed today in federal court in Manhattan, alleges that defendants manufacture and sell various unapproved drugs and dietary supplements that claim to cure, treat, and/or prevent numerous diseases and conditions, including but not limited to syphilis, diabetes, high blood pressure, arthritis, asthma, heart disease, and cancer. None of their products has been tested or approved by the FDA for safety or effectiveness. Their sale of such products poses a threat to public health because the products’ disease treatment claims may cause consumers to delay appropriate medical care for the serious medical issues described above. Further, defendants cannot guarantee the identity, purity, strength, and composition of their dietary supplements.
Defendants have been inspected by the FDA multiple times, and, despite repeated promises to do so, have failed to correct their violations of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
* * *
The Complaint seeks an order enjoining defendants from manufacturing and selling drugs and dietary supplements in violation of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
Mr. Berman thanked the FDA for its work leading to the Complaint.
This case is being handled by the Office’s Environmental Protection Unit in the Civil Division. Assistant United States Attorney Emily Bretz is in charge of the case.
Geoffrey S. Berman, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced today that DEREK BROOMES, the former president and chief executive officer (“CEO”) of a nonprofit housing organization based in Harlem, New York (the “Housing Nonprofit”), pled guilty before U.S. Magistrate Judge Kevin Nathanial Fox to abusing his position at the Housing Nonprofit to embezzle hundreds of thousands of dollars in federal funds.
U.S. Attorney Geoffrey S. Berman said: “Derek Broomes abused his position by selfishly diverting hundreds of thousands of dollars in public funds designed to assist low-income citizens living with HIV/AIDS. It is hard to imagine a more at-risk, vulnerable tenant population than the one Broomes chose to victimize, and for that reason today’s guilty plea is a deserving one.”
According to the allegations contained in the Complaint, the Indictment, and publicly-available documents:
The Housing Nonprofit is a faith-based, non-profit organization located in New York, New York that develops and provides low-income housing in Harlem to a variety of constituencies. In approximately 2002, DEREK BROOMES, the defendant, became the chief financial officer of the Housing Nonprofit. In approximately 2011, BROOMES became its president and CEO. Prior to joining the Housing Nonprofit, BROOMES worked briefly as a Deputy Commissioner at the New York City Human Resources Administration (“HRA”) and, for three years at the City’s Department of Investigation (“DOI”) in various capacities, including as an investigator and Deputy Inspector General.
Since at least 1999, the Housing Nonprofit has participated in the federally funded Scattered Site Housing Program (“SSHP” or the “Program”), through which the Housing Nonprofit receives federal funds that it uses to subsidize rents for low-income individuals who are living with HIV and/or AIDS. According to Program rules, SSHP funds are to be maintained in a segregated account and used exclusively for Program costs, including rental payments for residents covered by the Program. In fiscal years 2014 and 2015, the Housing Nonprofit received more than $3,000,000 in SSHP funds.
Beginning in at least 2013, BROOMES abused his position as president and CEO of the Housing Nonprofit, stealing hundreds of thousands of dollars in funds from his employer by charging personal and unauthorized expenses to a corporate credit card issued in his name (the “Corporate Credit Card”). Using the Corporate Credit Card, BROOMES routinely paid for personal auto repairs, medical bills, electronics, clothing, and gifts. None of these charges were authorized by the Housing Nonprofit, which ultimately was required to pay the monthly bills on the Corporate Credit Card. In total, between approximately March 2013, when the Corporate Credit Card was issued, and March 2015, when it was cancelled, BROOMES charged $394,145.65 to the Corporate Credit Card. Of that, an analysis conducted by the Housing Nonprofit determined that more than $200,000 of those charges were either personal or otherwise unauthorized.
To cover those expenditures and other operating expenses at the Housing Nonprofit, BROOMES misappropriated hundreds of thousands of dollars in federal funds that were provided through the SSHP. Specifically, BROOMES diverted the SSHP funds, which were intended to be used to cover rent payments for residents covered by the Program, to the Housing Nonprofit’s operating account, where they were used to pay for unauthorized expenses, including the monthly Corporate Credit Card bills. As a result of BROOMES’s diversion of SSHP funds, the Housing Nonprofit was often unable to make rent payments for SSHP apartments on a timely basis. The Housing Nonprofit thus fell increasingly behind on its rent obligations due to a lack of sufficient SSHP funds in its accounts, and tenants it sponsored in the SSHP began to receive threats of eviction by landlords who were owed months’ worth of back rent by the Housing Nonprofit.
Moreover, to conceal his conduct, BROOMES submitted, and caused others to submit, false and fraudulent reimbursement requests to HRA, which administers the SSHP, in which BROOMES and others acting at his direction certified that the Housing Nonprofit had properly used SSHP funds for program expenses, including rental payments, when, in fact, substantial amounts of those funds had been diverted to cover unauthorized expenses, including the substantial charges incurred by BROOMES’s use of the Corporate Credit Card. BROOMES personally signed false and fraudulent paperwork submitted to HRA as a part of the Housing Nonprofit’s monthly certifications and reimbursement requests on May 8, 2013, and July 19, 2013, and directed others to sign similarly false monthly certifications and related paperwork throughout the duration of the charged scheme.
* * *
BROOMES, 72, pled guilty to one count of embezzlement from a federally funded program, which carries a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison and a maximum fine of $250,000 or twice the gross gain or loss from the offense. The maximum statutory penalties are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendant would be determined by the judge. As a condition of the plea, BROOMES consented to the entry of a forfeiture order in the amount of $203,408.80 and further agreed to entry of an order of restitution. BROOMES is scheduled to be sentenced by the Chief Judge Colleen McMahon on April 26th, 2018.
The case is being prosecuted by the Office’s Public Corruption Unit. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Edward B. Diskant and Alison G. Moe are in charge of the prosecution.
Preet Bharara, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced today that ERIC IAN HORNAK SPOUTZ, a/k/a “Robert Chad Smith,” a/k/a “John Goodman,” a/k/a “James Sinclair,” was sentenced today to 41 months in prison by U.S. District Judge Lewis A. Kaplan for wire fraud charges arising out of his sale of dozens of forged artworks purportedly by renowned American artists such as Willem De Kooning, Franz Kline, and Joan Mitchell.
Manhattan U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara said: “Eric Spoutz made a lucrative ‘career’ selling forged art as originals from American masters like De Kooning, Kline and Mitchell. From creating fake documents to assuming new identities, Spoutz used the full palette of deception to complete his decade-long work of fraud, swindling art collectors out of more than a million dollars. Now, thanks to the dedicated work of the FBI and the prosecutors in my Office, Spoutz will spend time in a federal prison.”
According to the allegations contained in the criminal complaint and information and other documents in the public record, and statements made in court:
Since at least 2006, SPOUTZ engaged in a fraudulent scheme to sell works of art he falsely claimed were by well-known artists, using forged documents to convince buyers of the authenticity of those works. During the course of the scheme, SPOUTZ sold dozens of fraudulent works of art – which he attributed to, among others, Willem De Kooning, Franz Kline, and Joan Mitchell – through various channels, including auction houses and on EBay.
SPOUTZ was publicly accused of selling forged works of art as early as 2005, after which he began selling them under various aliases, particularly “Robert Chad Smith” and “John Goodman.” To deceive his victims into believing the works of art were authentic, SPOUTZ created and provided forged receipts, bills of sale, and letters from deceased attorneys and other individuals.
These documents falsely indicated that SPOUTZ, in the guise of one of his false identities, had inherited or purchased dozens of works by these artists. Despite his efforts to create false histories for the artwork, investigators identified multiple inconsistencies and errors in SPOUTZ’s forged provenance documents. Many of the purported transactions took place before SPOUTZ was born, and the forged letters included nonexistent addresses both for the purported sender and various parties referenced as sources of the artworks. SPOUTZ also consistently used a single distinctive typesetting when forging documents purportedly authored by entirely different art galleries in different decades regarding unrelated transactions. In one instance, investigators located the original letter used by SPOUTZ as a model for one of his forgeries in a collection at a private university, which holds letters from the individual whose identity SPOUTZ used to create a false story of inheritance.
In total, SPOUTZ stole at least $1,450,000 from his victims over the course of a decade of fraudulent art sales.
* * *
In addition to the prison sentence, SPOUTZ, 33, of Mount Clemens, Michigan, was sentenced to three years of supervised release. Judge Kaplan also ordered SPOUTZ to forfeit $1,450,000 in ill-gotten gains and to pay restitution in the amount of $154,100.
Mr. Bharara praised the outstanding investigative work of the FBI’s Art Crime Team.
The case is being handled by the Office’s Money Laundering and Asset Forfeiture Unit. Assistant United States Attorney Andrew C. Adams is in charge of the prosecution.
Geoffrey S. Berman, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Ashan M. Benedict, the Special Agent-in-Charge of the New York Field Division of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”), James P. O’Neill, the Commissioner of the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”), and Daniel A. Nigro, the Commissioner of the New York City Fire Department (“FDNY”), announced today the arrest of JAMAL DEESE in connection with a string of arsons in New York, which occurred from August 5, 2018, through August 7, 2018. DEESE was arrested yesterday evening, and was presented today in Manhattan federal court before the U.S. Magistrate Judge Katharine H. Parker.
U.S. Attorney Geoffrey S. Berman said: “As alleged, Jamal Deese set more than a dozen fires in midtown Manhattan locations during a three-day span. His alleged serial arsons threatened public safety and necessitated the deployment of valuable firefighting and law enforcement resources. Thanks to the work of the ATF, NYPD, and FDNY, Deese is in custody and will be prosecuted.”
ATF Special Agent-in-Charge Ashan M. Benedict said: “The defendant’s alleged conduct placed New Yorkers, commuters, and visitors at extreme and indiscriminate risk of injury or worse, and had the potential to cause extensive damage to businesses and property. While we are fortunate that there were no known injuries, the defendant will nonetheless face the consequences for his alleged arson spree. I’d like to thank the members of ATF’s SEAR Task Force and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for their efforts thus far in this investigation.”
NYPD Commissioner James P. O’Neill said: “The potential for serious injury or death was very real as Jamal Deese allegedly went on a spree across a swath of Midtown Manhattan. Fortunately, the collaborative efforts of our city and federal partners stopped him before further mayhem could occur. Today’s arrest is the result of the type of quick and effective investigative work performed each day in New York City.”
FDNY Commissioner Daniel A. Nigro said: “I’m proud of the outstanding collaborative investigation by the Arson Response Task Force to apprehend an individual whose alleged crimes needlessly put many lives in danger. Arson is a dangerous, potentially deadly crime; and thanks to our Fire Marshals, NYPD Detectives and ATF agents, an alleged serial arsonist has been stopped before anyone could be injured.”
According to the allegations in the Complaint sworn out in Manhattan federal court:[1]
From August 5, 2018, through August 7, 2018, DEESE set trashcan fires in the bathrooms of at least four midtown restaurants. He also set trashcan fires outside and inside the Amtrak terminal at Penn Station. During the course of his arson spree, DEESE ignited at least 14 fires at Penn Station and in the restaurants. DEESE was apprehended when he returned to one of the restaurants in which he had previously ignited a fire.
* * *
DEESE, 24, of Brooklyn, New York, is charged with four counts of arson, each of which carries a mandatory minimum sentence of five years in prison and a maximum 20 years in prison. The maximum potential sentences in this case are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendant will be determined by the judge.
Mr. Berman praised the outstanding investigative work of ATF, NYPD, FDNY, and the Strategic Explosive and Arson Response Task Force.
This case is being handled by the Office’s General Crimes Unit. Assistant United States Attorney Kyle A. Wirshba is in charge of the prosecution.
The charges contained in the Complaint are merely accusations, and the defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.
[1] As the introductory phrase signifies, the entirety of the text of the Complaint and the description of the Complaint set forth herein constitute only allegations, and every fact described should be treated as an allegation.
Description: The fiscal year of the data file obtained from the AOUSC
Format: YYYY
Description: The code of the federal judicial circuit where the case was located
Format: A2
Description: The code of the federal judicial district where the case was located
Format: A2
Description: The code of the district office where the case was located
Format: A2
Description: Docket number assigned by the district to the case
Format: A7
Description: A unique number assigned to each defendant in a case which cannot be modified by the court
Format: A3
Description: A unique number assigned to each defendant in a case which can be modified by the court
Format: A3
Description: A sequential number indicating whether a case is an original proceeding or a reopen
Format: N5
Description: Case type associated with the current defendant record
Format: A2
Description: Case type associated with a magistrate case if the current case was merged from a magistrate case
Format: A2
Description: A concatenation of district, office, docket number, case type, defendant number, and reopen sequence number
Format: A18
Description: A concatenation of district, office, docket number, case type, and reopen sequence number
Format: A15
Description: The docket number originally given to a case assigned to a magistrate judge and subsequently merged into a criminal case
Format: A7
Description: A unique number assigned to each defendant in a magistrate case
Format: A3
Description: The status of the defendant as assigned by the AOUSC
Format: A2
Description: A code indicating the fugitive status of a defendant
Format: A1
Description: The date upon which a defendant became a fugitive
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which a fugitive defendant was taken into custody
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date when a case was first docketed in the district court
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which proceedings in a case commenced on charges pending in the district court where the defendant appeared, or the date of the defendant’s felony-waiver of indictment
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: A code used to identify the nature of the proceeding
Format: N2
Description: The date when a defendant first appeared before a judicial officer in the district court where a charge was pending
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: A code indicating the event by which a defendant appeared before a judicial officer in the district court where a charge was pending
Format: A2
Description: A code indicating the type of legal counsel assigned to a defendant
Format: N2
Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense committed which carried the highest severity
Format: A20
Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with FTITLE1
Format: N2
Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with FTITLE1
Format: A4
Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with FTITLE1
Format: A4
Description: A code indicating the severity associated with FTITLE1
Format: A3
Description: The FIPS code used to indicate the county or parish where an offense was committed
Format: A5
Description: The date of the last action taken on the record
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which judicial proceedings before the court concluded
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which the final sentence is recorded on the docket
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which the case was closed
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The number of days from the earlier of filing date or first appearance date to proceeding date
Format: N3
Description: The number of days from proceeding date to disposition date
Format: N3
Description: The number of days from disposition date to sentencing date
Format: N3
Description: The code of the district office where the case was terminated
Format: A2
Description: A code indicating the type of legal counsel assigned to a defendant at the time the case was closed
Format: N2
Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense that carried the most severe disposition and penalty under which the defendant was disposed
Format: A20
Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with TTITLE1
Format: N2
Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with TTITLE1
Format: A4
Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with TTITLE1
Format: A4
Description: A code indicating the severity associated with TTITLE1
Format: A3
Description: The code indicating the nature or type of disposition associated with TTITLE1
Format: N2
Description: The number of months a defendant was sentenced to prison under TTITLE1
Format: N4
Description: The number of months of probation imposed upon a defendant under TTITLE1
Format: N4
Description: A period of supervised release imposed upon a defendant under TTITLE1
Format: N3
Description: The fine imposed upon the defendant at sentencing under TTITLE1
Format: N8
Description: The total fine imposed at sentencing for all offenses of which the defendant was convicted and a fine was imposed
Format: N8
Description: A count of defendants filed including inter-district transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants filed excluding inter-district transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of original proceedings commenced
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants filed whose proceedings commenced by reopen, remand, appeal, or retrial
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants terminated including interdistrict transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants terminated excluding interdistrict transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of original proceedings terminated
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants terminated whose proceedings commenced by reopen, remand, appeal, or retrial
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants pending as of the last day of the period including long term fugitives
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants pending as of the last day of the period excluding long term fugitives
Format: N1
Description: The source from which the data were loaded into the AOUSC’s NewSTATS database
Format: A10
Description: A sequential number indicating the iteration of the defendant record
Format: N2
Description: The date the record was loaded into the AOUSC’s NewSTATS database
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: Statistical year ID label on data file obtained from the AOUSC which represents termination year
Geoffrey S. Berman, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Ashan M. Benedict, the Special Agent-in-Charge of the New York Field Division of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”), James P. O’Neill, the Commissioner of the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”), and Daniel A. Nigro, the Commissioner of the New York City Fire Department (“FDNY”), announced today the arrest of JAMAL DEESE in connection with a string of arsons in New York, which occurred from August 5, 2018, through August 7, 2018. DEESE was arrested yesterday evening, and was presented today in Manhattan federal court before the U.S. Magistrate Judge Katharine H. Parker.
U.S. Attorney Geoffrey S. Berman said: “As alleged, Jamal Deese set more than a dozen fires in midtown Manhattan locations during a three-day span. His alleged serial arsons threatened public safety and necessitated the deployment of valuable firefighting and law enforcement resources. Thanks to the work of the ATF, NYPD, and FDNY, Deese is in custody and will be prosecuted.”
ATF Special Agent-in-Charge Ashan M. Benedict said: “The defendant’s alleged conduct placed New Yorkers, commuters, and visitors at extreme and indiscriminate risk of injury or worse, and had the potential to cause extensive damage to businesses and property. While we are fortunate that there were no known injuries, the defendant will nonetheless face the consequences for his alleged arson spree. I’d like to thank the members of ATF’s SEAR Task Force and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for their efforts thus far in this investigation.”
NYPD Commissioner James P. O’Neill said: “The potential for serious injury or death was very real as Jamal Deese allegedly went on a spree across a swath of Midtown Manhattan. Fortunately, the collaborative efforts of our city and federal partners stopped him before further mayhem could occur. Today’s arrest is the result of the type of quick and effective investigative work performed each day in New York City.”
FDNY Commissioner Daniel A. Nigro said: “I’m proud of the outstanding collaborative investigation by the Arson Response Task Force to apprehend an individual whose alleged crimes needlessly put many lives in danger. Arson is a dangerous, potentially deadly crime; and thanks to our Fire Marshals, NYPD Detectives and ATF agents, an alleged serial arsonist has been stopped before anyone could be injured.”
According to the allegations in the Complaint sworn out in Manhattan federal court:[1]
From August 5, 2018, through August 7, 2018, DEESE set trashcan fires in the bathrooms of at least four midtown restaurants. He also set trashcan fires outside and inside the Amtrak terminal at Penn Station. During the course of his arson spree, DEESE ignited at least 14 fires at Penn Station and in the restaurants. DEESE was apprehended when he returned to one of the restaurants in which he had previously ignited a fire.
* * *
DEESE, 24, of Brooklyn, New York, is charged with four counts of arson, each of which carries a mandatory minimum sentence of five years in prison and a maximum 20 years in prison. The maximum potential sentences in this case are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendant will be determined by the judge.
Mr. Berman praised the outstanding investigative work of ATF, NYPD, FDNY, and the Strategic Explosive and Arson Response Task Force.
This case is being handled by the Office’s General Crimes Unit. Assistant United States Attorney Kyle A. Wirshba is in charge of the prosecution.
The charges contained in the Complaint are merely accusations, and the defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.
[1] As the introductory phrase signifies, the entirety of the text of the Complaint and the description of the Complaint set forth herein constitute only allegations, and every fact described should be treated as an allegation.
Description: The fiscal year of the data file obtained from the AOUSC
Format: YYYY
Description: The code of the federal judicial circuit where the case was located
Format: A2
Description: The code of the federal judicial district where the case was located
Format: A2
Description: The code of the district office where the case was located
Format: A2
Description: Docket number assigned by the district to the case
Format: A7
Description: A unique number assigned to each defendant in a case which cannot be modified by the court
Format: A3
Description: A unique number assigned to each defendant in a case which can be modified by the court
Format: A3
Description: A sequential number indicating whether a case is an original proceeding or a reopen
Format: N5
Description: Case type associated with the current defendant record
Format: A2
Description: Case type associated with a magistrate case if the current case was merged from a magistrate case
Format: A2
Description: A concatenation of district, office, docket number, case type, defendant number, and reopen sequence number
Format: A18
Description: A concatenation of district, office, docket number, case type, and reopen sequence number
Format: A15
Description: The docket number originally given to a case assigned to a magistrate judge and subsequently merged into a criminal case
Format: A7
Description: A unique number assigned to each defendant in a magistrate case
Format: A3
Description: The status of the defendant as assigned by the AOUSC
Format: A2
Description: A code indicating the fugitive status of a defendant
Format: A1
Description: The date upon which a defendant became a fugitive
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which a fugitive defendant was taken into custody
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date when a case was first docketed in the district court
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which proceedings in a case commenced on charges pending in the district court where the defendant appeared, or the date of the defendant’s felony-waiver of indictment
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: A code used to identify the nature of the proceeding
Format: N2
Description: The date when a defendant first appeared before a judicial officer in the district court where a charge was pending
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: A code indicating the event by which a defendant appeared before a judicial officer in the district court where a charge was pending
Format: A2
Description: A code indicating the type of legal counsel assigned to a defendant
Format: N2
Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense committed which carried the highest severity
Format: A20
Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with FTITLE1
Format: N2
Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with FTITLE1
Format: A4
Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with FTITLE1
Format: A4
Description: A code indicating the severity associated with FTITLE1
Format: A3
Description: The FIPS code used to indicate the county or parish where an offense was committed
Format: A5
Description: The date of the last action taken on the record
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which judicial proceedings before the court concluded
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which the final sentence is recorded on the docket
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which the case was closed
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The number of days from the earlier of filing date or first appearance date to proceeding date
Format: N3
Description: The number of days from proceeding date to disposition date
Format: N3
Description: The number of days from disposition date to sentencing date
Format: N3
Description: The code of the district office where the case was terminated
Format: A2
Description: A code indicating the type of legal counsel assigned to a defendant at the time the case was closed
Format: N2
Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense that carried the most severe disposition and penalty under which the defendant was disposed
Format: A20
Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with TTITLE1
Format: N2
Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with TTITLE1
Format: A4
Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with TTITLE1
Format: A4
Description: A code indicating the severity associated with TTITLE1
Format: A3
Description: The code indicating the nature or type of disposition associated with TTITLE1
Format: N2
Description: The number of months a defendant was sentenced to prison under TTITLE1
Format: N4
Description: The number of months of probation imposed upon a defendant under TTITLE1
Format: N4
Description: A period of supervised release imposed upon a defendant under TTITLE1
Format: N3
Description: The fine imposed upon the defendant at sentencing under TTITLE1
Format: N8
Description: The total fine imposed at sentencing for all offenses of which the defendant was convicted and a fine was imposed
Format: N8
Description: A count of defendants filed including inter-district transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants filed excluding inter-district transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of original proceedings commenced
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants filed whose proceedings commenced by reopen, remand, appeal, or retrial
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants terminated including interdistrict transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants terminated excluding interdistrict transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of original proceedings terminated
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants terminated whose proceedings commenced by reopen, remand, appeal, or retrial
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants pending as of the last day of the period including long term fugitives
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants pending as of the last day of the period excluding long term fugitives
Format: N1
Description: The source from which the data were loaded into the AOUSC’s NewSTATS database
Format: A10
Description: A sequential number indicating the iteration of the defendant record
Format: N2
Description: The date the record was loaded into the AOUSC’s NewSTATS database
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: Statistical year ID label on data file obtained from the AOUSC which represents termination year
Audrey Strauss, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced that RUVIM KRUPKIN, a former New York state-licensed doctor, was sentenced yesterday to 120 months in prison for conspiring to distribute medically unnecessary oxycodone unlawfully. KRUPKIN pled guilty on September 24, 2020, before U.S. District Judge Analisa Torres, who also imposed yesterday’s sentence.
U.S. Attorney Audrey Strauss said: “Dr. Ruvim Krupkin wrote medically unnecessary prescriptions for millions of oxycodone pills. He ignored his patients’ serious medical needs and his medical training, instead turning his medical clinic in Brooklyn into a pill mill, where he doled out oxycodone prescriptions in exchange for cash. Krupkin put his own greed before his duties as a medical professional, and for that he will now spend a lengthy term in federal prison.”
According to the Indictment and other court documents, as well as statements made in public court proceedings:
KRUPKIN, a former licensed internal medicine doctor with specialties in oncology and hematology, practiced at a medical office in Brooklyn. From 2006 to July 2017, KRUPKIN prescribed over four million oxycodone pills to individuals he knew had no legitimate medical need for the pills. KRUPKIN charged each patient $200 in cash for each visit, payable directly to him.
As a hematologist, KRUPKIN treated patients who had, or claimed to have, sickle cell anemia – a medical condition that can cause pain for which oxycodone, in conjunction with other treatments, may be legitimately prescribed. However, KRUPKIN wrote thousands of prescriptions for large quantities of oxycodone to patients, knowing that they in fact had no legitimate medical need for the prescriptions. KRUPKIN generally performed little to no physical examination on these patients; indeed, the medical notes for each patient were largely the same from one visit to the next.
KRUPKIN typically issued patients prescriptions for large doses of oxycodone. KRUPKIN’s patients filled their prescriptions at pharmacies throughout New York, and in certain cases, sold the oxycodone pills they received to drug dealers, who in turn re-sold the pills at high value on the street. KRUPKIN knew that certain of his patients were diverting the oxycodone pills he was prescribing, but he nonetheless continued writing prescriptions of oxycodone for such individuals.
* * *
KRUPKIN, 70, of Summit, New Jersey, pled guilty to one count of conspiring to unlawfully distribute and possess with intent to distribute oxycodone.
In addition to the prison term, KRUPKIN was sentenced to one year of supervised release, and ordered to pay a $500,000 fine and forfeit $124,000.
In imposing yesterday’s sentence, Judge Torres said: “Krupkin had a moral and ethical obligation to do no harm. Instead, he prescribed staggering amounts of medically unnecessary pills of oxycodone. He capitalized on the pain and desperation of poor New Yorkers.”
Ms. Strauss praised the outstanding investigative work of the FBI-NYPD Health Care Fraud Task Force. Ms. Strauss also thanked the New York City Human Resources Administration for its work on the investigation.
This case is being handled by the Office’s Narcotics Unit. Assistant United States Attorneys Tara M. La Morte and Alexandra N. Rothman are in charge of the prosecution.
Damian Williams, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced today that OFER ABARBANEL was sentenced by U.S. District Judge Lewis A. Kaplan to four years in prison for defrauding investors and prospective investors in a mutual fund he founded and controlled. ABARBANEL previously pled guilty to one count of investment adviser fraud.
U.S. Attorney Damian Williams said: “Ofer Abarbanel violated the trust placed in him by investors. He promised investors safe and liquid investments, but instead transferred their money to counterparties he controlled and engaged in risky investments he was not authorized to make. Today’s sentence should send a strong signal to investment advisers that violations of their fiduciary duties to investors will have consequences.”
According to the allegations in the Indictment, Superseding Information, and statements made in public court proceedings:
Beginning in approximately 2018 through his arrest in June 2021, OFER ABARBANEL engaged in a scheme to defraud investors in a mutual fund he founded and controlled, called “Income Collecting 1-3 Months T-Bills Mutual Fund” (the “Fund”). ABARBANEL also owned and controlled the investment adviser to the Fund. In that capacity, ABARBANEL made materially false representations and omitted material information to the largest group of investors (the “Investor Group”) about how their money would be invested.
Among other things, ABARBANEL falsely represented that investments in the Fund would be placed “primarily” in short-term United States Treasury securities, when instead of investing in such securities directly, ABARBANEL and his confederates transferred the investor funds to counterparties controlled by or otherwise closely associated with ABARBANEL for use, among other things, in trading not authorized by the Fund’s offering documents.
ABARBANEL further represented that, in order to enhance income, the Fund intended to invest in securities lending transactions as well as repurchase and reverse repurchase agreements. ABARBANEL represented, as to these transactions, that the Fund would receive and maintain in its possession and control safe and secure collateral in the form of Treasury securities that could be quickly liquidated in the event a counterparty defaulted on its obligations. ABARBANEL, however, failed to obtain for the Fund the promised collateral to secure the investments. Nonetheless, ABARBANEL repeatedly represented, in substance, that the Fund had possession of the collateral.
In or about May and June 2021, ABARBANEL failed to honor a redemption request by the Investor Group for the entirety of its outstanding investment, totaling more than $100 million, instead placing conditions on the redemption that were contrary to the Fund’s offering document and to the Fund’s practices with respect to prior redemptions. On or about June 16, 2021, the Fund transferred more than $10 million in investor funds from the Fund to a personal brokerage account of an attorney working with the Fund.
* * *
In addition to the prison sentence, OFER ABARBANEL, 48, of Woodland Hills, California, was ordered to forfeit $106 million and to pay restitution to victims in the amount of $106 million.
Mr. Williams praised the investigative work of the U.S. Postal Inspection Service.
This case is being handled by the Office’s Securities and Commodities Fraud Task Force. Assistant U.S. Attorney Allison Nichols is in charge of the prosecution.
Description: The fiscal year of the data file obtained from the AOUSC
Format: YYYY
Description: The code of the federal judicial circuit where the case was located
Format: A2
Description: The code of the federal judicial district where the case was located
Format: A2
Description: The code of the district office where the case was located
Format: A2
Description: Docket number assigned by the district to the case
Format: A7
Description: A unique number assigned to each defendant in a case which cannot be modified by the court
Format: A3
Description: A unique number assigned to each defendant in a case which can be modified by the court
Format: A3
Description: A sequential number indicating whether a case is an original proceeding or a reopen
Format: N5
Description: Case type associated with the current defendant record
Format: A2
Description: Case type associated with a magistrate case if the current case was merged from a magistrate case
Format: A2
Description: A concatenation of district, office, docket number, case type, defendant number, and reopen sequence number
Format: A18
Description: A concatenation of district, office, docket number, case type, and reopen sequence number
Format: A15
Description: The docket number originally given to a case assigned to a magistrate judge and subsequently merged into a criminal case
Format: A7
Description: A unique number assigned to each defendant in a magistrate case
Format: A3
Description: The status of the defendant as assigned by the AOUSC
Format: A2
Description: A code indicating the fugitive status of a defendant
Format: A1
Description: The date upon which a defendant became a fugitive
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which a fugitive defendant was taken into custody
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date when a case was first docketed in the district court
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which proceedings in a case commenced on charges pending in the district court where the defendant appeared, or the date of the defendant’s felony-waiver of indictment
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: A code used to identify the nature of the proceeding
Format: N2
Description: The date when a defendant first appeared before a judicial officer in the district court where a charge was pending
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: A code indicating the event by which a defendant appeared before a judicial officer in the district court where a charge was pending
Format: A2
Description: A code indicating the type of legal counsel assigned to a defendant
Format: N2
Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense committed which carried the highest severity
Format: A20
Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with FTITLE1
Format: N2
Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with FTITLE1
Format: A4
Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with FTITLE1
Format: A4
Description: A code indicating the severity associated with FTITLE1
Format: A3
Description: The FIPS code used to indicate the county or parish where an offense was committed
Format: A5
Description: The date of the last action taken on the record
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which judicial proceedings before the court concluded
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which the final sentence is recorded on the docket
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which the case was closed
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The total fine imposed at sentencing for all offenses of which the defendant was convicted and a fine was imposed
Format: N8
Description: A count of defendants filed including inter-district transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants filed excluding inter-district transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of original proceedings commenced
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants filed whose proceedings commenced by reopen, remand, appeal, or retrial
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants terminated including interdistrict transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants terminated excluding interdistrict transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of original proceedings terminated
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants terminated whose proceedings commenced by reopen, remand, appeal, or retrial
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants pending as of the last day of the period including long term fugitives
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants pending as of the last day of the period excluding long term fugitives
Format: N1
Description: The source from which the data were loaded into the AOUSC’s NewSTATS database
Format: A10
Description: A sequential number indicating the iteration of the defendant record
Format: N2
Description: The date the record was loaded into the AOUSC’s NewSTATS database
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: Statistical year ID label on data file obtained from the AOUSC which represents termination year
Joon H. Kim, Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, James J. Hunt, Special Agent in Charge of the Drug Enforcement Administration, New York Division (the “DEA”), and Charles Gardner, Yonkers Police Department Commissioner (the “YPD”), announced today the arrest of ANSLEY R. ESTRELLA, RONALD E. LEON, and LUIS OSCAR REYES relating to 13 kilograms of cocaine and nearly 19,000 glassines of heroin in a house in Yonkers. ESTRELLA, LEON, and REYES were all charged Friday in a complaint with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine and more than one kilogram of heroin.
Acting U.S. Attorney Joon H. Kim said: “After receiving a call about suspicious activity near a house in suburban Yonkers, responding officers allegedly discovered massive quantities of cocaine and heroin, as well as drug paraphernalia, in that home. We commend our law enforcement partners for their swift and effective response to this potentially dangerous situation, and the citizens who notified them when something just didn’t look right. Citizens can play an important role in keeping dangerous drugs, including opioids, off our streets.”
DEA Special Agent in Charge James J. Hunt stated: “A Parent’s worst fear is a heroin dealer setting up shop next door. This case is a reminder that drug traffickers’ greed outweighs the safety of their neighbors. Law enforcement is committed to keeping a vigilant eye out for drug dealers like these whose trafficking encourages heroin abuse, crime and drug related violence, allegedly.”
Yonkers Police Commissioner Charles Gardner said: “A thorough investigation conducted by the responding Yonkers police officers resulted in the discovery of a large scale narcotics distribution operation and the arrest of three individuals. We are working with our federal law enforcement partners on the follow-up investigation and the prosecution of these males. I would like to thank the U.S Drug Enforcement Administration and the U.S. Attorney’s office for their support and invaluable assistance.”
According to the allegations made in the Complaint:[1]
On the evening of December 7, 2017, YPD officers received a call indicating that three men had pushed a fourth man into a house in Yonkers, New York. YPD officers responded to the house, and saw ESTRELLA walk out of the house. The man said he lived in the house with his girlfriend, and that nobody was in the house. The officers could see – through the closed shades – silhouettes of people moving inside the house. Nonetheless, the man repeated that nobody was in the house.
As YPD officers approached the open front door, they saw REYES, with a surgical mask on, and then LEON, also with a surgical mask on, who had blood on his face. The YPD officers entered the house, where LEON denied being hurt.
YPD officers walked through the house to see if there were any additional people committing an ongoing crime or if there were victims in the house. In a room on the second floor, they found white powder, respiratory masks, and, in an open closet, a large number of glassine envelopes and scales.
In the garage, a YPD officer found a car with an open shopping bag, in which the YPD Officer could see what appeared to be bundles of decks of heroin.
The YPD officers placed ESTRELLA, LEON, and REYES under arrest. LEON had keys in his possession for the car in the garage.
The YPD obtained and executed a search warrant and did a full search of the house and the car in the garage, as well as two other cars. During that search, the YPD found, among other things, 13 kilogram-sized bricks of cocaine, 18,598 glassine envelopes containing heroin, 813 tan pills stamped “M30,” a number of plastic bags and clear knotted twists containing white chunky substances, a scale, five small grinders, assorted stamp pads and stamps, a metal kilogram press, and a money-counting machine.
The Complaint charges each of ESTRELLA, LEON, and REYES with one count of narcotics conspiracy, and one count of distribution and possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, and aiding and abetting the same.
* * *
Mr. Kim thanked the DEA and YPD for their outstanding work on the investigation.
This case is being handled by the Office’s White Plains Division. Assistant United States Attorney Michael Maimin is in charge of the prosecution.
The charges contained in the Complaint are merely accusations, and the defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.
[1] As the introductory phrase signifies, the entirety of the text of the Complaint, and the description of the Complaint set forth herein, constitute only allegations, and every fact described should be treated as allegations.
Description: The fiscal year of the data file obtained from the AOUSC
Format: YYYY
Description: The code of the federal judicial circuit where the case was located
Format: A2
Description: The code of the federal judicial district where the case was located
Format: A2
Description: The code of the district office where the case was located
Format: A2
Description: Docket number assigned by the district to the case
Format: A7
Description: A unique number assigned to each defendant in a case which cannot be modified by the court
Format: A3
Description: A unique number assigned to each defendant in a case which can be modified by the court
Format: A3
Description: A sequential number indicating whether a case is an original proceeding or a reopen
Format: N5
Description: Case type associated with the current defendant record
Format: A2
Description: Case type associated with a magistrate case if the current case was merged from a magistrate case
Format: A2
Description: A concatenation of district, office, docket number, case type, defendant number, and reopen sequence number
Format: A18
Description: A concatenation of district, office, docket number, case type, and reopen sequence number
Format: A15
Description: The docket number originally given to a case assigned to a magistrate judge and subsequently merged into a criminal case
Format: A7
Description: A unique number assigned to each defendant in a magistrate case
Format: A3
Description: The status of the defendant as assigned by the AOUSC
Format: A2
Description: A code indicating the fugitive status of a defendant
Format: A1
Description: The date upon which a defendant became a fugitive
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which a fugitive defendant was taken into custody
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date when a case was first docketed in the district court
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which proceedings in a case commenced on charges pending in the district court where the defendant appeared, or the date of the defendant’s felony-waiver of indictment
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: A code used to identify the nature of the proceeding
Format: N2
Description: The date when a defendant first appeared before a judicial officer in the district court where a charge was pending
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: A code indicating the event by which a defendant appeared before a judicial officer in the district court where a charge was pending
Format: A2
Description: A code indicating the type of legal counsel assigned to a defendant
Format: N2
Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense committed which carried the highest severity
Format: A20
Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with FTITLE1
Format: N2
Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with FTITLE1
Format: A4
Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with FTITLE1
Format: A4
Description: A code indicating the severity associated with FTITLE1
Format: A3
Description: The FIPS code used to indicate the county or parish where an offense was committed
Format: A5
Description: The date of the last action taken on the record
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which judicial proceedings before the court concluded
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which the final sentence is recorded on the docket
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which the case was closed
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The total fine imposed at sentencing for all offenses of which the defendant was convicted and a fine was imposed
Format: N8
Description: A count of defendants filed including inter-district transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants filed excluding inter-district transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of original proceedings commenced
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants filed whose proceedings commenced by reopen, remand, appeal, or retrial
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants terminated including interdistrict transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants terminated excluding interdistrict transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of original proceedings terminated
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants terminated whose proceedings commenced by reopen, remand, appeal, or retrial
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants pending as of the last day of the period including long term fugitives
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants pending as of the last day of the period excluding long term fugitives
Format: N1
Description: The source from which the data were loaded into the AOUSC’s NewSTATS database
Format: A10
Description: A sequential number indicating the iteration of the defendant record
Format: N2
Description: The date the record was loaded into the AOUSC’s NewSTATS database
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: Statistical year ID label on data file obtained from the AOUSC which represents termination year
On December 5, 2023, a federal jury in New Haven found KEISHAWN DONALD, 22; TREVON WRIGHT, also known as “Tre,” 22; ERIC HAYES, also known as “Heavyweight Champ,” 26; and TRAVON JONES, also known as “Budda,” 21, guilty of racketeering offenses related to their involvement in a violent Bridgeport street gang.
Today’s announcement was made by Vanessa Roberts Avery, United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut; Joseph T. Corradino, State’s Attorney for the Fairfield Judicial District; Bridgeport Police Chief Roderick Porter; Robert Fuller, Special Agent in Charge of the New Haven Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; James Ferguson, Special Agent in Charge, ATF Boston Field Division; Brian D. Boyle, Special Agent in Charge of the Drug Enforcement Administration for New England, and Acting U.S. Marshal Lawrence Bobnick.
According to the evidence presented during a month-long trial, the FBI, ATF, DEA, U.S. Marshals Service and Bridgeport Police have been investigating multiple Bridgeport-based gangs whose members are involved in narcotics trafficking, murder and other acts of violence. Donald, Wright, Hayes, and Jones have been members of the “East End gang,” which began as a local street gang based in the East End of Bridgeport, but currently has members and associates who are either incarcerated or living throughout Bridgeport and surrounding towns. The East End gang has been aligned with other groups, including the PT Barnum Gang, the East Side gang and 150, which is a geographic gang based on the West Side of Bridgeport. These groups were aligned against rival organizations in Bridgeport, including the “Original North End” (“O.N.E.”) and the “Greene Homes Boyz,” (“GHB/Hotz”), based in the Charles F. Greene Homes Housing Complex in Bridgeport’s North End.
East End members distributed heroin, crack cocaine, marijuana and Percocet pills; used and shared firearms; and committed at least six murders and other acts of violence against rival gang members and other individuals. East End members celebrated their criminal conduct on social media websites such as Facebook and YouTube, and committed acts of intimidation and made threats to deter potential witnesses to their crimes and to protect gang members and associates from detection and prosecution by law enforcement authorities.
During the trial, the government presented evidence that:
On January 30, 2018, Donald shot and killed Eric Heard, a.k.a. “Fetti,” a member and associate of the GHB/Hotz gang;
On March 5, 2019, Hayes shot and killed Jerrell Gatewood;
On July 12, 2019, Jones and another East End Member, Tyrone Moore, shot and killed Sean Warren, also known as “Kujoe,” a member and associate of the O.N.E. gang;
On September 15, 2019, Wright shot and attempted to kill Marquis Isreal, a.k.a. “Garf” or “Gbaby,” a member and associate of the O.N.E. gang;
On October 17, 2019, Jones shot and attempted to kill Joshua Gilbert, a member and associate of the O.N.E. gang;
On December 8, 2019, Wright shot and attempted to kill Arvan Smith, a.k.a. “Arv Barkley,” an associate of the O.N.E. gang;
On January 26, 2020, Wright shot and killed Myreke Kenion and shot and attempted to kill D’Andre Brown, both members and associates of the GHB/Hotz gang
The jury found Donald, Wright, Hayes, and Jones guilty of conspiring to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity. At sentencing, Donald, Wright, and Jones face a maximum term of imprisonment of life, and Hayes faces a maximum term of imprisonment of 20 years. All are detained pending sentencing.
U.S. Attorney Avery noted that due to rising level of gun violence Bridgeport was experiencing, this wide-ranging investigation commenced in January 2020, shortly before the violence culminated on January 27, 2020, when GHB/Hotz and O.N.E. members, in retaliation for the Myreke Kenion murder and D’Andre Brown shooting, attempted to kill East End gang members and associates in a brazen afternoon shooting in front of a state courthouse on Golden Hill Street in Bridgeport. After a Shot Spotter activation detected approximately 20 shots being fired in front of the courthouse, law enforcement and first responders discovered that four victims had been shot while sitting inside a car.
Approximately 47 members and associates of the East End, O.N.E. and the GHB/Hotz gangs have now been convicted of federal offenses stemming from this investigation, which has and solved eight murders and approximately 20 attempted murders.
“We believe that the investigation of these warring gangs and resulting prosecutions have had a significant and substantial impact on the violence being perpetrated in Bridgeport,” said U.S. Attorney Vanessa Roberts Avery. “In 2020 and 2021, when many other cities saw significant surges in gun violence, much of it caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and longstanding societal issues, Bridgeport saw a significant decrease in gun violence, with a 61 percent decline in gang-related homicides and a 59 percent decrease in gang shootings not resulting in death. Moreover, the gun violence, and particularly the gang related violence, has decreased from 2022 to 2023. While these statistics are encouraging, the amount of gun violence in our cities remains unacceptable and a top priority for our office and our federal partners. I thank all of the law enforcement officers who have contributed to these investigations, and commend and acknowledge the trial teams that are prosecuting these cases.”
“Every Connecticut resident, regardless of where they reside or their race, ethnicity, or socioeconomic class, should be able to feel safe in their community,” U.S. Attorney Avery continued. “No person, or group of people is entitled to wreak havoc by engaging in repeated acts of violence, instilling fear and trauma on the children and families who reside in our communities. Every life matters. We implore anyone engaged in, or planning to engage in, senseless violence like these defendants to reconsider so you don’t end up either killed or facing the prospect of wasting your life sitting in a federal prison.”
“The continuing cooperation between local, state, and federal officials in Bridgeport is a model of effective law enforcement,” said Fairfield Judicial District State’s Attorney Joseph T. Corradino. “The net result of these sustained efforts is a safer community for the people who live and work in the Greater Bridgeport area. We are committed to maintaining this successful long term relationship with our federal counterparts for the benefit of the people we serve.”
“The level of complexity involved in this long term investigation proved to be no match for our Connecticut professional law enforcement partners ability, skills and determination to bring about justice,” said FBI Special Agent in Charge Robert Fuller. “We here in Connecticut have a unified partnership with local, state, and federal partners that is second to none in the country. Justice has been served.”
“Keishawn Donald, Trevon Wright, Eric Hayes and Travon Jones have been found guilty in federal court of gang related racketeering offenses, including murder and other violent crimes. Said James M. Ferguson, Special Agent in Charge of the ATF Boston Field Division. “The ATF alongside our local, state and federal partners remain dedicated to protecting the citizens of Bridgeport from violent gangs like the East End gang.”
“Drug trafficking, along with the violence that all too often accompanies it, is a serious threat to the safety and security of our communities,” said DEA Special Agent in Charge Brian D. Boyle. “Drug dealers and street gangs value their own profits over human life, and are responsible for fueling drug addiction and much of the violent crimes across New England. These crimes hold law abiding citizens of Connecticut hostage to drug-fueled lawlessness. This is unacceptable and will not be allowed to happen. DEA and its local, state, and federal partners are dedicated to bringing to justice those that commit these crimes.”
“On behalf of the City of Bridgeport and the Bridgeport Police Department, I want to the thank the U.S. Attorney’s Office and all of the federal law enforcement agencies for their continued support and partnership in helping to reduce violent crime in the City of Bridgeport and bringing those responsible for violence in our city to justice,” said Bridgeport Police Chief Roderick Porter.
This investigation is being conducted by the FBI’s Safe Streets and Violent Crimes Task Forces, ATF, DEA, U.S. Marshals Service, Bridgeport Police Department, Connecticut State Police and the Bridgeport State’s Attorney’s Office, with the assistance of the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, Connecticut Forensic Science Laboratory and the Waterbury Police Department. The East End gang cases are being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Jocelyn C. Kaoutzanis, Rahul Kale, and Stephanie T. Levick
This prosecution is a part of the Justice’s Department’s Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), Project Longevity and Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) programs.
PSN is the centerpiece of the Department of Justice’s violent crime reduction efforts. PSN is an evidence-based program proven to be effective at reducing violent crime. Through PSN, a broad spectrum of stakeholders work together to identify the most pressing violent crime problems in the community and develop comprehensive solutions to address them. As part of this strategy, PSN focuses enforcement efforts on the most violent offenders and partners with locally based prevention and reentry programs for lasting reductions in crime.
Project Longevity is a comprehensive initiative to reduce gun violence in Connecticut’s major cities. Through Project Longevity, community members and law enforcement directly engage with members of groups that are prone to commit violence and deliver a community message against violence, a law enforcement message about the consequences of further violence and an offer of help for those who want it. If a group member elects to engage in gun violence, the focused attention of federal, state and local law enforcement will be directed at that entire group.
OCDETF identifies, disrupts and dismantles drug traffickers, money launderers, gangs and transnational criminal organizations through a prosecutor-led and intelligence-driven approach that leverages the strengths of federal, state and local law enforcement agencies. Additional information about the OCDETF Program can be found at https://www.justice.gov/OCDETF.
Damian Williams, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and Christie M. Curtis, the Acting Assistant Director in Charge of the New York Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), announced today that U.S. COMPOUNDING, INC. (“USC”), a subsidiary of DMK Pharmaceuticals Corporation, pled guilty to multiple fraud offenses before U.S. District Judge Arun Subramanian, and a former USC executive, SAM GLOVER, was charged in an Indictment with conspiring to violate the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”). GLOVER was arrested this morning and is expected to be presented today before a U.S. Magistrate Judge in the Eastern District of Arkansas.
U.S. Attorney Damian Williams said: “Distributing prescription drugs with sham prescriptions is wrong and illegal. The corporate resolution entered into today, and the indictment of Sam Glover, an executive who oversaw and allegedly perpetuated that scheme, reflects this Office’s commitment to holding accountable those who seek to violate laws designed to ensure that the drugs distributed across the United States are safe, necessary, and legal.”
FBI Acting Assistant Director in Charge Christie M. Curtis said: “U.S. Compounding, Inc. and its former executive, Sam Glover, allegedly committed various frauds and violated the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act by falsifying prescription orders. Despite scrutiny by members of the company who suspected the orders were unverified, the company’s leadership continued to allow the requests and collect profits as a result. This investigation is part of the FBI’s larger effort to ensure that both individuals and organizations who devise complex fraud schemes are prevented from furthering their illegitimate arrangements and making money off mistruths.”
According to admissions and court documents, as well as the allegations in the Indictment:[1]
Beginning in approximately 2015, while USC was still a privately-held corporation, a USC sales representative (“Sales Rep 1”) entered into an illegal arrangement with a veterinarian (the “Veterinarian”), wherein Sales Rep 1 would use the Veterinarian’s state veterinary licenses to generate false prescriptions in order to justify shipping prescription drugs directly to consumers, including to consumers in the Southern District of New York, in violation of the FDCA. Those consumers otherwise lacked bona fide prescriptions for those drugs. The Veterinarian was promised a 10% commission of all such sales generated using his credentials, even though Sales Rep 1 and his supervisor, GLOVER, the Vice President of Sales at USC, knew that the prescriptions issued in the Veterinarian’s name were a sham. GLOVER, Sales Rep 1, and the sales team working under them generated approximately $1 million in sales annually because of the false prescription scheme, which comprised approximately one-third of Sales Rep 1’s total sales of USC drugs.
On or about March 28, 2016, USC was acquired by Adamis Pharmaceuticals Corporation (“Adamis”), a publicly traded company that has since changed its name to DMK Pharmaceuticals Corporation (“DMK”). USC retained its essential functions, operating as a wholly owned subsidiary of Adamis, and much of its staff remained employed, including GLOVER. Following the acquisition, an executive at Adamis (the “Adamis Executive”) was made aware of the scheme and the Veterinarian’s role in it. GLOVER, in conjunction with the Adamis Executive and Sales Rep 1, continued the false prescription scheme and attempted to enter into a sham consulting agreement with the Veterinarian that purported to pay the Veterinarian an hourly rate for consultations. In actuality, the consulting agreement was a means to cover up the commission payments the Veterinarian was receiving as part of the scheme. GLOVER and others intended to claim the Veterinarian was a USC consultant if the commission payments to the Veterinarian were ever questioned.
In or about December 2019, the head of the USC pharmacy responsible for fulfilling prescription drug orders (“Pharmacist-1”) resigned due to USC’s failure to halt the practice of fulfilling drug orders submitted by USC’s sales representatives based on unverified prescriptions. Pharmacist-1’s replacement (“Pharmacist-2”) refused to fulfill any further orders for prescription drugs predicated on unverified prescriptions submitted by USC’s sales representatives. Pharmacist-2 raised concerns regarding USC’s prescription practices with GLOVER and the Adamis Executive. Pharmacist-2’s concerns were initially dismissed, but they ultimately convinced Adamis to implement a new veterinary software platform that was intended to eliminate the involvement of USC’s sales representatives in the creation or submission of prescriptions in connection with drug orders. Nonetheless, GLOVER, the Adamis Executive, and Sales Rep 1 allowed sales representatives to submit false prescriptions through the new software, circumventing the control that Pharmacist-2 had insisted on implementing. Consequently, in or about September 2020, Pharmacist-2 and two other pharmacists employed at USC resigned. A fourth pharmacist employed at USC resigned the following week. USC sales representatives continued to falsely indicate through the new software that drug orders were accompanied by valid prescriptions when they were not.
In or about July 2020, in response to increased perceived scrutiny of USC’s operations, USC sales representatives ceased submitting false prescriptions in the name of the Veterinarian. Instead, USC sales representatives falsely classified direct-to-consumer sales of prescription drugs as sales of office stock to the Veterinarian, on the pretext that the Veterinarian was prescribing these drugs to USC’s customers. According to USC’s internal sales data, sales of a particular prescription drug to the Veterinarian’s practice increased proportionally as direct-to-consumer sales of that drug declined.
In or about April 2021, the Arkansas State Board of Pharmacy issued an Order and Notice of Hearing directed to the pharmacist who replaced Pharmacist-2. Prior to any hearing, USC entered into a consent order wherein USC agreed to cease all operations in Arkansas, and USC agreed to relinquish its Arkansas State licenses as a pharmacy and wholesale distributor. USC also entered into a resolution in which they made the following factual admissions: USC “failed to ensure prescribing veterinarians were licensed in the state into which product was ordered and/or shipped”; USC “allowed for issuance of veterinary legend products directly to consumers without receipt of a legal prescription”; USC “provided remuneration directly to a veterinarian in connection with a veterinary prescription”; USC “provided veterinary prescriptions drugs to animal owners without the authorization of a licensed veterinarian and a prescription”; and USC “filled veterinary prescriptions for patients that did not have a valid practitioner-patient relationship.”
The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York reached its resolution with USC based on a number of factors, including the nature, seriousness, and pervasiveness of the offense conduct. The U.S. Attorney’s Office also considered USC and its parent company’s efforts to cooperate with the federal criminal investigation. After learning of the federal criminal investigation in May 2021, Adamis, through its Audit Committee, cooperated in the investigation, which included making presentations to, and addressing questions posed by, the U.S. Attorney’s Office after conducting an internal investigation. Moreover, since learning of the investigation, Adamis, on behalf of USC, made remedial efforts, including ceasing all USC’s operations; terminating all employees and severing its relationships with all individuals involved in the criminal conduct, including senior personnel; and engaging a third party to conduct a cross-company enterprise risk assessment evaluating governance, product services, internal audit, risk management, compliance, and operations and implementing and effectuating the resulting recommendations.
Pursuant to the plea agreement, USC agreed that it is subject to an approximately $4.2 million forfeiture payment and a criminal fine of up to $16.9 million.
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GLOVER, 45, of Arkansas, is charged with one count of conspiring to violate the FDCA, which carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison.
The maximum potential sentences in this case are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendant will be determined by the judge.
Mr. Williams praised the outstanding investigative work of the FBI. Mr. Williams also thanked the Food and Drug Administration and the Customs and Border Protection for their support of this investigation.
This case is being handled by the Office’s Illicit Finance and Money Laundering Unit. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Sarah Mortazavi and David Felton are in charge of the prosecution.
The charges contained in the Indictment are merely accusations and the defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.
[1] As the introductory phrase signifies, the entirety of the text of the Indictment and the description of the Indictment set forth herein constitute only allegations, and every fact described should be treated as an allegation.
Damian Williams, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and James Smith, the Assistant Director in Charge of the New York Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), announced the arrest of DONALD DILLION on wire fraud and money laundering charges arising out of a scheme to defraud victims by convincing them that they had won prizes in a sweepstakes sponsored by a well-known marketing and sweepstakes company (the “Sweepstakes Company”). DILLION was arrested on February 3, 2024, at John F. Kennedy International Airport while attempting to enter the United States from Jamaica. DILLION was presented before U.S. Magistrate Judge Barbara Moses yesterday.
U.S. Attorney Damian Williams said: “As alleged in the Complaint, Donald Dillion defrauded numerous victims, who were lured into thinking that they had won life-changing prizes in a well-known sweepstakes. Through their lies, Dillion and others allegedly convinced these victims that they would only receive their prizes if they first parted with tens of thousands of dollars in supposed taxes and fees. Dillion then allegedly laundered these funds by sending them to a foreign bank. My Office will prosecute these crimes to the fullest to demonstrate that fraud schemes like Dillion’s simply do not pay.”
FBI Assistant Director in Charge James Smith said: “Winning a significant amount of cash or a luxury car through a sweepstakes often represents a dream to many Americans. Donald Dillion turned his victims’ dream into a nightmare when he allegedly stole tens of thousands of dollars through his fraudulent scheme. The FBI will continue to investigate and bring to justice anyone attempting defraud innocent people.”
According to the allegations in the Complaint:[1]
At least in or about 2021, DILLION, working with others, perpetrated a scheme in which victims were contacted by individuals claiming to work for the Sweepstakes Company, who convinced the victims that they had won a large cash prize and a luxury car as part of the Sweepstakes Company’s sweepstakes. The perpetrators of the scheme told the victims that their prizes would be released to them upon the Sweepstakes Company’s receipt of, among other things, the taxes and fees purportedly owed on the prizes. In this way, numerous victims were induced to wire tens of thousands of dollars to bank accounts held in the name of DD Metro Solutions LLC (“DD Metro”) and controlled by DILLION. DILLION wired a significant proportion of these victim funds to a Chinese bank, including memoranda with some of these wires suggesting no connection to the Sweepstakes Company. None of the victims received the cash prizes or luxury cars promised to them.
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DILLION, 57, of the Bronx, New York, has been charged with conspiracy to commit wire fraud, which carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison; wire fraud, which carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison; and conspiracy to commit money laundering, which carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison.
The maximum potential sentences in this case are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendant will be determined by a judge.
Mr. Williams praised the outstanding investigative work of the FBI.
The prosecution of this case is being handled by the Office’s Illicit Finance and Money Laundering Unit. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Benjamin A. Gianforti and Jennifer Ong are in charge of the prosecution.
The charges in the Complaint are merely accusations, and DILLION is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.
[1] As the introductory phrase signifies, the entirety of the text of the Complaint and the description of the Complaint set forth herein constitute only allegations, and every fact described should be treated as an allegation.
Damian Williams, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced today that ALEXANDER MASHINSKY, the founder and former Chief Executive Officer of Celsius Network LLC and their affiliated entities (collectively, “Celsius”), pled guilty to one count of committing commodities fraud and one count of committing securities fraud in connection with two fraudulent schemes at Celsius, the purported “bank” of the crypto industry. In the first scheme, MASHINSKY misled Celsius’s customers about core aspects of the company he founded, including Celsius’s success and profitability and the nature of the investments Celsius made using customer funds. In the second scheme, MASHINSKY illicitly manipulated the price of CEL, Celsius’s proprietary crypto token, while he was secretly selling his own CEL token at artificially inflated prices. As part of his plea, MASHINSKY has agreed to forfeit over $48 million in proceeds from his illegal schemes. MASHINSKY pled guilty today before U.S. District Judge John G. Koeltl.U.S. Attorney Damian Williams said: “Alexander Mashinsky orchestrated one of the biggest frauds in the crypto industry. He lured ordinary, retail crypto investors into investing billions of dollars in Celsius with false promises that their investments were low-risk. Using catchy slogans like ‘Unbank Yourself,’ Mashinsky promised that Celsius would keep customers’ crypto as safe as money in a bank, but that, unlike a bank, Celsius returned most of the profits from its business back to users. In reality, Celsius was never profitable. To disguise the flaws in his business model, Mashinsky put investors’ money into riskier and riskier bets, and secretly used customer money to prop up the price of CEL token. Mashinsky made tens of millions of dollars selling his own CEL at artificially high prices, while his customers were left holding the bag when the company went bankrupt. Today’s convictions reflect this Office’s commitment to holding fraudsters like Mashinsky accountable for their crimes.”According to the allegations contained in the Indictment and statements made in public filings and in public court proceedings:Celsius was a crypto asset platform that, among other things, allowed its customers to earn returns on their crypto assets in the form of weekly “rewards” payments, to take loans secured by their crypto assets, and to custody their crypto assets. Celsius billed itself as the “safest place for your crypto” and urged potential customers to “unbank” themselves by moving their crypto assets to Celsius. Celsius’s primary public offering was its “Earn” program, through which Celsius offered to deploy customers’ crypto assets to generate investment returns. In addition to its Earn program, Celsius offered retail investors a “Custody” program and a “Borrow” program, which allowed customers to receive retail loans in exchange for posting their crypto assets as collateral with Celsius.MASHINSKY directly marketed Celsius to retail customers located in the U.S. and abroad. Throughout his tenure as CEO of Celsius, MASHINSKY repeatedly made public misrepresentations regarding core aspects of Celsius’s business and financial condition in order to induce retail customers to provide their crypto assets to Celsius and continue to use Celsius’s services. MASHINSKY misrepresented, among other things, the safety of Celsius’s yield-generating activities, Celsius’s profitability, the long-term sustainability of Celsius’s high rewards rates, and the risks associated with depositing crypto assets with Celsius.As MASHINSKY falsely portrayed Celsius as a safe and secure institution, Celsius’s customer base grew exponentially. Many of those customers were retail investors rather than large institutions. By in or about the fall of 2021, Celsius had grown to become one of the largest crypto platforms in the world, purportedly holding approximately $25 billion in assets at its peak.MASHINSKY and others working at Celsius also orchestrated a yearslong scheme to mislead customers and market participants regarding the market value and interest in Celsius’s proprietary crypto token CEL. They did so by manipulating the price of CEL through causing Celsius to spend hundreds of millions of dollars purchasing CEL in the open market with the objective of artificially supporting and inflating the price of CEL. At various times during MASHINSKY’s tenure, MASHINSKY and his co-conspirators also caused Celsius to use its own customer deposits to fund these market purchases of CEL in order to prop up CEL’s price, without disclosing this fact to Celsius’s customers.Without Celsius’s aggressive and illegal price manipulation, the price of CEL would have been drastically lower. As Roni Cohen-Pavon, Celsius’s Chief Revenue Officer who previously pled guilty to illegally manipulating the price of CEL, wrote to MASHINSKY in a private message exchanged during the scheme: “[T]he issue is that people are selling [CEL] and no one is buying except for us,” adding, “[t]he main problem was that the value was fake and was based on us spending millions (~8M a week and even more until February 2020) just to keep it where it is.”To further the scheme to manipulate CEL, MASHINSKY also repeatedly made false and misleading public statements concerning the nature of Celsius’s market activity and the extent to which Celsius itself was responsible for artificially supporting and inflating the price of CEL. In certain instances, MASHINSKY and other Celsius executives also personally purchased CEL for the purpose of artificially supporting CEL’s price.Artificially inflating the price of CEL allowed MASHINSKY to sell his own CEL holdings for a substantial profit. MASHINSKY personally reaped approximately $48 million in proceeds from his sales of CEL. At various times, MASHINSKY made false and misleading public statements about his own sales of CEL, claiming that he was not selling CEL, when, in reality, he was taking advantage of the upward price manipulation he had orchestrated by contemporaneously selling huge quantities of his CEL on the market, including, on occasion, to Celsius itself.In the lead up to the June 12, 2022 “Pause” of Celsius customer withdrawals, MASHINSKY continued to assure Celsius customers that Celsius was in a strong financial position and had sufficient liquidity to meet all customer withdrawal demands. Even as he made these statements, however, MASHINSKY had removed approximately $8 million worth of his own non-CEL crypto assets from the Celsius platform.On June 12, 2022 Celsius announced it was halting all customer withdrawals from the Celsius platform, at which time hundreds of thousands of Celsius customers—many of whom were retail investors—still had approximately $4.7 billion worth of crypto assets on the Celsius platform, none of which they could access. On or about July 13, 2022, Celsius filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.If you believe you have been a victim of the schemes described above, and you wish to provide information to law enforcement with connection to sentencing or to receive additional information, please contact Wendy Olsen-Clancy, the Victim Witness Coordinator at the United States Attorney’s Office of the Southern District of New York, at 866-874-8900 or wendy.olsen@usdoj.gov.* * *MASHINSKY, 58, of New York, New York, pled guilty to one count of commodities fraud and one count of securities fraud, which combined carry a maximum sentence of 30 years in prison.The maximum potential sentence is prescribed by Congress and is provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendant will be determined by the judge. MASHINSKY is scheduled to be sentenced by Judge Koeltl on April 8, 2024.Mr. Williams praised the outstanding work of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Mr. Williams also thanked the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, each of which has filed a parallel civil action.The case is being overseen by the Office’s Securities and Commodities Fraud Task Force. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Peter J. Davis, Adam S. Hobson, Allison Nichols, and Noah Solowiejczyk are in charge of the prosecution.
Geoffrey S. Berman, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and William F. Sweeney Jr., the Assistant Director-in-Charge of the New York Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), announced today that ONYEKACHI EMMANUEL OPARA was extradited from South Africa. In December 2016, OPARA was arrested in South Africa on the basis of a provisional arrest warrant for participating in fraudulent business email compromise scams that targeted thousands of victims around the world, including the United States. Collectively, the scams attempted to defraud millions of dollars from victims. OPARA arrived in the Southern District of New York this morning, and will be presented today in Manhattan federal court before U.S. Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck. Co-defendant David Chukwuneke Adindu was previously sentenced to 41 months in prison for participating in the business email compromise scams.
Manhattan U.S. Attorney Geoffrey S. Berman said: “As alleged, Onyekachi Opara attempted to dupe thousands of victims into transferring money to him and his co-defendant in a phony email scheme. Today’s extradition shows that defendants who allegedly target American victims from a distance are nonetheless subject to the reach of American justice.”
FBI Assistant Director William F. Sweeney Jr. said: “Technology changes daily, so do the tactics used by scammers to prey on unsuspecting victims. This case and others we are aggressively investigating every day prove, regardless of these criminals efforts to disguise their illegal activity, we won’t stop pursuing them. FBI New York Cyber Crime agents and our law enforcement partners will search out suspects in these cases, even reaching internationally, to stop the next victims from losing their money.”
According to the allegations in the Indictment unsealed today in Manhattan federal court:[1]
Between 2014 and 2016, OPARA and Adindu participated in Business Email Compromise scams (“BEC scams”) targeting thousands of victims around the world, including in the United States. As part of the BEC scams, emails were sent to employees of various companies directing that funds be transferred to specified bank accounts. The emails purported to be from supervisors at those companies or third party vendors that did business with those companies. The emails, however, were not legitimate. Rather, they were either from email accounts with a domain name that was very similar to a legitimate domain name, or the metadata in the emails had been modified so that the emails appeared as if they were from legitimate email addresses. After victims complied with the fraudulent wiring instructions, the transferred funds were quickly withdrawn or moved into different bank accounts. In total, the BEC scams attempted to defraud millions of dollars from victims.
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OPARA, 29, of Lagos, Nigeria, is charged in an Indictment with one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and one count of wire fraud, each of which carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison.
The maximum potential sentences are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendant will be determined by the judge. The case is assigned to U.S. District Judge Paul A. Crotty.
Mr. Berman praised the investigative work of the FBI. Mr. Berman also thanked Oath’s E-Crime Investigations Team, the National Prosecuting Authority for South Africa, the South African Police Service, the United States Marshals Service, and the Department of Justice’s Office of International Affairs, and noted that the investigation is continuing.
This case is being handled by the Office’s Complex Frauds and Cybercrime Unit. Assistant United States Attorneys Andrew K. Chan and Daniel Loss are in charge of the prosecution.
The charges contained in the Indictment are merely accusations, and the defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.
[1] As the introductory phrase signifies, the entirety of the text of the Indictment constitutes only allegations, and every fact described herein should be treated as an allegation.
Damian Williams, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced today the conviction of SYLVIA ASH, a justice of the New York State Supreme Court, and former chair of the Board of Directors of Municipal Credit Union (“MCU”), for conspiracy to obstruct justice, obstruction of justice, and making a false statement to a federal agent. These charges arose from a scheme to impede the federal criminal investigation into fraud and corruption at MCU, a non-profit, multibillion-dollar financial institution, including misconduct committed by Kam Wong, the former chief executive officer (“CEO”), and Joseph Guagliardo, a former New York City Police Department Officer and member of MCU’s Supervisory Committee. Wong and Guagliardo were charged separately and previously pled guilty to embezzlement from MCU. ASH was convicted after a two-week jury trial before U.S. District Judge Lewis A. Kaplan and is scheduled to be sentenced on April 20, 2022 by Judge Kaplan.
U.S. Attorney Damian Williams said: “Today’s conviction demonstrates our resolve in uncovering criminal conduct at the highest levels of MCU and ensuring that those who attempt to thwart a federal investigation face consequences for that corrosive conduct. As the jury unanimously found, Sylvia Ash took repeated steps, over multiple months, to seek to obstruct the federal criminal investigation into financial misconduct at MCU that took place during Ash’s tenure as chair of the Board of Directors. Obstruction of justice, particularly by a sitting state court judge, is a serious crime, and Ash now faces punishment for her obstruction scheme.”
According to the Complaint, Indictment, Superseding Indictment, publicly-available information, court filings, and evidence presented during the trial in Manhattan federal court:
Municipal Credit Union
MCU is a non-profit financial institution headquartered in New York, New York, which is federally insured by the National Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”). MCU is the oldest credit union in New York State and one of the oldest and largest in the country, providing banking services to more than 500,000 members, and with more than $4 billion in member accounts, each of which is insured for at least $250,000 by the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund, which is administered by the NCUA. Membership in MCU is generally available to employees of New York City and its agencies, employees of the federal and New York state governments who work in New York City, and employees of hospitals, nursing homes, and similar facilities located within New York State.
At all relevant times, MCU was overseen by a Board of Directors (the “Board”) and a Supervisory Committee (the “Supervisory Committee”), each of which was composed of members of MCU, who were not supposed to be compensated. As a result of severe deficiencies in the Board’s and the Supervisory Committee’s oversight of the credit union, which came to light in connection with the federal investigation, the New York Department of Financial Services (“DFS”) removed the members of the Supervisory Committee in May 2018 and the Board in June 2018. Subsequently, DFS appointed NCUA as the conservator for the credit union.
ASH
ASH is a sitting New York State Supreme Court Justice in Kings County. ASH has served as a judge in the New York State court system since approximately 2006, first as a Kings County Civil Court Judge, and then, starting in 2011, as a Kings County Supreme Court Justice. In or about January 2016, ASH was appointed as the presiding judge in the Kings County Supreme Court’s Commercial Division. After the charges in this case were unsealed, ASH was suspended from her position.
ASH served on MCU’s Board from in or about May 2008 until on or about August 15, 2016, when she resigned. From in or about May 2015 until her resignation, ASH served as the chair of the Board. ASH resigned after a complaint was filed against her by the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct arising from a conflict of interest between her position as a state judge and her membership on MCU’s Board. More than a year before her resignation, ASH had been instructed to resign from MCU’s Board by the Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics, which instruction she disregarded.
From at least in or about 2012 through 2016, while serving as an MCU Board member and while Wong was CEO, ASH received annually tens of thousands of dollars in reimbursements and other benefits from MCU, including airfare, hotels, food and entertainment expenses for her and a guest to attend conferences both domestically and abroad, annual birthday parties at a minor league baseball stadium, payment for phone and cable bills, and electronic devices. Even after her resignation from the Board, Wong continued to provide or cause MCU to provide ASH with benefits, such as Apple devices and sports tickets. As a sitting state judge, ASH was required to report both her board service and gifts and benefits she received from any outside sources on an annual state disclosure form. But between at least 2012 and 2018, ASH never reported her board service nor any gifts or benefits from MCU.
ASH’s Obstruction of Justice
In January 2018, after Wong, MCU’s then-CEO, had been approached by federal law enforcement agents investigating apparent financial misconduct by Wong, in an attempt to protect Wong, ASH agreed to and did sign a false and misleading memorandum purporting to explain and justify millions of dollars Wong had received from MCU. Wong subsequently provided that false and misleading memorandum to federal agents in an attempt to demonstrate that the millions of dollars had purportedly been orally approved for him to receive by ASH in June 2015, when she was chair of the Board. However, in truth, neither ASH nor the Board had approved the payment of those funds.
On March 1, 2018, shortly after Wong was placed on administrative leave by MCU, ASH was interviewed about the memorandum she signed for Wong. During that interview, ASH admitted that the memorandum was not accurate, but attempted to justify the money that Wong received by stating that MCU’s then-current general counsel had told her that Wong’s employment contract gave him the option of receiving such money. That statement was false.
On March 13, 2018, ASH was served with a federal grand jury subpoena (the “First Subpoena”), which required the production of documents related to various matters, including Wong’s compensation, and any communications with Wong through the date of the First Subpoena. On April 6, 2018, during a telephonic interview with a federal agent, ASH falsely stated that she did not have any materials responsive to the First Subpoena.
On June 8, 2018—after Wong was charged with embezzlement from MCU and the Government executed a judicially-authorized search of the residence of Guagliardo—ASH was interviewed by telephone for a second time about the First Subpoena. During that interview, ASH again falsely stated that she did not have any materials responsive to the First Subpoena.
On June 18, 2018, ASH was served with a second federal grand jury subpoena (the “Second Subpoena”), which required the production of, among other things, all correspondence with Wong and Guagliardo; all documents regarding any criminal investigation, internal investigation, or audit related to Wong; and all documents regarding items of value ASH received from MCU, Wong, or Guagliardo. Shortly afterward, ASH went to an Apple store and wiped an iPhone X that Wong had provided her in January 2018. In addition, ASH deleted emails from her Gmail account, including all of her emails with Guagliardo, none of which she produced in response to either of the two federal grand jury subpoenas directed to her. ASH also later wiped two MCU-issued iPads she had received.
On July 6, 2018, on ASH’s behalf, her then-counsel produced materials to the Government in response to the Second Subpoena. This production was materially incomplete, and did not contain text messages, emails, and other documents ASH possessed or had under her custody or control that were responsive to the Second Subpoena.
On July 9, 2018, ASH attended a voluntary interview with the U.S. Attorney’s Office. During this interview, while accompanied by her then-counsel, ASH made multiple false statements, including repeating false statements regarding her purported conversations with MCU’s former general counsel about Wong’s receipt of cash payments and falsely claiming that she and her aunt took a trip to Las Vegas paid for by MCU, including airfare, lodging, and entertainment expenses, after she resigned because all of her travel arrangements were paid for by MCU before she resigned, when in truth all of the expenses were paid for after she resigned.
On or about October 11, 2019, ASH was arrested and her cellphone was seized. After obtaining a judicially-authorized search warrant, ASH’s phone was searched, which revealed, among other things, numerous text messages, including with Wong and Guagliardo, that were concealed in response to the First and Second Subpoenas.
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ASH, 64, of Brooklyn, New York, was convicted of one count of conspiracy to obstruct justice, which carries a maximum penalty of five years in prison; one count of obstruction of justice, which carries a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison; and one count of making false statements, which carries a maximum penalty of five years in prison. The maximum potential penalties are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as sentencing of the defendant will be determined by Judge Kaplan.
On June 4, 2019, Wong was sentenced to 66 months in prison for embezzlement from MCU and was ordered to forfeit $9,890,375 and to pay restitution in the same amount to MCU.
On July 23, 2020, Guagliardo was sentenced to 27 months in prison for embezzlement from MCU and was ordered to forfeit $425,514 and to pay $468,189 in restitution to MCU.
U.S. Attorney Williams praised the outstanding work of the Special Agents of the United States Attorney’s Office. Mr. Williams also thanked the New York County District Attorney’s Office and DFS for their assistance.
The case is being handled by the Office’s Public Corruption Unit. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Eli J. Mark, Daniel C. Richenthal, and Jonathan Rebold are in charge of the prosecution, with the assistance of Special Assistant U.S. Attorney Alona S. Katz from the New York County District Attorney’s Office.
Audrey Strauss, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced the conviction today of HAMID “Ray” AKHAVAN and RUBEN WEIGAND, following a four-week trial before the Honorable Jed S. Rakoff. AKHAVAN and WEIGAND devised a complex scheme involving fake companies, false websites, and fake “customer service centers,” to deceive U.S. issuing banks and credit unions into effectuating more than $150 million of credit and debit card purchases of marijuana by disguising those purchases as being for other kinds of goods, such as face creams and dog products. The defendants were each convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit bank fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1349.
Manhattan U.S. Attorney Audrey Strauss said: “As a jury has now found, Ray Akhavan and Ruben Weigand were in the business of selling lies. Under the radar of U.S. banks and credit card companies screening for suspicious and illegal activity, these men offered their services: creating fake companies and fake websites, and ginning up fake web traffic to those fake websites, all in the service of fraudulently moving money through the United States financial system. Today, a jury has seen through those lies and convicted Akhavan and Weigand of bank fraud.”
As reflected in the Indictment, public filings, and the evidence presented at trial:
From in or around 2016 through in or around 2019, AKHAVAN and WEIGAND, working with others, including principals from one of the leading on-demand marijuana delivery companies in the United States (the “Company”) planned and executed a scheme to deceive United States banks and other financial institutions into processing over $150 million in credit and debit card payments for the purchase and delivery of marijuana products (the “Scheme”).
The Scheme involved the deception of virtually all of the participants in the payment processing network, including issuing banks in the United States (the “Issuing Banks”) and Visa and MasterCard. The primary method used by AKHAVAN, WEIGAND, and other coconspirators to deceive the Issuing Banks involved the purchase and use of shell companies that were used to disguise the marijuana transactions through the use of phony merchants (the “Phony Merchants”). The shell companies were used to open offshore bank accounts with merchant acquiring banks and to initiate credit card charges for marijuana purchases made through the Company. AKHAVAN and WEIGAND worked with other co-conspirators to create these phony merchant accounts – including phony online merchants purportedly selling dog products, diving gear, carbonated drinks, green tea, and face creams – and established Visa and MasterCard merchant processing accounts with one or more offshore acquiring banks. They then arranged for more than a dozen Phony Merchants to be used by the Company to process debit and credit card purchases of marijuana products. Many of the Phony Merchants purported to be based in the United Kingdom, but, despite being based outside the United States, claimed to maintain U.S.-based customer service numbers.
To facilitate the Scheme, webpages were created and deployed to lend legitimacy to the Phony Merchants. The Phony Merchants typically had web pages suggesting that they were involved in selling legitimate goods, such as carbonated drinks, face cream, dog products, and diving gear. Yet these companies were actually being used to facilitate the approval and processing of marijuana transactions. The defendants’ scheme even involved fake visits to those websites to make it appear as though the websites had real customers and were operating legitimate online businesses.
The defendants’ scheme also involved the use of online tracking pixels. Because the descriptors listed on Company customers’ credit card statements often were the URLs for the Phony Merchant websites, Company customers were sometimes confused and did not recognize the transactions on their credit card statements. The defendants and their coconspirators were concerned that confused customers would call their Issuing Banks and inadvertently reveal the Scheme by indicating that they had purchased marijuana products and/or that they had made a purchase through the Company. To lessen the risk that customers would be confused, the defendants used a number of techniques, including online tracking pixels to track which users had visited the Company’s website. If a Company customer had visited the Company’s website and went to the URL listed on their credit card statement, they would automatically be re-routed to a webpage connected to the Company so that the customer would understand what the real purchase had been for (i.e., from the Company). However, in order to hide the Scheme, the defendants ensured that if a third party such as a bank or credit card company investigator visited a URL of a Phony Merchant, they would not be re-routed, and would therefore be unable to discern any connection between the Phony Merchant website and the Company and/or the sale of marijuana products.
Over $150 million in marijuana credit and debit card transactions were processed using the Phony Merchants. Some of the merchant websites listed for those transactions included: diverkingdom.com, desirescent.com, outdoormaxx.com, and happypuppybox.com. Moreover, none of the Phony Merchant website names listed for those transactions referred to the Company or to marijuana. AKHAVAN, WEIGAND, and others also worked with and directed others to apply incorrect merchant category codes (“MCCs”) to the marijuana transactions in order to disguise the nature of those transactions and create the false appearance that the transactions were completely unrelated to marijuana. Some of the MCCs/categories listed for the transactions included freight carrier, trucking; clock, jewelry, watch, and silverware; stenographic services; department stores; music stores/pianos; and cosmetic stores.
AKHAVAN was the leader of the transaction laundering scheme and WEIGAND was responsible for overseeing the acquiring bank accounts used by the Phony Merchants and sending the proceeds from the marijuana transactions back to bank accounts in the United States.
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AKHAVAN, 43, of, California, and WEIGAND, 38, of Germany, were each convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit bank fraud, which carries a maximum sentence of 30 years in prison. The maximum potential sentence is prescribed by Congress and is provided here for informational purposes only, as the sentencing of the defendants will be determined by the judge. Sentencing before Judge Rakoff is scheduled for June 25, 2021.
Ms. Strauss praised the work of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
The prosecution of this case is being handled by the Office’s Complex Frauds and Cybercrime Unit and the Money Laundering and Transnational Criminal Enterprises Unit. Assistant United States Attorneys Nicholas Folly, Tara La Morte, and Emily Deininger are in charge of the prosecution.
Damian Williams, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced that ALEXANDER GULKAROV pled guilty today to conspiracy to commit bribery, conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, and aggravated identity theft in connection with his orchestration of a $40 million fraud targeting no-fault automobile insurance companies. GULKAROV further admitted to obstructing law enforcement’s investigation by fabricating documents and intimidating witnesses.
U.S. Attorney Damian Williams said: “Alexander Gulkarov was one of the leaders of a multifaceted scheme to defraud automobile insurance companies; bribe hospital employees, 911 dispatchers, and others; launder hundreds of thousands of dollars; and obstruct law enforcement. This complex scheme resulted in over $40 million in losses, which Gulkarov used to fund his lavish lifestyle, taking luxury vacations and renovating his multimillion-dollar home. This Office has no tolerance for those who cheat the system to wrongfully enrich themselves, and we will continue to dismantle wide-ranging schemes such as this one.”
According to the Information to which GULKAROV pled guilty, the plea agreement, and statements made in court:
The Healthcare Fraud Scheme
New York and New Jersey no-fault insurance laws require a driver’s automobile insurance company to pay automobile insurance claims automatically for certain types of motor vehicle accidents, provided that the claim is legitimate and below a particular monetary threshold. Pursuant to these requirements, insurance companies will often pay medical service providers directly for the treatment they provide to automobile accident victims without the need to bill the victims themselves. This process resolves automobile claims without apportioning blame or fault for the accident, thereby avoiding protracted disputes and the costs associated with an extended investigation of the accident.
From 2014 through 2021, GULKAROV and others (collectively, the “Clinic Controllers”) agreed that they would unlawfully own, run, and profit from medical clinics in the New York area and that GULKAROV would also profit from pharmacies in the New York area that were unlawfully owned and controlled by other Clinic Controllers. GULKAROV knew that clinics and pharmacies are unable to bill insurance companies for No-Fault benefits if the medical facilities are controlled by non-physicians. GULKAROV nonetheless agreed with others to submit bills to insurance companies falsely representing that the clinics were owned and operated by licensed medical practitioners and for medical practitioners to lie under oath during Examinations under Oath about the ownership, control, and finances of the clinics. GULKAROV personally coached medical practitioners to lie under oath. GULKAROV and his fellow Clinic Controllers unlawfully obtained from insurance companies at least $40,000,000 as part of the scheme.
In connection with the scheme described above, GULKAROV personally approached medical practitioners, including physicians, and directed them to prescribe unnecessary medical treatments (including MRIs, EMG/NCV testing, spinal injections, and computerized radiologic mensuration analysis), unnecessary durable medical equipment (including cervical home traction devices and lumbar back support), and medically unnecessary medications (including prescription strength painkillers, topical creams, and topical gels). GULKAROV received kickbacks from MRI facilities, pain management doctors, and other specialized care providers, who performed these unnecessary medical treatments. GULKAROV further personally arranged for the unnecessary medications to be filled at pharmacies under the control of other Clinic Controllers. The medical practitioners provided necessary procedures and treatments to patients as well.
GULKAROV also overbilled insurance companies for treatments provided by medical practitioners. In connection with the scheme, GULKAROV owned and operated a billing company called “Billing for You.” Billing for You submitted bills to insurance companies overstating the amount of time that practitioners spent treating patients. Billing for You also used improper, unlisted billing codes to bill insurance companies in excess of what is permitted under No-Fault regulations.
The Bribery Scheme
GULKAROV and his fellow Clinic Controllers further agreed to pay bribes in connection with the above-described scheme. From at least 2014 through November 2019, GULKAROV agreed with others to pay bribes to hospital employees, 911 dispatchers, and other individuals for the confidential names and numbers of motor vehicle accident victims. As part of the scheme, GULKAROV and others provided approximately $150,000 for the creation of a call center, operated by Anthony Rose, a/k/a “Todd Chambers,” that called victims and lied to them to induce victims to receive medical treatment at, among other places, clinics controlled by GULKAROV and his associates. GULKAROV further personally paid Anthony Rose hundreds of thousands of dollars in bribe payments in cash.
As part of the scheme, GULKAROV arranged for a New York City police officer to provide confidential information from New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) servers. In particular, this officer sent GULKAROV over 400 photos of confidential NYPD motor vehicle accident reports using the encrypted messaging application, WhatsApp. GULKAROV then re-transmitted the reports to Rose and others so that they could call patients, lie to them, and direct them to clinics controlled by GULKAROV and others.
Money Laundering and Obstruction Conduct
GULKAROV laundered the proceeds of the bribery and healthcare fraud from the bank accounts of the medical clinics and pharmacies to personal accounts using a variety of methods. Among other things, GULKAROV personally told medical practitioners to sign blank checks from the clinics’ bank accounts, which GULKAROV used to pay personal expenses such as luxury vacations around the world, expensive meals, jewelry, and parties. GULKAROV also used the blank checks to pay for hundreds of thousands of dollars of construction-related expenses for this three-story, multimillion-dollar home in Queens, New York.
GULKAROV arranged for checks from the clinics’ bank accounts to be cashed at over a dozen shell companies under his control or the control of co-conspirators, including, for instance, “Sign N Drive Auto GRP,” “Transport on Wheels,” and “Sancus Consulting & Trading Inc.” Over two dozen of these shell companies were opened by foreign nationals, who entered the country on tourism visas, opened bank accounts for the shell companies, provided the debit cards to GULKAROV’s coconspirators, and then left the country.
GULKAROV additionally agreed to use Wisnicki & Associates and Wisnicki Neuhauser (collectively, the “Wisnicki Firm”) to launder proceeds from the No-Fault scheme. GULKAROV and his fellow Clinic Controllers wrote over $150,000 in checks to the Wisnicki Firm from the No-Fault clinics’ bank accounts. The Wisnicki Firm did not provide any legal services to the No-Fault clinics. Instead, the Wisnicki Firm used this money to purchase real estate for one of GULKAROV’s coconspirators. GULKAROV and his coconspirators deducted the payments to the Wisnicki Firm on the clinics’ tax returns as legal expenses.
Lastly, GULKAROV engaged in a multi-month obstruction scheme beginning in February 2021. In February and March 2021, the Government served grand jury subpoenas on the medical practitioners involved in the No-Fault scheme. GULKAROV immediately contacted at least half-a-dozen of his coconspirators and ordered them not to speak with law enforcement. In return, GULKAROV gave his coconspirators money to pay for attorneys. GULKAROV also obtained the phones of multiple practitioners and deleted his communications with them from their devices.
Thereafter, on or about April 1, 2021, the Government served a grand jury subpoena on the Wisnicki Firm for documentation surrounding the $150,000 in payments made from the clinics to the Wisnicki Firm. GULKAROV agreed with others that the Wisnicki Firm would fabricate retainer agreements for transmission to the grand jury. The fabricated retainer agreements, which were backdated to 2016 and 2017, falsely represented that the No-Fault clinics had retained the Wisnicki Firm for legal services.
During the following months, in or about April and May 2021, GULKAROV approached multiple medical practitioners and ordered them to sign the backdated, fabricated retainer agreements. The medical practitioners complied. GULKAROV also provided these medical practitioners with checks, written from the Wisnicki Firm, returning the purported “retainer fees” paid to the Wisnicki Firm. GULKAROV ordered the medical practitioners to deposit the checks, withdraw the money in small cash increments, and return the cash to GULKAROV. At least one medical practitioner complied.
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ALEXANDER GULKAROV, 37, of Queens, New York, pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit bribery, which carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison; one count of conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, which carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison; and one count of aggravated identity theft, which carries a mandatory sentence of two years in prison to run consecutively to any other prison term imposed. As part of his plea agreement with the Government, GULKAROV agreed to pay forfeiture of $40,000,000 and restitution of $40,000,000.
The maximum potential sentences are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as the sentencing of the defendant will be determined by a judge.
Mr. Williams praised the work of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
This case is being handled by the Office’s Complex Frauds and Cybercrime Unit and the White Plains Division. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Mathew Andrews, Timothy Capozzi, and Ryan W. Allison are in charge of the prosecution.
Joan Loughnane, the Acting Deputy United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced today that SCOTT TUCKER was sentenced to 200 months in prison for operating a nationwide internet payday lending enterprise that systematically evaded state laws for more than 15 years in order to charge illegal interest rates as high as 1,000 percent on loans. TUCKER’s co-defendant, TIMOTHY MUIR, an attorney, was also sentenced, to 84 months in prison, for his participation in the scheme. In addition to their willful violation of state usury laws across the country, TUCKER and MUIR lied to millions of customers regarding the true cost of their loans to defraud them out of hundreds, and in some cases, thousands of dollars. Further, as part of their multi-year effort to evade law enforcement, the defendants formed sham relationships with Native American tribes and laundered the billions of dollars they took from their customers through nominally tribal bank accounts to hide Tucker’s ownership and control of the business.
After a five-week jury trial, TUCKER and MUIR were found guilty on October 13, 2017, on all 14 counts against them, including racketeering, wire fraud, money laundering, and Truth-In-Lending Act (“TILA”) offenses. U.S. District Judge P. Kevin Castel presided over the trial and imposed today’s sentences.
Acting Deputy U.S. Attorney Joan Loughnane said: “For more than 15 years, Scott Tucker and Timothy Muir made billions of dollars exploiting struggling, everyday Americans through payday loans carrying interest rates as high as 1,000 percent. And to hide their criminal scheme, they tried to claim their business was owned and operated by Native American tribes. But now Tucker and Muir’s predatory business is closed and they have been sentenced to significant time in prison for their deceptive practices.”
According to the allegations contained in the Superseding Indictment, and evidence presented at trial:
The Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Crimes
From at least 1997 until 2013, TUCKER engaged in the business of making small, short-term, high-interest, unsecured loans, commonly referred to as “payday loans,” through the Internet. TUCKER’s lending enterprise, which had up to 1,500 employees based in Overland Park, Kansas, did business as Ameriloan, f/k/a Cash Advance; OneClickCash, f/k/a Preferred Cash Loans; United Cash Loans; US FastCash; 500 FastCash; Advantage Cash Services; and Star Cash Processing (the “Tucker Payday Lenders”). TUCKER, working with MUIR, the general counsel for TUCKER’s payday lending businesses since 2006, routinely charged interest rates of 600 percent or 700 percent, and sometimes higher than 1,000 percent. These loans were issued to more than 4.5 million working people in all 50 states, including more than 250,000 people in New York, many of whom were struggling to pay basic living expenses. Many of these loans were issued in states, including New York, with laws that expressly forbid lending at the exorbitant interest rates TUCKER charged. Evidence at trial established that TUCKER and MUIR were fully aware of the illegal nature of the loans charged and, in fact, prepared scripts to be used by call center employees to deal with complaints by customers that their loans were illegal.
Fraudulent Loan Disclosures
TILA is a federal statute intended to ensure that credit terms are disclosed to consumers in a clear and meaningful way, both to protect customers against inaccurate and unfair credit practices, and to enable them to compare credit terms readily and knowledgeably. Among other things, TILA and its implementing regulations require lenders, including payday lenders like the Tucker Payday Lenders, to disclose accurately, clearly, and conspicuously, before any credit is extended, the finance charge, the annual percentage rate, and the total of payments that reflect the legal obligation between the parties to the loan.
The Tucker Payday Lenders purported to inform prospective borrowers, in clear and simple terms, as required by TILA, of the cost of the loan (the “TILA Box”). For example, for a loan of $500, the TILA Box provided that the “finance charge – meaning the ‘dollar amount the credit will cost you’” – would be $150, and that the “total of payments” would be $650. Thus, in substance, the TILA Box stated that a $500 loan to the customer would cost $650 to repay. While the amounts set forth in the Tucker Payday Lenders’ TILA Box varied according to the terms of particular customers’ loans, they reflected, in substance, that the borrower would pay $30 in interest for every $100 borrowed.
In fact, through at least 2012, TUCKER and MUIR structured the repayment schedule of the loans such that, on the borrower’s payday, the Tucker Payday Lenders automatically withdrew the entire interest payment due on the loan, but left the principal balance untouched so that, on the borrower’s next payday, the Tucker Payday Lenders could again automatically withdraw an amount equaling the entire interest payment due (and already paid) on the loan. With TUCKER and MUIR’s approval, the Tucker Payday Lenders proceeded automatically to withdraw such “finance charges” payday after payday (typically every two weeks), applying none of the money toward repayment of principal, until at least the fifth payday, when they began to withdraw an additional $50 per payday to apply to the principal balance of the loan. Even then, the Tucker Payday Lenders continued to assess and automatically withdraw the entire interest payment calculated on the remaining principal balance until the entire principal amount was repaid. Accordingly, as TUCKER and MUIR well knew, the Tucker Payday Lenders’ TILA box materially understated the amount the loan would cost, including the total of payments that would be taken from the borrower’s bank account. Specifically, for a customer who borrowed $500, contrary to the TILA Box disclosure stating that the total payment by the borrower would be $650, in fact, and as TUCKER and MUIR well knew, the finance charge was $1,425, for a total payment of $1,925 by the borrower.
The Sham Tribal Ownership of the Business
In response to complaints that the Tucker Payday Lenders were extending abusive loans in violation of their usury laws, several states began to investigate the Tucker Payday Lenders. To thwart these state actions, TUCKER devised a scheme to claim that his lending businesses were protected by sovereign immunity, a legal doctrine that, among other things, generally prevents states from enforcing their laws against Native American tribes. Beginning in 2003, TUCKER entered into agreements with several Native American tribes (the “Tribes”), including the Santee Sioux Tribe of Nebraska, the Miami Tribe of Oklahoma, and the Modoc Tribe of Oklahoma. The purpose of these agreements was to cause the Tribes to claim they owned and operated parts of TUCKER’s payday lending enterprise, so that when states sought to enforce laws prohibiting TUCKER’s loans, TUCKER’s lending businesses would claim to be protected by sovereign immunity. In return, the Tribes received payments from TUCKER, typically one percent of the revenues from the portion of TUCKER’s payday lending business that the Tribes purported to own.
In order to create the illusion that the Tribes owned and controlled TUCKER’s payday lending business, TUCKER and MUIR engaged in a series of lies and deceptions. Among other things:
MUIR and other counsel for TUCKER prepared false factual declarations from tribal representatives that were submitted to state courts, falsely claiming, among other things, that tribal corporations substantively owned, controlled, and managed the portions of TUCKER’s business targeted by state enforcement actions.
TUCKER opened bank accounts to operate and receive the profits of the payday lending enterprise, which were nominally held by tribally owned corporations, but which were, in fact, owned and controlled by TUCKER. TUCKER received over $380 million from these accounts on lavish personal expenses, some of which was spent on a fleet of Ferraris and Porsches, the expenses of a professional auto racing team, a private jet, a luxury home in Aspen, Colorado, and his personal taxes.
In order to deceive borrowers into believing that they were dealing with Native American tribes, employees of TUCKER making payday loans over the phone told borrowers, using scripts directed and approved by TUCKER and MUIR, that they were operating in Oklahoma and Nebraska, where the Tribes were located, when in fact they were operating at TUCKER’s corporate headquarters in Kansas.
These deceptions succeeded for a time, and several state courts dismissed enforcement actions against TUCKER’s payday lending businesses based on claims that they were protected by sovereign immunity. In reality, the Tribes neither owned nor operated any part of TUCKER’s payday lending business. The Tribes made no payment to TUCKER to acquire the portions of the business they purported to own. TUCKER continued to operate his lending business from a corporate headquarters in Kansas, and TUCKER continued to reap the profits of the payday lending businesses, which generated over $3.5 billion in revenue from just 2008 to June 2013 – in substantial part by charging struggling borrowers high interest rates expressly forbidden by state laws.
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In addition to their prison terms, TUCKER, 55, of Leawood, Kansas, and MUIR, 46, of Overland Park, Kansas, were each sentenced to three years of supervised release. Judge Castel ordered the defendants to forfeit the proceeds of their crimes. TUCKER was remanded into custody.
In pronouncing sentence, Judge Castel described the crimes as “a scheme to extract money from people in desperate circumstances” that “created heartbreak and sorrow . . . not just a financial loss.”
Mrs. Loughnane praised the outstanding investigative work of the St. Louis Field Office of the IRS-CI. Mrs. Loughnane also thanked the Criminal Investigators at the United States Attorney’s Office, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Federal Trade Commission for their assistance with the case.
The prosecution is being handled by the Office’s Complex Frauds and Cybercrime Unit. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Niketh Velamoor, Hagan Scotten, and Sagar Ravi are in charge of the prosecution.
Audrey Strauss, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and William F. Sweeney Jr., the Assistant Director-in-Charge of the New York Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) announced that JOSEPH CIMINO, the founder of an Orange County-based tequila company, was arrested this morning and charged with securities fraud and wire fraud arising out of his fraudulent solicitation of investments for the company. CIMINO will be presented before United States Magistrate Judge Judith C. McCarthy in White Plains federal court later today.
U.S. Attorney Audrey Strauss said: “Joseph Cimino allegedly raised nearly $1 million in investor funds for his start-up tequila company by lying about the company’s finances, and then spent a significant portion of that money to finance his own lifestyle. Now Cimino faces the sobering reality of federal securities and wire fraud charges.”
FBI Assistant Director William F. Sweeney Jr. said: “Through falsely inflating capital, misleading investors, and lying about other aspects of his tequila company, Cimino, as alleged, raised nearly $1 million in furtherance of his fraudulent scheme. While his alleged illegal activity continued over a period of four years, today’s arrest has effectively shattered any hopes he may have had of continuing to scam innocent investors.”
According to the allegations contained in the Complaint[1] unsealed today in White Plains federal court:
From 2014 to 2018, CIMINO raised approximately $935,000 from at least 25 investors ostensibly to fund a tequila company that he founded (the “Tequila Company”). Throughout this period CIMINO made numerous false and misleading representations in an effort to attract and maintain investors. For example, in multiple communications with prospective investors, CIMINO falsely inflated the amount of capital that the Tequila Company had raised from other investors, and falsely represented that certain individuals were investors in the Tequila Company, when in reality they had not invested any funds. CIMINO also fabricated or falsely inflated the Tequila Company’s sales in a number of investor communications. In December 2015, CIMINO made statements in an email to a prospective investor falsely implying that the Tequila Company already had sales, when in fact, the company’s initial sales did not occur until 2017. In July 2017, CIMINO falsely represented in an investor report and quarterly profit and loss (“P&L”) statement that the Tequila Company’s year-to-date sales totaled 3,410 cases, when its actual sales totaled only 350 cases. Then, in October 2017, CIMINO falsely represented that the Tequila Company’s year-to-date sales totaled 6,035 cases, when its actual year-to-date sales totaled barely 20 percent of that number. CIMINO further claimed to investors in October 2017 that the Tequila Company would receive reimbursement for 800 cases of tequila that were supposedly destroyed at a distributor’s warehouse in Puerto Rico as a result of Hurricane Maria. That statement was a fabrication. In reality, the Tequila Company had no insurance and none of its inventory had been destroyed in the hurricane.
In addition to deceiving investors about the Tequila’s Company’s financial condition, CIMINO used investor money for personal expenses, including groceries, pet supplies, and personal entertainment. From 2014 to 2018, CIMINO transferred approximately $472,000 of investor money from the Tequila Company into his personal bank account, and used a significant portion of those deposits for personal living expenses, contrary to the operating agreements provided to investors.
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CIMINO, age 56, of Warwick, New York, is charged with one count of securities fraud and one count of wire fraud. Each charge carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison.
The maximum potential sentences in this case are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendant will be determined by a judge.
Ms. Strauss praised the investigative work of the FBI Hudson Valley White Collar Crime Task Force and Orange County Sheriff’s Office. Ms. Strauss also thanked the Securities & Exchange Commission for its assistance in the investigation.
In a related case, the Securities & Exchange Commission brought a civil action today against CIMINO in U.S. District Court in White Plains.
The criminal case is being prosecuted by the Office’s White Plains Division. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Benjamin Gianforti and Daniel Loss are in charge of the prosecution.
[1] As the introductory phrase signifies, the entirety of the text of the Complaint and the description of the Complaint set forth below constitute only allegations and every fact described should be treated as an allegation.
Damian Williams, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced that PETER KHAIMOV, ALEXANDER GULKAROV, and ROMAN ISRAILOV were sentenced to 15 years, 12 years, and seven years in prison, respectively, by U.S. District Judge Paul G. Gardephe for crimes related to their orchestration of a $40 million fraud targeting No-Fault automobile insurance companies. KHAIMOV previously pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit bribery, one count of conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, and one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering and was sentenced on June 11, 2024. GULKAROV previously pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit bribery, one count of conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, and one count of aggravated identity theft and was sentenced on June 20, 2024. ISRAILOV previously pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud and one count of aggravated identity theft and was sentenced on May 23, 2024.
U.S. Attorney Damian Williams said: “Peter Khaimov, Alexander Gulkarov, and Roman Israilov organized one of the largest No-Fault insurance frauds in New York history, stealing $40 million through their operation of sham medical clinics and pharmacies. By posing as legitimate medical providers, they exploited the system, prescribed unnecessary treatments, and jeopardized patient care. This case exemplifies our relentless pursuit of justice against those who think they can outsmart the system, and I commend the FBI and our dedicated team of prosecutors for their outstanding work in dismantling this massive fraud operation.”
According to the Indictment, the Informations to which KHAIMOV, GULKAROV, and ISRAILOV pled guilty, their plea agreements, and statements made in court:
New York and New Jersey No-Fault insurance laws require a driver’s automobile insurance company to pay automobile insurance claims automatically for certain types of motor vehicle accidents, provided that the claim is legitimate and below a particular monetary threshold. Pursuant to these requirements, insurance companies will often pay medical service providers directly for the treatment they provide to automobile accident victims without the need to bill the victims themselves. This process resolves automobile claims without apportioning blame or fault for the accident, thereby avoiding protracted disputes and the costs associated with an extended investigation of the accident.
From 2014 through 2021, KHAIMOV, GULKAROV, and ISRAILOV (collectively, the “Clinic Controllers”) conspired to unlawfully own, run, and profit from medical clinics and pharmacies in the New York area. KHAIMOV, GULKAROV, and ISRAILOV knew that clinics and pharmacies are unable to bill insurance companies for No-Fault benefits if the medical facilities are controlled by non-physicians. They nonetheless agreed to submit bills to insurance companies falsely representing that the clinics were owned and operated by licensed medical practitioners, and for medical practitioners to lie under oath during Examinations under Oath (“EUOs”) about the ownership, control, and finances of the clinics. KHAIMOV, GULKAROV, and ISRAILOV unlawfully obtained from insurance companies at least $40,000,000 as part of the scheme.
In connection with the scheme described above, KHAIMOV, GULKAROV, and ISRAILOV also arranged for medical practitioners, including physicians, to prescribe unnecessary medical treatments (including MRIs, EMG/NCV testing, spinal injections, and computerized radiologic mensuration analysis), unnecessary durable medical equipment (including cervical home traction devices and lumbar back support), and medically unnecessary medications (including prescription strength painkillers, topical creams, and topical gels). KHAIMOV and GULKAROV received kickbacks from MRI facilities, pain management doctors, and other specialized care providers, who performed these unnecessary medical treatments. KHAIMOV and GULKAROV further personally arranged for the unnecessary medications to be filled at pharmacies under the control of the conspirators.
GULKAROV also overbilled insurance companies for treatments provided by medical practitioners. In connection with the scheme, GULKAROV owned and operated a billing company, which submitted bills to insurance companies overstating the amount of time that practitioners spent treating patients. The billing company also used improper, unlisted billing codes to bill insurance companies in excess of what is permitted under No-Fault regulations.
The Bribery Scheme
KHAIMOV, GULKAROV, and ISRAILOV further agreed to pay bribes in connection with the above-described scheme. From at least 2014 through November 2019, they agreed with others to pay bribes to hospital employees, 911 dispatchers, and other individuals for the confidential names and numbers of motor vehicle accident victims. As part of the scheme, KHAIMOV, GULKAROV, and others provided approximately $150,000 for the creation of a call center that called victims and lied to them to induce victims to receive medical treatment at, among other places, clinics controlled by KHAIMOV, GULKAROV, and ISRAILOV. KHAIMOV and GULKAROV further personally paid the operation of the call center hundreds of thousands of dollars in bribe payments in cash.
As part of the bribery scheme, KHAIMOV also personally attempted to recruit others to disclose confidential names and numbers of motor vehicle accident victims. These people included, among others, a hospital employee. KHAIMOV was ultimately unsuccessful because these other individuals refused to provide confidential information.
As part of the scheme, GULKAROV arranged for an New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) officer to provide confidential information from NYPD servers. In particular, this officer sent GULKAROV over 400 photos of confidential NYPD motor vehicle accident reports using the encrypted messaging application, WhatsApp. GULKAROV then re-transmitted the reports to others so that they could call patients, lie to them, and direct them to clinics controlled by KHAIMOV, GULKAROV, and ISRAILOV.
Money Laundering and Obstruction Conduct
KHAIMOV, GULKAROV, and ISRAILOV laundered the proceeds of the bribery and healthcare fraud from the bank accounts of the medical clinics and pharmacies to personal accounts using a variety of methods. Among other things, KHAIMOV, GULKAROV, and ISRAILOV agreed to have medical practitioners sign blank checks from the clinics’ bank accounts, which KHAIMOV, GULKAROV, and ISRAILOV used to pay personal expenses such as luxury vacations around the world, expensive meals, jewelry, and parties. GULKAROV also used the blank checks to pay for hundreds of thousands of dollars of construction-related expenses for a three-story, multimillion dollar home in Queens, New York.
KHAIMOV, GULKAROV, and ISRAILOV arranged for checks from the clinics’ bank accounts to be cashed at shell companies under their control or the control of co-conspirators. Over two dozen of these shell companies were opened by foreign nationals, who entered the country on tourism visas, opened bank accounts for the shell companies, provided the debit cards to the co-conspirators, and then left the country.
KHAIMOV and GULKAROV additionally agreed to use the Wisnicki & Associates and Wisnicki Neuhauser (collectively, the “Wisnicki Firm”) to launder proceeds from the No-Fault scheme. KHAIMOV and GULKAROV wrote over $150,000 in checks to the Wisnicki Firm from the No-Fault clinics’ bank accounts. The Wisnicki Firm did not provide any legal services to the No-Fault clinics. Instead, the Wisnicki Firm used this money to purchase real estate for KHAIMOV and another individual. The conspirators deducted the payments to the Wisnicki Firm on the clinics’ tax returns as legal expenses.
In addition, GULKAROV engaged in a multi-month obstruction scheme beginning in February 2021. In February and March 2021, the Government served grand jury subpoenas on the medical practitioners involved in the No-Fault scheme. GULKAROV immediately contacted at least half-a-dozen of his co-conspirators and ordered them not to speak with law enforcement. In return, GULKAROV gave his co-conspirators money to pay for attorneys. GULKAROV also obtained the phones of multiple practitioners and deleted his communications with them from their devices.
Thereafter, on or about April 1, 2021, the Government served a grand jury subpoena on the Wisnicki Firm for documentation surrounding the $150,000 in payments made from the clinics to the Wisnicki Firm. GULKAROV agreed with others that the Wisnicki Firm would fabricate retainer agreements for transmission to the grand jury. The fabricated retainer agreements, which were backdated to 2016 and 2017, falsely represented that the No-Fault clinics had retained the Wisnicki Firm for legal services.
During the following months, in or about April and May 2021, GULKAROV approached multiple medical practitioners and ordered them to sign the backdated, fabricated retainer agreements. The medical practitioners complied. GULKAROV also provided these medical practitioners with checks, written from the Wisnicki Firm, returning the purported “retainer fees” paid to the Wisnicki Firm. GULKAROV ordered the medical practitioners to deposit the checks, withdraw the money in small cash increments, and return the cash to GULKAROV. At least one medical practitioner complied.
Lastly, in or about early 2022, KHAIMOV approached a cooperating witness (the “CW”), who was the registered owner of one of KHAIMOV’s pharmacies. KHAIMOV drove to the CW’s house and began honking his car horn outside. The CW came out, at which point KHAIMOV told the CW that he heard the CW was speaking with law enforcement. KHAIMOV instructed the CW to stop doing so.
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KHAIMOV, 44, GULKAROV, 37, and ISRAILOV, 42, all of Queens, New York, were each sentenced to three years of supervised release, respectively, and they were each ordered to forfeit money judgments of $40,000,000. The Court deferred determination of restitution.
Mr. Williams praised the investigative work of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
This case is being handled by the Office’s Complex Frauds and Cybercrime Unit and the White Plains Division. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Mathew Andrews, Ryan Allison, and Timothy V. Capozzi are in charge of the prosecution.
Damian Williams, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York; Naomi Gruchacz, the Special Agent in Charge of the New York Regional Office of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General (“HHS-OIG”); Brian J. Solecki, the Acting Special Agent in Charge of the Northeast Field Office of the U.S. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Defense Criminal Investigative Service (“DCIS”); Derek M. Holt, the Special Agent in Charge of the Office of Personnel Management, Office of the Inspector General (“OPM-OIG”); and Michael J. Waters, the Special Agent in Charge of the Eastern Field Office of the Amtrak Office of Inspector General (“Amtrak-OIG”), announced that the United States has settled a civil fraud lawsuit against LINCARE INC., a large durable medical equipment (“DME”) supplier with approximately 700 locations throughout the United States. The settlement resolves claims that LINCARE violated the False Claims Act by fraudulently continuing to bill federal health care programs for the rental of costly non-invasive ventilators (“NIVs”) when patients no longer needed or used the devices. The settlement also resolves claims that LINCARE violated the Anti-Kickback Statute by waiving coinsurance payments to induce certain Medicare and TRICARE beneficiaries to rent NIVs.
Under the settlement, which was approved yesterday by U.S. District Judge Paul G. Gardephe, LINCARE agreed to pay a total sum of $25.5 million, of which $24,228,517.96 will be paid to the United States and the remainder will be paid to various states. As part of the settlement, LINCARE also made factual admissions regarding its conduct. LINCARE admitted that it received reimbursement from federal health care programs for some NIV rental claims that did not comply with all of those programs’ billing rules and guidance. LINCARE also admitted that in some instances, it continued to seek monthly payments when it was aware that patients were not using the devices.
U.S. Attorney Damian Williams said: “When DME suppliers like Lincare knowingly seek federal funds for items that are not medically necessary and not being used, they threaten the sustainability and financial integrity of vital federal health care programs like Medicare and Medicaid. Companies will be held accountable for fraudulent billing practices that prioritize profits over legal obligations.”
HHS-OIG Special Agent in Charge Naomi Gruchacz said: “Individuals and entities that participate in the federal health care system are required to obey the laws meant to preserve the integrity of program funds and the provision of appropriate, quality services to patients. Our agency, working closely with our law enforcement partners, will continue to hold health care providers responsible for receiving improper payments from federal health care programs.”
DCIS Acting Special Agent in Charge Brian J. Solecki said: “This settlement makes clear that firms will pay a price for attempting to defraud the government. We, along with our federal partners, are committed to protecting taxpayers from companies that engage in deceptive practices.”
OPM-OIG Special Agent in Charge Derek M. Holt said: “I applaud the excellent work of our investigators and law enforcement partners on this case. We take all false claims seriously as the integrity of the federal health care programs relies on the submission of medically reasonable and necessary claims.”
Amtrak-OIG Special Agent in Charge Michael J. Waters said: “The favorable outcome in this case is a testament to the professionalism and teamwork displayed by our agents, our fellow investigative agencies, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office. We are very proud of this well-coordinated joint effort.”
As alleged in the Complaint filed in Manhattan federal court:
NIVs are a type of respiratory equipment designed to deliver pressurized air into the lungs of patients with respiratory failure. Patients frequently rent NIVs for regular use in their homes. During the period of January 1, 2013, through February 29, 2020 (the “Relevant Period”), Medicare and other federal health care programs reimbursed DME suppliers like LINCARE as much as $1,400 per month for supplying NIV rentals to patients.
When DME suppliers like LINCARE rent NIVs to federal health care program beneficiaries and seek reimbursement for such rentals, the DME suppliers must ensure that the NIVs continue to be used and that they remain medically reasonable and necessary during the rental period. For example, under Medicare, a DME supplier is required to monitor the extent to which the beneficiary is using the NIV at home and to maintain documentation to support that the device continues to be used and is medically reasonable and necessary. In addition, DME suppliers must discontinue billing federal health care programs when the NIV is no longer being used and is not medically reasonable and necessary.
LINCARE often continued to submit monthly claims for payments to federal health care programs when the NIVs were no longer medically necessary or the beneficiary had stopped using the device. LINCARE frequently did not know, or have documentation to support, that a patient continued to use or need the NIV. LINCARE nonetheless continued to seek monthly payments from federal health care programs for these NIV rentals.
LINCARE’s primary method to monitor patient usage of NIVs was by having their Respiratory Therapists (“RTs”) conduct home visits, during which RTs would evaluate the device’s settings, usage, and need for maintenance. As part of these “vent checks,” RTs were supposed to record the extent to which patients had been using the NIVs and confirm that they were using their devices as directed by their physicians. Under LINCARE’s own policy, home visits were supposed to occur at least every 60 days. However, LINCARE’s RTs frequently failed to comply with this policy; on tens of thousands of occasions during the Relevant Period, LINCARE failed to perform home visits for NIV patients as required by its policy. Further, when RTs did conduct vent checks, they often failed to record whether, and for how many hours, patients had used their NIVs. In some instances, LINCARE continued to seek monthly payments from federal health care programs when it was aware, through home visits and vent checks conducted by its RTs, that beneficiaries had stopped using their devices. LINCARE billed for NIVs in instances when the beneficiary had not used or had very rarely used the device for over a year.
Finally, in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute, LINCARE’s Regional Vice Presidents waived, either partially or in full, the coinsurance payment due from certain Medicare and TRICARE beneficiaries in an effort to persuade them to rent NIVs from LINCARE instead of another DME supplier. These coinsurance payment waivers were not based on an individualized assessment of the beneficiaries’ financial needs.
As part of the settlement, LINCARE admitted and accepted responsibility for certain conduct alleged by the United States, including the following:
In violation of LINCARE’s internal protocols, LINCARE’s center clinical staff frequently failed to visit NIV patients every 60 days to confirm that the patients were using their NIVs as directed by their physicians. Some centers lacked sufficient staff to adequately monitor patient progress and confirm that patients were using the devices as directed by their physicians. On many occasions, clinical staff did not perform home visits for NIV patients for several months.
In addition to conducting patient visits, LINCARE had the ability to remotely monitor certain patients’ NIV usage for certain newer NIV models through online cloud-based platforms. However, LINCARE did not use these systems to confirm that those patients were using the devices as directed.
LINCARE continued to seek monthly payments from federal health care programs for NIV rentals in many instances when its staff had not verified that patients were still using their NIVs or had not maintained documentation showing that the patient continued to use the devices.
In some instances, LINCARE continued to seek monthly payments from federal health care programs when it was aware that patients were not using the devices.
On certain occasions, LINCARE granted coinsurance payment waivers that were not based on the patient’s financial need in order to persuade patients to rent NIVs.
As a result of the above-referenced conduct, LINCARE received reimbursements from federal health care programs for some NIV rental claims that did not comply with all of those programs’ billing rules and guidance.
In connection with the filing of the lawsuit and settlement, the Government joined a private whistleblower lawsuit that had been filed under seal pursuant to the False Claims Act.
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Mr. Williams thanked the Washington and Texas State Medicaid Fraud Control Units for their extensive collaboration in the investigation and resolution of this case, and also praised the outstanding investigative work of HHS-OIG, DCIS, OPM-OIG, and Amtrak-OIG.
The case is being handled by the Office’s Civil Frauds Unit. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Charles S. Jacob, Ilan Stein, and Amanda Lee are in charge of the case.
Robert Khuzami, Attorney for the United States, Acting Under Authority Conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 515, announced that GARY HIRST pled guilty today to defrauding a Native American tribal entity and various investment advisory clients of tens of millions of dollars in connection with the issuance of bonds by the tribal entity and the subsequent sale of those bonds through fraudulent and deceptive means. HIRST pled guilty to conspiracy to commit securities fraud, securities fraud, investment adviser fraud, and conspiracy to commit investment adviser fraud before U.S. Magistrate Judge Barbara Moses.
Mr. Khuzami said: “Today, Gary Hirst admitted that he and his co-conspirators placed tens of millions of dollars of Native American bonds with clients of an investment advisory firm, without telling those clients about numerous conflicts of interest surrounding the issuance and placement of the bonds. In addition, Hirst and his co-conspirators then misappropriated the bond proceeds, by failing to invest the money as promised and instead using it to finance their other business endeavors and to pay personal expenses. Now, thanks to the dedicated work of the U.S. Postal Inspection Service and the FBI, Hirst will have to answer for his crimes.”
According to the allegations contained in the Superseding Indictment filed against GARY HIRST and his co-conspirators and statements made in related court filings and proceedings[1]:
From March 2014 through April 2016, HIRST, along with his co-conspirators Jason Galanis, John Galanis, a/k/a “Yanni,” Hugh Dunkerley, Michelle Morton, Devon Archer, and Bevan Cooney, engaged in a fraudulent scheme to misappropriate the proceeds of bonds issued by the Wakpamni Lake Community Corporation (“WLCC”), a Native American tribal entity (the “Tribal Bonds”), and to use funds in the accounts of clients of asset management firms controlled by HIRST and others to purchase the Tribal Bonds, which the clients were then unable to redeem or sell because the bonds were illiquid and lacked a ready secondary market.
The WLCC was convinced to issue the Tribal Bonds through false and fraudulent representations by John Galanis. Once the Tribal Bonds were issued, HIRST and Morton used funds belonging to clients of two related investment advisers, Hughes Capital Management, Inc. (“Hughes”) – where HIRST served as Chief Investment Officer – and Atlantic Asset Management, LLC (“Atlantic”), to purchase the Tribal Bonds, even though HIRST and Morton were well aware that material facts about the Tribal Bonds had been withheld from clients in whose accounts they were placed, including the fact that the Tribal Bond purchases fell outside of the investment parameters set forth in the investment advisory contracts of certain Hughes clients and of the Atlantic pooled investment vehicle in which the Tribal Bonds were purchased. In addition, HIRST and his co-defendants failed to apprise clients of Hughes and Atlantic regarding substantial conflicts of interest with respect to the issuance and placement of the Tribal Bonds before the Tribal Bonds were purchased on these clients’ behalf.
Hughes and Atlantic clients were provided no prior notice that HIRST and Morton caused them to purchase the Tribal Bonds. When these clients learned about the purchase of the Tribal Bonds in their accounts, several of them demanded that the Tribal Bonds be sold. However, because there was no ready secondary market for the Tribal Bonds, no Tribal Bonds have been sold from any Hughes or Atlantic client accounts.
Documents governing the Tribal Bonds specified that an investment manager would invest the proceeds of the Tribal Bonds in investments that would generate annuity payments sufficient to pay interest on the Tribal Bonds and provide funds to the WLCC to be used for tribal economic development purposes. In fact, none of the proceeds of the Tribal Bonds were turned over to the investment manager specified in the closing documents. Instead, significant portions of the proceeds were misappropriated by the defendants for their personal and professional use.
Specifically, the proceeds of the Tribal Bonds were deposited into a bank account in the name of Wealth Assurance Private Client Corporation (“WAPCC”), an entity controlled by HIRST and Dunkerley. Dunkerley transferred more than $38 million from the WAPCC account to an account controlled by Jason Galanis, who then misappropriated more than $8.5 million of the proceeds for his personal use, including for expenses associated with his home, jewelry and clothing purchases, travel and entertainment, and restaurant meals.
In addition, a portion of the misappropriated proceeds were recycled and provided by Jason Galanis to entities affiliated with Archer and Cooney in order to enable Archer and Cooney to purchase subsequent Tribal Bonds issued by the WLCC. As a result of the use of recycled proceeds to purchase additional issuances of Tribal Bonds, the face amount of Tribal Bonds outstanding increased and the amount of interest payable by the WLCC increased, but the actual bond proceeds available for investment on behalf of the WLCC did not increase.
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GARY HIRST, 65, pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, which carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison and a maximum fine of $250,000 or twice the gross gain or loss from the offense; one count of securities fraud, which carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison and a maximum fine of $5,000,000 or twice the gross gain or loss from the offense; one count of conspiracy to commit investment adviser fraud, which carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison and a maximum fine of $250,000 or twice the gross gain or loss from the offense; and one count of investment adviser fraud, which also which carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison and a maximum fine of $250,000 or twice the gross gain or loss from the offense.
Jason Galanis, 47, pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, which carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison and a maximum fine of $250,000 or twice the gross gain or loss from the offense; one count of securities fraud, which carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison and a maximum fine of $5,000,000 or twice the gross gain or loss from the offense; and one count of conspiracy to commit investment adviser fraud, which carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison and a maximum fine of $250,000 or twice the gross gain or loss from the offense. On August 11, 2017, Galanis was sentenced principally to a term of 173 months in prison.
Hugh Dunkerley, 44, pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, which carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison and a maximum fine of $250,000 or twice the gross gain or loss from the offense; two counts of securities fraud, each of which carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison and a maximum fine of $5,000,000 or twice the gross gain or loss from the offense; one count of bankruptcy fraud, which carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison and a maximum fine of $250,000 or twice the gross gain or loss from the offense; and one count of falsification of records with the intent to obstruct a Government investigation, which carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison and a maximum fine of $5,000,000 or twice the gross gain or loss from the offense.
The maximum potential sentences in this case are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendants will be determined by the judge.
Trial against the remaining defendants is scheduled to begin on May 22, 2018, before U.S. District Judge Ronnie Abrams.
The guilty plea in this matter is HIRST’s second conviction in this District on charges of securities fraud. On September 28, 2016, HIRST was convicted following a jury trial before U.S. District Judge P. Kevin Castel for several offenses relating to a scheme to manipulate the market for shares of Gerova Financial Group, Ltd. (“Gerova”), a publicly traded company listed on the New York Stock Exchange. In that case, HIRST was sentenced to a term of 78 months in prison.
Mr. Khuzami praised the work of the U.S. Postal Inspection Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and thanked the SEC.
This case is being handled by the Office’s Securities and Commodities Fraud Task Force. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Rebecca Mermelstein, Brendan F. Quigley, and Negar Tekeei are in charge of the prosecution.
[1] As for the defendants who have not pled guilty (John Galanis, Michelle Morton, Devon Archer, and Bevan Cooney) the description of the charges set forth herein constitute only allegations.
Geoffrey S. Berman, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and Stacy Amin, Chief Counsel for the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), announced today that the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York has entered an injunction against defendants RAHSAN A. HAKIM (“Hakim”) and ADONIIAH A. RAHSAN (“Rahsan”) (collectively, the “Defendants”) for repeated violations of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. HAKIM and RAHSAN do business as Sundial Herbal Products (“Sundial”).
U.S. Attorney Geoffrey S. Berman said: “If you threaten the public health by selling unapproved or misbranded drugs, we will stop you. There is no place for modern-day snake oil salesmen.”
FDA Chief Counsel Stacy Amin said: “Americans expect and deserve medical treatments that have been scientifically proven to be safe and effective. Making claims that unproven drugs can cure or prevent diseases places consumers’ health at risk. We remain committed to pursuing and taking swift action against those who attempt to subvert the regulatory functions of the FDA by repeatedly disregarding the law and distributing unapproved products.”
The Complaint
According to the Government’s complaint, Defendants manufactured and sold various herbal products – often referred to as “tonics” and “herbal teas” – that constitute unapproved new drugs. Defendants claimed that these products cure, treat, and/or prevent numerous diseases and conditions, including HIV, cancer, syphilis, diabetes, high blood pressure, arthritis, asthma, and heart disease. None of Defendants’ products had been tested or approved by the FDA for safety or effectiveness. These products were also “misbranded” in that they failed to include instructions for their safe use. Defendants’ sale of such products pose a threat to public health because the products’ disease treatment claims may cause consumers to delay appropriate medical care for these serious medical issues. Sundial had been inspected by the FDA multiple times, including during the pendency of the lawsuit, and, despite repeated promises to do so, Defendants failed to correct their violations of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”).
The United States filed this lawsuit seeking to enjoin Defendants from manufacturing and selling drugs in violation of the FDCA.
The District Court’s Findings
On May 26, 2020, the District Court found that Defendants have repeatedly violated the law by distributing unapproved new and misbranded drugs. Among other things, the Court concluded that:
“The labels that the FDA collected . . . indisputably establish that Defendants claimed that their products were intended for use in diagnosing, curing, mitigating, treating, and/or preventing a wide variety of diseases.”
The drugs sold by Defendants were “unapproved new drugs” because, among other things, they are “not generally recognized as safe and effective” and have not been approved by the FDA.
Defendants’ drugs were “misbranded” because “the record shows that many of Defendants’ drugs are intended for treating serious diseases or conditions such as HIV, cancer, and Ebola, all of which require diagnosis and management by a physician . . . . As such, they are only safe for use under the supervision of a physician, which brings them within the definition of prescription drugs.” Furthermore, “Defendants’ drugs are also misbranded because they lack adequate instructions for lay use.”
“Defendants’ past violations are also egregious, as they made claims that their products could cure cancer, HIV, and Ebola, among other serious diseases,” and “absent injunctive relief, nothing prevents Defendants from returning to their old ways.”
Permanent Injunction
After finding that Defendants had committed “egregious” violations of the law, the Court entered a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants from manufacturing or selling these products or any drug unless and until either: (1) a new drug application is approved for their drugs; or (2) they meet various requirements demonstrating compliance with the FDCA. Such requirements include that Defendants must:
Remove all claims in labels, promotional material, websites, and social media pages that these herbal remedies diagnose, cure, mitigate, treat, or prevent disease.
Recall and destroy, at their own cost, under the FDA’s supervision, all drugs manufactured, packed, labeled, held, and distributed from 2014 through the present.
Retain, at their own cost, a qualified, trained, and experienced drug labeling expert to review and report to the FDA on Defendants’ compliance with the issued injunction and FDCA.
Arrange for annual audits by an independent third-party to confirm ongoing compliance.
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Mr. Berman thanked the investigators and attorneys of the FDA for their valuable assistance on this matter.
This case was handled by the Environmental Protection Unit of the Office’s Civil Division. Assistant U.S. Attorney Emily Bretz is in charge of this case.
Geoffrey S. Berman, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and William F. Sweeney Jr., Assistant Director-in-Charge of the New York Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), announced today the unsealing of a criminal Complaint charging WILLIAM McFARLAND with wire fraud and money laundering, in connection with conducting a sham ticket scheme in which he purported to sell fraudulent tickets to exclusive fashion, music, and sporting events through NYC VIP Access, a company controlled by McFARLAND, and also caused the fraud proceeds to be sent to others’ financial accounts in an effort to conceal his ownership and control of the funds. McFARLAND is expected to be presented before U.S. Magistrate Gabriel W. Gorenstein today.
Manhattan U.S. Attorney Geoffrey Berman said: “William McFarland, already awaiting sentencing for a prior fraud scheme, allegedly continued to conduct criminal business as usual, selling nonexistent tickets to fashion, music, and sporting events. As alleged, McFarland’s purported exclusive event ticket company, NYC VIP Access, in fact had no access to events for which he sold bogus tickets. Now McFarland faces criminal charges on top of those to which he already pled guilty.”
FBI Assistant Director-in-Charge William F. Sweeney Jr. said: “In March of 2018, William McFarland pled guilty to defrauding investors and vendors of the Fyre Festival, but it is apparent that he did not stop there. McFarland allegedly went on to sell fraudulent tickets to many grand events, totaling almost $100,000. Today’s charges depict our intolerance for such fraudulent activity, and we will continue to diligently investigate acts such as this.”
According to the allegations in the Complaint[1] unsealed today in Manhattan federal court:
On March 6, 2018, McFARLAND pled guilty before United States District Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald to one count of wire fraud in connection with a scheme to defraud over 80 investors in Fyre Media and Fyre Festival LLC of over $24 million in losses, and one count of wire fraud with a scheme to defraud a ticket vendor for the Fyre Festival of $2 million in losses. United States v. William McFarland, 17 Cr. 600 (NRB). McFARLAND has been on pretrial release since July 1, 2017, and is currently awaiting sentencing in that case.
From at least in or about late 2017, up to and including at least in or about March 2018, McFARLAND owned NYC VIP Access, a company based in New York, New York, that purported to be in the business of obtaining and selling for profit tickets to various exclusive events including fashion galas, music festivals, and sporting events. NYC VIP Access purported to sell tickets to the following events, among others: the 2018 Met Gala, Burning Man 2018, Coachella 2018, the 2018 Grammy Awards, Super Bowl LII, and a Cleveland Cavaliers game and team dinner with Lebron James. McFARLAND, while on pretrial release, perpetrated a scheme to defraud attendees of the Fyre Festival and others by soliciting them to purchase tickets from NYC VIP Access to exclusive events when, in fact, no such tickets existed.
McFARLAND took steps to make NYC VIP Access appear as it if were controlled and operated by other individuals. In soliciting ticket sales, McFARLAND used an email account in the name of a then-employee (“Employee-1”) in order to hide his affiliation with NYC VIP Access. McFARLAND provided prospective customers with contracts that falsely represented that NYC VIP Access had tickets to exclusive events in fashion, music, and sports. In order to distance himself from the operation, McFARLAND directed that Employee-1 sign the contracts between NYC VIP Access and the customers. After McFARLAND induced customers to wire money for tickets, McFARLAND either did not provide tickets at all, or did not provide tickets as advertised. McFARLAND charged at least approximately $100,000 in fraudulent tickets to at least approximately 15 customer-victims. McFARLAND instructed and caused ticket sale proceeds to be sent to a bank account belonging to Employee-1, to which McFARLAND had access and control, or a mobile payment service account belonging to another employee (“Employee-2”), for the purpose of concealing his ownership and control of the funds.
* * *
McFARLAND, 26, of New York, New York, is charged with one count of wire fraud, which carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison, and one count of money laundering, which carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison.
The maximum potential sentences are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendant will be determined by the judge.
Mr. Berman praised the investigative work of the FBI’s New York Field Office.
The case is being prosecuted by the Office’s Complex Frauds and Cybercrime Unit. Assistant United State Attorney Kristy J. Greenberg is in charge of the prosecution.
The charges contained in the Complaint are merely accusations, and the defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.
[1] As the introductory phase signifies, the entirety of the text of the Complaint, and the description of the Complaint set forth herein, constitute only allegations, and every fact described should be treated as an allegation.
Description: The fiscal year of the data file obtained from the AOUSC
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Description: The code of the federal judicial district where the case was located
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Description: Docket number assigned by the district to the case
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Description: A unique number assigned to each defendant in a case which cannot be modified by the court
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Description: A unique number assigned to each defendant in a case which can be modified by the court
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Description: The date when a defendant first appeared before a judicial officer in the district court where a charge was pending
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Description: A code indicating the severity associated with FTITLE1
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Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense committed which carried the second highest severity
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Description: A code indicating the severity associated with FTITLE3
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Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with FTITLE4
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Description: A code indicating the severity associated with FTITLE4
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Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense committed which carried the fifth highest severity
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Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with FTITLE5
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Description: The FIPS code used to indicate the county or parish where an offense was committed
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Description: The date of the last action taken on the record
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Description: The date upon which judicial proceedings before the court concluded
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Description: The date upon which the final sentence is recorded on the docket
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Description: The date upon which the case was closed
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Description: A count of defendants filed whose proceedings commenced by reopen, remand, appeal, or retrial
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Description: A count of defendants terminated excluding interdistrict transfers
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Description: A count of original proceedings terminated
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Description: A count of defendants terminated whose proceedings commenced by reopen, remand, appeal, or retrial
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Description: A sequential number indicating the iteration of the defendant record
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Description: The date the record was loaded into the AOUSC’s NewSTATS database
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Description: Statistical year ID label on data file obtained from the AOUSC which represents termination year
Description: The fiscal year of the data file obtained from the AOUSC
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Description: The code of the federal judicial circuit where the case was located
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Description: The code of the federal judicial district where the case was located
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Description: The code of the district office where the case was located
Format: A2
Description: Docket number assigned by the district to the case
Format: A7
Description: A unique number assigned to each defendant in a case which cannot be modified by the court
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Description: A unique number assigned to each defendant in a case which can be modified by the court
Format: A3
Description: A sequential number indicating whether a case is an original proceeding or a reopen
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Description: Case type associated with the current defendant record
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Description: Case type associated with a magistrate case if the current case was merged from a magistrate case
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Description: A concatenation of district, office, docket number, case type, and reopen sequence number
Format: A15
Description: The docket number originally given to a case assigned to a magistrate judge and subsequently merged into a criminal case
Format: A7
Description: A unique number assigned to each defendant in a magistrate case
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Description: The date upon which a fugitive defendant was taken into custody
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Description: The date when a case was first docketed in the district court
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which proceedings in a case commenced on charges pending in the district court where the defendant appeared, or the date of the defendant’s felony-waiver of indictment
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Description: The date when a defendant first appeared before a judicial officer in the district court where a charge was pending
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Description: A code indicating the event by which a defendant appeared before a judicial officer in the district court where a charge was pending
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Description: A code indicating the type of legal counsel assigned to a defendant
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Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with FTITLE1
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Description: A code indicating the severity associated with FTITLE1
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Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense committed which carried the second highest severity
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Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense committed which carried the third highest severity
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Description: A code indicating the severity associated with FTITLE3
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Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense committed which carried the fourth highest severity
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Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with FTITLE4
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Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with FTITLE4
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Description: A code indicating the severity associated with FTITLE4
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Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense committed which carried the fifth highest severity
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Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with FTITLE5
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Description: The FIPS code used to indicate the county or parish where an offense was committed
Format: A5
Description: The date of the last action taken on the record
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Description: The date upon which judicial proceedings before the court concluded
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Description: The date upon which the final sentence is recorded on the docket
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Description: The date upon which the case was closed
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Description: The total fine imposed at sentencing for all offenses of which the defendant was convicted and a fine was imposed
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Description: A count of defendants filed including inter-district transfers
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Description: A count of defendants filed excluding inter-district transfers
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Description: A count of original proceedings commenced
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Description: A count of defendants filed whose proceedings commenced by reopen, remand, appeal, or retrial
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Description: A count of defendants terminated including interdistrict transfers
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Description: A count of defendants terminated excluding interdistrict transfers
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Description: A count of original proceedings terminated
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Description: A count of defendants terminated whose proceedings commenced by reopen, remand, appeal, or retrial
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Description: A count of defendants pending as of the last day of the period including long term fugitives
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Description: A count of defendants pending as of the last day of the period excluding long term fugitives
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Description: The source from which the data were loaded into the AOUSC’s NewSTATS database
Format: A10
Description: A sequential number indicating the iteration of the defendant record
Format: N2
Description: The date the record was loaded into the AOUSC’s NewSTATS database
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: Statistical year ID label on data file obtained from the AOUSC which represents termination year
Robert Khuzami, Attorney for the United States, Acting Under Authority Conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 515, William F. Sweeney Jr., the Assistant Director-in-Charge of the New York Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), and James D. Robnett, the Special Agent-in-Charge of the New York Field Office of the Internal Revenue Service, Criminal Investigation (“IRS-CI”), announced today the guilty plea of MICHAEL COHEN to charges of tax evasion, making false statements to a federally-insured bank, and campaign finance violations. The plea was entered followed the filing of an eight-count criminal information, which alleged that COHEN concealed more than $4 million in personal income from the IRS, made false statements to a federally-insured financial institution in connection with a $500,000 home equity loan, and, in 2016, caused $280,000 in payments to be made to silence two women who otherwise planned to speak publicly about their alleged affairs with a presidential candidate, thereby intending to influence the 2016 presidential election. COHEN pled guilty today before U.S. District Judge William H. Pauley III.
Attorney for the United States Robert Khuzami said: “Michael Cohen is a lawyer who, rather than setting an example of respect for the law, instead chose to break the law, repeatedly over many years and in a variety of ways. His day of reckoning serves as a reminder that we are a nation of laws, with one set of rules that applies equally to everyone.”
FBI Assistant Director-in-Charge William F. Sweeney Jr. said: “This investigation uncovered crimes of fraud, deception and evasion, conducted through a string of financial transactions that were carefully constructed and concealed to protect a variety of interests. But as we all know, the truth can only remain hidden for so long before the FBI brings it to light. We are all expected to follow the rule of law, and the public expects us - the FBI - to enforce the law equally. Today, Mr. Cohen has been reminded of this important lesson, as he acknowledged with his guilty plea.”
IRS-CI Special Agent-in-Charge James D. Robnett said: “Today’s guilty plea exemplifies IRS Special Agents' rigorous pursuit of tax evasion and sends the clear message that the tax laws apply to everybody. Mr. Cohen’s greed to hide his income from the IRS cheats all the honest taxpayers, and we should not expect law abiding citizens to foot the bill for those who circumvent the system to evade paying their fair share.”
According to the allegations in the Information unsealed today as well as statements made in Manhattan federal court:
From 2007 through January 2017, COHEN was an attorney and employee of a Manhattan-based real estate company (the “Company”). COHEN held the title of “Executive Vice President” and “Special Counsel” to the owner of the Company (“Individual-1”). In January 2017, COHEN left the Company and began holding himself out as the “personal attorney” to Individual-1, who by that time had become the President of the United States.
In addition to working for and earning income from the Organization, at all times relevant to this Information, COHEN owned taxi medallions in New York City and Chicago worth millions of dollars. COHEN owned these taxi medallions as investments and leased the medallions to operators who paid COHEN a portion of the operating income.
The Tax Evasion Scheme
In late 2013, COHEN retained an accountant (“Accountant-1”) for the purpose of handling COHEN’s personal and entity tax returns. After being retained, Accountant-1 filed amended 2011 and 2012 Form 1040 tax returns with the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). For tax years 2013 through 2016, Accountant-1 prepared individual returns for COHEN and returns for COHEN’s medallion and real estate entities. To confirm he had reviewed and approved these returns, both COHEN and his wife signed a Form 8879 for tax years 2013 through 2016, and filed manually for tax year 2012. Between 2012 and the end of 2016, COHEN earned more than $2.4 million in income from a series of personal loans made by COHEN to a taxi operator to whom COHEN leased certain of his Chicago taxi medallions (“Taxi Operator-1”), none of which he disclosed to the IRS.
As a further part of the scheme to evade paying income taxes, COHEN also concealed more than $1.3 million in income he received from another taxi operator to whom COHEN leased certain of his New York medallions (“Taxi Operator-2”). This income took two forms. First, COHEN did not report the substantial majority of a bonus payment of at least $870,000, which was made by Taxi Operator-2 in 2012 to induce COHEN to allow Taxi Operator-2 to operate certain of COHEN’s medallions. Second, between 2012 and 2016, COHEN concealed nearly $1 million in taxable income he received from Taxi Operator-2’s operation of certain of COHEN’s taxi medallions.
To ensure the concealment of this additional operator income, COHEN arranged to receive a portion of the medallion income personally, as opposed to having the income paid to COHEN’s medallion entities. Paying the medallion entities would have alerted Accountant-1, who prepared the returns for those entities, to the existence of the income such that it would have been included on COHEN’s tax returns.
As a further part of his scheme to evade taxes, COHEN also hid the following additional sources of income from Accountant-1 and the IRS:
A $100,000 payment received, in 2014, for brokering the sale of a piece of property in a private aviation community in Ocala, Florida.
Approximately $30,000 in profit made, in 2014, for brokering the sale of a Birkin Bag, a highly coveted French handbag that retails for between $11,900 to $300,000, depending on the type of leather or animal skin used.
More than $200,000 in consulting income earned in 2016 from an assisted living company purportedly for COHEN’s “consulting” on real estate and other projects.
In total, COHEN failed to report more than $4 million in income, resulting in the avoidance of taxes of more than $1.4 million due to the IRS.
False Statements to a Bank
In 2010, COHEN, through companies he controlled, executed a $6.4 million promissory note with a bank (“Bank-1”), collateralized by COHEN’s taxi medallions and personally guaranteed by COHEN. A year later, in 2011, COHEN personally obtained a $6 million line of credit from Bank-1 (the “Line of Credit”), also collateralized by his taxi medallions. By February 2013, COHEN had increased the Line of Credit from $6 million to $14 million, thereby increasing COHEN’s personal medallion liabilities at Bank-1 to more than $20 million.
In November 2014, COHEN refinanced his medallion debt at Bank-1 with another bank (“Bank-2”), who shared the debt with a New York-based credit union (the “Credit Union”). The transaction was structured as a package of individual loans to the entities that owned COHEN’s New York medallions. Following the loans’ closing, COHEN’s medallion debt at Bank-1 was paid off with funds from Bank-2 and the Credit Union, and the Line of Credit with Bank-1 was closed.
In 2013, in connection with a successful application for a mortgage from another Bank (“Bank-3”) for his Park Avenue condominium (the “2013 Application”), COHEN disclosed only the $6.4 million medallion loan he had with Bank-1 at the time. As noted above, COHEN also had a larger, $14 million Line of Credit with Bank-1 secured by his medallions, which COHEN did not disclose in the 2013 Application.
In February 2015, COHEN, in an attempt to secure financing from Bank-3 to purchase a summer home for approximately $8.5 million, again concealed the $14 million Line of Credit. Specifically, in connection with this proposed transaction, Bank-3 obtained a 2014 personal financial statement COHEN had provided to Bank-2 while refinancing his medallion debt. Bank-3 questioned COHEN about the $14 million Line of Credit reflected on that personal financial statement, because COHEN had omitted that debt from the 2013 Application to Bank-3. COHEN misled Bank-3, stating, in writing, that the $14 million Line of Credit was undrawn and that he would close it. In truth and in fact, COHEN had effectively overdrawn the Line of Credit, having swapped it out for a fully drawn, larger loan shared by Bank-2 and the Credit Union upon refinancing his medallion debt. When Bank-3 informed COHEN that it would only provide financing if COHEN closed the Line of Credit, COHEN lied again, misleadingly stating in an email: “The medallion line was closed in the middle of November 2014.”
In December 2015, COHEN contacted Bank-3 to apply for a home equity line of credit (“HELOC”). In so doing, COHEN again significantly understated his medallion debt. Specifically, in the HELOC application, COHEN, together with his wife, represented a positive net worth of more than $40 million, again omitting the $14 million in medallion debt with Bank-2 and the Credit Union. Because COHEN had previously confirmed in writing to Bank-3 that the $14 million Line of Credit had been closed, Bank-3 had no reason to question COHEN about the omission of this liability on the HELOC application. In addition, in seeking the HELOC, COHEN substantially and materially understated his monthly expenses to Bank-3 by omitting at least $70,000 in monthly interest payments due to Bank-2 on the true amount of his medallion debt.
In April 2016, Bank-3 approved COHEN for a $500,000 HELOC. By fraudulently concealing truthful information about his financial condition, COHEN obtained a HELOC that Bank-3 would otherwise not have approved.
Campaign Finance Violations
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended, Title 52, United States Code, Section 30101, et seq., (the “Election Act”), regulates the influence of money on politics. At all relevant times, the Election Act set certain limitations and prohibitions, among them: (a) individual contributions to any presidential candidate, including expenditures coordinated with a candidate or his political committee, were limited to $2,700 per election, and presidential candidates and their committees were prohibited from accepting contributions from individuals in excess of this limit; and (b) Corporations were prohibited from making contributions directly to presidential candidates, including expenditures coordinated with candidates or their committees, and candidates were prohibited from accepting corporate contributions.
On June 16, 2015, Individual-1 began his presidential campaign. While COHEN continued to work at the Company and did not have a formal title with the campaign, he had a campaign email address and, at various times, advised the campaign, including on matters of interest to the press, and made televised and media appearances on behalf of the campaign.
In August 2015, the Chairman and Chief Executive of Corporation-1, a media company that owns, among other things, a popular tabloid magazine (“Chairman-1” and “Magazine-1,” respectively”), in coordination with COHEN and one or more members of the campaign, offered to help deal with negative stories about Individual-1’s relationships with women by, among other things, assisting the campaign in identifying such stories so they could be purchased and their publication avoided. Chairman-1 agreed to keep COHEN apprised of any such negative stories.
Consistent with the agreement described above, Corporation-1 advised COHEN of negative stories during the course of the campaign, and COHEN, with the assistance of Corporation-1, was able to arrange for the purchase of two stories so as to suppress them and prevent them from influencing the election.
First, in June 2016, a model and actress (“Woman-1”) began attempting to sell her story of her alleged extramarital affair with Individual-1 that had taken place in 2006 and 2007, knowing the story would be of considerable value because of the election. Woman-1 retained an attorney (“Attorney-1”), who in turn contacted the editor-in-chief of Magazine-1 (“Editor-1”), and offered to sell Woman-1’s story to Magazine-1. Chairman-1 and Editor-1 informed COHEN of the story. At COHEN’s urging and subject to COHEN’s promise that Corporation-1 would be reimbursed, Editor-1 ultimately began negotiating for the purchase of the story.
On August 5, 2016, Corporation-1 entered into an agreement with Woman-1 to acquire her “limited life rights” to the story of her relationship with “any then-married man,” in exchange for $150,000 and a commitment to feature her on two magazine covers and publish more than 100 magazine articles authored by her. Despite the cover and article features to the agreement, its principal purpose, as understood by those involved, including COHEN, was to suppress Woman-1’s story so as to prevent it from influencing the election.
Between late August 2016 and September 2016, COHEN agreed with Chairman-1 to assign the rights to the non-disclosure portion of Corporation-1’s agreement with Woman-1 to COHEN for $125,000. COHEN incorporated a shell entity called “Resolution Consultants LLC” for use in the transaction. Both Chairman-1 and COHEN ultimately signed the agreement, and a consultant for Corporation-1, using his own shell entity, provided COHEN with an invoice for the payment of $125,000. However, in early October 2016, after the assignment agreement was signed but before COHEN had paid the $125,000, Chairman-1 contacted COHEN and told him, in substance, that the deal was off and that COHEN should tear up the assignment agreement.
Second, on October 8, 2016, an agent for an adult film actress (“Woman-2”) informed Editor-1 that Woman-2 was willing to make public statements and confirm on the record her alleged past affair with Individual-1. Chairman-1 and Editor-1 then contacted COHEN and put him in touch with Attorney-1, who was also representing Woman-2. Over the course of the next few days, COHEN negotiated a $130,000 agreement with Attorney-1 to himself purchase Woman-2’s silence, and received a signed confidential settlement agreement and a separate side letter agreement from Attorney-1.
COHEN did not immediately execute the agreement, nor did he pay Woman-2. On the evening of October 25, 2016, with no deal with Woman-2 finalized, Attorney-1 told Editor-1 that Woman-2 was close to completing a deal with another outlet to make her story public. Editor-1, in turn, texted COHEN that “[w]e have to coordinate something on the matter [Attorney-1 is] calling you about or it could look awfully bad for everyone.” Chairman-1 and Editor-1 then called COHEN through an encrypted telephone application. COHEN agreed to make the payment, and then called Attorney-1 to finalize the deal.
The next day, on October 26, 2016, COHEN emailed an incorporating service to obtain the corporate formation documents for another shell corporation, Essential Consultants LLC, which COHEN had incorporated a few days prior. Later that afternoon, COHEN drew down $131,000 from the fraudulently obtained HELOC and requested that it be deposited into a bank account COHEN had just opened in the name of Essential Consultants. The next morning, on October 27, 2016, COHEN went to Bank-3 and wired approximately $130,000 from Essential Consultants to Attorney-1. On the bank form to complete the wire, COHEN falsely indicated that the “purpose of wire being sent” was “retainer.” On November 1, 2016, COHEN received from Attorney-1 copies of the final, signed confidential settlement agreement and side letter agreement.
COHEN caused and made the payments described herein in order to influence the 2016 presidential election. In so doing, he coordinated with one or more members of the campaign, including through meetings and phone calls, about the fact, nature, and timing of the payments. As a result of the payments solicited and made by COHEN, neither Woman-1 nor Woman-2 spoke to the press prior to the election.
In January 2017, COHEN in seeking reimbursement for election-related expenses, presented executives of the Company with a copy of a bank statement from the Essential Consultants bank account, which reflected the $130,000 payment COHEN had made to the bank account of Attorney-1 in order to keep Woman-2 silent in advance of the election, plus a $35 wire fee, adding, in handwriting, an additional “$50,000.” The $50,000 represented a claimed payment for “tech services,” which in fact related to work COHEN had solicited from a technology company during and in connection with the campaign. COHEN added these amounts to a sum of $180,035. After receiving this document, executives of the Company “grossed up” for tax purposes COHEN’s requested reimbursement of $180,000 to $360,000, and then added a bonus of $60,000 so that COHEN would be paid $420,000 in total. Executives of the Company also determined that the $420,000 would be paid to COHEN in monthly amounts of $35,000 over the course of 12 months, and that COHEN should send invoices for these payments.
On February 14, 2017, COHEN sent an executive of the Company (“Executive-1”) the first of his monthly invoices, requesting “[p]ursuant to [a] retainer agreement, . . . payment for services rendered for the months of January and February, 2017.” The invoice listed $35,000 for each of those two months. Executive-1 forwarded the invoice to another executive of the Company (“Executive-2”) the same day by email, and it was approved. Executive-1 forwarded that email to another employee at the Company, stating: “Please pay from the Trust. Post to legal expenses. Put ‘retainer for the months of January and February 2017’ in the description.”
Throughout 2017, COHEN sent to one or more representatives of the Company monthly invoices, which stated, “Pursuant to the retainer agreement, kindly remit payment for services rendered for” the relevant month in 2017, and sought $35,000 per month. The Company accounted for these payments as legal expenses. In truth and in fact, there was no such retainer agreement, and the monthly invoices COHEN submitted were not in connection with any legal services he had provided in 2017.
During 2017, pursuant to the invoices described above, COHEN received monthly $35,000 reimbursement checks, totaling $420,000.
* * *
COHEN, 51, of NEW YORK, NEW YORK, pleaded guilty to five counts of willful tax evasion; one count of making false statements to a bank; one count of causing an unlawful campaign contribution; and one count of making an excessive campaign contribution.
COHEN’S sentencing is scheduled for December 12 at 11 a.m.
A chart identifying the charges and the maximum penalties applicable to COHEN is below.
Count
Charge
Maximum Penalty
1-5
Tax Evasion
5 years in prison
6
Making false statements to a federally insured bank
30 years in prison
7
Causing an unlawful corporate contribution
5 years in prison
8
Making an excessive campaign contribution
5 years in prison
The maximum potential sentences in this case are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencings of the defendant will be determined by the judge.
Mr. Khuzami praised the work of the FBI, the IRS, and the Special Agents of the U.S. Attorney’s Office.
This case is being handled by the Office’s Public Corruption Unit. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Andrea M. Griswold, Rachel Maimin, Thomas McKay, and Nicolas Roos are in charge of the prosecution.
Description: The fiscal year of the data file obtained from the AOUSC
Format: YYYY
Description: The code of the federal judicial circuit where the case was located
Format: A2
Description: The code of the federal judicial district where the case was located
Format: A2
Description: The code of the district office where the case was located
Format: A2
Description: Docket number assigned by the district to the case
Format: A7
Description: A unique number assigned to each defendant in a case which cannot be modified by the court
Format: A3
Description: A unique number assigned to each defendant in a case which can be modified by the court
Format: A3
Description: A sequential number indicating whether a case is an original proceeding or a reopen
Format: N5
Description: Case type associated with the current defendant record
Format: A2
Description: A concatenation of district, office, docket number, case type, defendant number, and reopen sequence number
Format: A18
Description: A concatenation of district, office, docket number, case type, and reopen sequence number
Format: A15
Description: The status of the defendant as assigned by the AOUSC
Format: A2
Description: A code indicating the fugitive status of a defendant
Format: A1
Description: The date upon which a defendant became a fugitive
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which a fugitive defendant was taken into custody
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date when a case was first docketed in the district court
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which proceedings in a case commenced on charges pending in the district court where the defendant appeared, or the date of the defendant’s felony-waiver of indictment
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: A code used to identify the nature of the proceeding
Format: N2
Description: The date when a defendant first appeared before a judicial officer in the district court where a charge was pending
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: A code indicating the event by which a defendant appeared before a judicial officer in the district court where a charge was pending
Format: A2
Description: A code indicating the type of legal counsel assigned to a defendant
Format: N2
Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense committed which carried the highest severity
Format: A20
Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with FTITLE1
Format: N2
Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with FTITLE1
Format: A4
Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with FTITLE1
Format: A4
Description: A code indicating the severity associated with FTITLE1
Format: A3
Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense committed which carried the second highest severity
Format: A20
Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with FTITLE2
Format: N2
Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with FTITLE2
Format: A4
Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with FTITLE2
Format: A4
Description: A code indicating the severity associated with FTITLE2
Format: A3
Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense committed which carried the third highest severity
Format: A20
Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with FTITLE3
Format: N2
Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with FTITLE3
Format: A4
Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with FTITLE3
Format: A4
Description: A code indicating the severity associated with FTITLE3
Format: A3
Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense committed which carried the fourth highest severity
Format: A20
Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with FTITLE4
Format: N2
Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with FTITLE4
Format: A4
Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with FTITLE4
Format: A4
Description: A code indicating the severity associated with FTITLE4
Format: A3
Description: The FIPS code used to indicate the county or parish where an offense was committed
Format: A5
Description: The date of the last action taken on the record
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which judicial proceedings before the court concluded
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which the final sentence is recorded on the docket
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which the case was closed
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The total fine imposed at sentencing for all offenses of which the defendant was convicted and a fine was imposed
Format: N8
Description: A count of defendants filed including inter-district transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants filed excluding inter-district transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of original proceedings commenced
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants filed whose proceedings commenced by reopen, remand, appeal, or retrial
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants terminated including interdistrict transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants terminated excluding interdistrict transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of original proceedings terminated
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants terminated whose proceedings commenced by reopen, remand, appeal, or retrial
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants pending as of the last day of the period including long term fugitives
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants pending as of the last day of the period excluding long term fugitives
Format: N1
Description: The source from which the data were loaded into the AOUSC’s NewSTATS database
Format: A10
Description: A sequential number indicating the iteration of the defendant record
Format: N2
Description: The date the record was loaded into the AOUSC’s NewSTATS database
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: Statistical year ID label on data file obtained from the AOUSC which represents termination year
Robert Khuzami, Attorney for the United States, Acting Under Authority Conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 515, announced that MICHAEL COHEN was sentenced today to three years in prison for tax evasion, making false statements to a federally insured bank, and campaign finance violations. COHEN pled guilty on August 21, 2018, to an eight-count information before U.S. District Judge William H. Pauley III, who imposed today’s sentence. In a separate prosecution brought by the Special Counsel’s Office (“SCO”), COHEN pled guilty on November 29, 2018 to one count of making false statements to the U.S. Congress and was also sentenced on that case today, receiving a two-month concurrent sentence.
According to the allegations in Information 18 Cr. 602 (WHP), filed by the United States States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York (the “Office”), as well as previous court filings and statements in public court proceedings:
Between 2012 and 2016, COHEN concealed more than $4 million in personal income from the Internal Revenue Service, avoiding more than $1.3 million in income tax. COHEN also made false statements to a federally insured financial institution to obtain a $500,000 home equity loan. Finally, in 2016, COHEN made or caused two separate payments to women to ensure that they did not publicly disclose their alleged affairs with a presidential candidate in advance of the election. In one instance, COHEN caused American Media, Inc. (“AMI”), which was identified in previous court filings as “Corporation-1,” to make a $150,000 payment to one woman; in the other, COHEN made a $130,000 payment to another woman through an LLC he incorporated for the purpose of making the payment. COHEN was reimbursed for the latter payment in monthly installments disguised as payments for legal services performed pursuant to a retainer, when in fact no such retainer existed. COHEN made or caused both of these payments in order to influence the 2016 election and did so in coordination with one or more members of the campaign.
In addition to the sentence of imprisonment, Judge Pauley also ordered COHEN, 52, of New York, New York, to pay a fine of $50,000, to forfeit $500,000, to pay $1,393,858 in restitution to the IRS, and to pay a mandatory $800 special assessment. Separately, COHEN was ordered to pay a $50,000 fine and to pay a $100 special assessment in the case brought by the SCO. COHEN was also sentenced to concurrent three-year terms of supervised release in both cases, to follow his term of imprisonment.
* * *
The Office also announced today that it has previously reached a non-prosecution agreement with AMI, in connection with AMI’s role in making the above-described $150,000 payment before the 2016 presidential election. As a part of the agreement, AMI admitted that it made the $150,000 payment in concert with a candidate’s presidential campaign, and in order to ensure that the woman did not publicize damaging allegations about the candidate before the 2016 presidential election. AMI further admitted that its principal purpose in making the payment was to suppress the woman’s story so as to prevent it from influencing the election.
Assuming AMI’s continued compliance with the agreement, the Office has agreed not to prosecute AMI for its role in that payment. The agreement also acknowledges, among other things, AMI’s acceptance of responsibility, its substantial and important assistance in this investigation, and its agreement to provide cooperation in the future and implement specific improvements to its internal compliance to prevent future violations of the federal campaign finance laws. These improvements include distributing written standards regarding federal election laws to its employees and conducting annual training concerning these standards.
* * *
Mr. Khuzami praised the work of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Internal Revenue Service, Criminal Investigation; and the Special Agents of the U.S. Attorney’s Office.
This case is being handled by the Office’s Public Corruption Unit. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Andrea M. Griswold, Rachel Maimin, Thomas McKay, and Nicolas Roos are in charge of the prosecution.
Robert Khuzami, Attorney for the United States, Acting Under Authority Conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 515, William F. Sweeney Jr., the Assistant Director-in-Charge of the New York Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), and James D. Robnett, the Special Agent-in-Charge of the New York Field Office of the Internal Revenue Service, Criminal Investigation (“IRS-CI”), announced today the guilty plea of MICHAEL COHEN to charges of tax evasion, making false statements to a federally-insured bank, and campaign finance violations. The plea was entered followed the filing of an eight-count criminal information, which alleged that COHEN concealed more than $4 million in personal income from the IRS, made false statements to a federally-insured financial institution in connection with a $500,000 home equity loan, and, in 2016, caused $280,000 in payments to be made to silence two women who otherwise planned to speak publicly about their alleged affairs with a presidential candidate, thereby intending to influence the 2016 presidential election. COHEN pled guilty today before U.S. District Judge William H. Pauley III.
Attorney for the United States Robert Khuzami said: “Michael Cohen is a lawyer who, rather than setting an example of respect for the law, instead chose to break the law, repeatedly over many years and in a variety of ways. His day of reckoning serves as a reminder that we are a nation of laws, with one set of rules that applies equally to everyone.”
FBI Assistant Director-in-Charge William F. Sweeney Jr. said: “This investigation uncovered crimes of fraud, deception and evasion, conducted through a string of financial transactions that were carefully constructed and concealed to protect a variety of interests. But as we all know, the truth can only remain hidden for so long before the FBI brings it to light. We are all expected to follow the rule of law, and the public expects us - the FBI - to enforce the law equally. Today, Mr. Cohen has been reminded of this important lesson, as he acknowledged with his guilty plea.”
IRS-CI Special Agent-in-Charge James D. Robnett said: “Today’s guilty plea exemplifies IRS Special Agents' rigorous pursuit of tax evasion and sends the clear message that the tax laws apply to everybody. Mr. Cohen’s greed to hide his income from the IRS cheats all the honest taxpayers, and we should not expect law abiding citizens to foot the bill for those who circumvent the system to evade paying their fair share.”
According to the allegations in the Information unsealed today as well as statements made in Manhattan federal court:
From 2007 through January 2017, COHEN was an attorney and employee of a Manhattan-based real estate company (the “Company”). COHEN held the title of “Executive Vice President” and “Special Counsel” to the owner of the Company (“Individual-1”). In January 2017, COHEN left the Company and began holding himself out as the “personal attorney” to Individual-1, who by that time had become the President of the United States.
In addition to working for and earning income from the Organization, at all times relevant to this Information, COHEN owned taxi medallions in New York City and Chicago worth millions of dollars. COHEN owned these taxi medallions as investments and leased the medallions to operators who paid COHEN a portion of the operating income.
The Tax Evasion Scheme
In late 2013, COHEN retained an accountant (“Accountant-1”) for the purpose of handling COHEN’s personal and entity tax returns. After being retained, Accountant-1 filed amended 2011 and 2012 Form 1040 tax returns with the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). For tax years 2013 through 2016, Accountant-1 prepared individual returns for COHEN and returns for COHEN’s medallion and real estate entities. To confirm he had reviewed and approved these returns, both COHEN and his wife signed a Form 8879 for tax years 2013 through 2016, and filed manually for tax year 2012. Between 2012 and the end of 2016, COHEN earned more than $2.4 million in income from a series of personal loans made by COHEN to a taxi operator to whom COHEN leased certain of his Chicago taxi medallions (“Taxi Operator-1”), none of which he disclosed to the IRS.
As a further part of the scheme to evade paying income taxes, COHEN also concealed more than $1.3 million in income he received from another taxi operator to whom COHEN leased certain of his New York medallions (“Taxi Operator-2”). This income took two forms. First, COHEN did not report the substantial majority of a bonus payment of at least $870,000, which was made by Taxi Operator-2 in 2012 to induce COHEN to allow Taxi Operator-2 to operate certain of COHEN’s medallions. Second, between 2012 and 2016, COHEN concealed nearly $1 million in taxable income he received from Taxi Operator-2’s operation of certain of COHEN’s taxi medallions.
To ensure the concealment of this additional operator income, COHEN arranged to receive a portion of the medallion income personally, as opposed to having the income paid to COHEN’s medallion entities. Paying the medallion entities would have alerted Accountant-1, who prepared the returns for those entities, to the existence of the income such that it would have been included on COHEN’s tax returns.
As a further part of his scheme to evade taxes, COHEN also hid the following additional sources of income from Accountant-1 and the IRS:
A $100,000 payment received, in 2014, for brokering the sale of a piece of property in a private aviation community in Ocala, Florida.
Approximately $30,000 in profit made, in 2014, for brokering the sale of a Birkin Bag, a highly coveted French handbag that retails for between $11,900 to $300,000, depending on the type of leather or animal skin used.
More than $200,000 in consulting income earned in 2016 from an assisted living company purportedly for COHEN’s “consulting” on real estate and other projects.
In total, COHEN failed to report more than $4 million in income, resulting in the avoidance of taxes of more than $1.4 million due to the IRS.
False Statements to a Bank
In 2010, COHEN, through companies he controlled, executed a $6.4 million promissory note with a bank (“Bank-1”), collateralized by COHEN’s taxi medallions and personally guaranteed by COHEN. A year later, in 2011, COHEN personally obtained a $6 million line of credit from Bank-1 (the “Line of Credit”), also collateralized by his taxi medallions. By February 2013, COHEN had increased the Line of Credit from $6 million to $14 million, thereby increasing COHEN’s personal medallion liabilities at Bank-1 to more than $20 million.
In November 2014, COHEN refinanced his medallion debt at Bank-1 with another bank (“Bank-2”), who shared the debt with a New York-based credit union (the “Credit Union”). The transaction was structured as a package of individual loans to the entities that owned COHEN’s New York medallions. Following the loans’ closing, COHEN’s medallion debt at Bank-1 was paid off with funds from Bank-2 and the Credit Union, and the Line of Credit with Bank-1 was closed.
In 2013, in connection with a successful application for a mortgage from another Bank (“Bank-3”) for his Park Avenue condominium (the “2013 Application”), COHEN disclosed only the $6.4 million medallion loan he had with Bank-1 at the time. As noted above, COHEN also had a larger, $14 million Line of Credit with Bank-1 secured by his medallions, which COHEN did not disclose in the 2013 Application.
In February 2015, COHEN, in an attempt to secure financing from Bank-3 to purchase a summer home for approximately $8.5 million, again concealed the $14 million Line of Credit. Specifically, in connection with this proposed transaction, Bank-3 obtained a 2014 personal financial statement COHEN had provided to Bank-2 while refinancing his medallion debt. Bank-3 questioned COHEN about the $14 million Line of Credit reflected on that personal financial statement, because COHEN had omitted that debt from the 2013 Application to Bank-3. COHEN misled Bank-3, stating, in writing, that the $14 million Line of Credit was undrawn and that he would close it. In truth and in fact, COHEN had effectively overdrawn the Line of Credit, having swapped it out for a fully drawn, larger loan shared by Bank-2 and the Credit Union upon refinancing his medallion debt. When Bank-3 informed COHEN that it would only provide financing if COHEN closed the Line of Credit, COHEN lied again, misleadingly stating in an email: “The medallion line was closed in the middle of November 2014.”
In December 2015, COHEN contacted Bank-3 to apply for a home equity line of credit (“HELOC”). In so doing, COHEN again significantly understated his medallion debt. Specifically, in the HELOC application, COHEN, together with his wife, represented a positive net worth of more than $40 million, again omitting the $14 million in medallion debt with Bank-2 and the Credit Union. Because COHEN had previously confirmed in writing to Bank-3 that the $14 million Line of Credit had been closed, Bank-3 had no reason to question COHEN about the omission of this liability on the HELOC application. In addition, in seeking the HELOC, COHEN substantially and materially understated his monthly expenses to Bank-3 by omitting at least $70,000 in monthly interest payments due to Bank-2 on the true amount of his medallion debt.
In April 2016, Bank-3 approved COHEN for a $500,000 HELOC. By fraudulently concealing truthful information about his financial condition, COHEN obtained a HELOC that Bank-3 would otherwise not have approved.
Campaign Finance Violations
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended, Title 52, United States Code, Section 30101, et seq., (the “Election Act”), regulates the influence of money on politics. At all relevant times, the Election Act set certain limitations and prohibitions, among them: (a) individual contributions to any presidential candidate, including expenditures coordinated with a candidate or his political committee, were limited to $2,700 per election, and presidential candidates and their committees were prohibited from accepting contributions from individuals in excess of this limit; and (b) Corporations were prohibited from making contributions directly to presidential candidates, including expenditures coordinated with candidates or their committees, and candidates were prohibited from accepting corporate contributions.
On June 16, 2015, Individual-1 began his presidential campaign. While COHEN continued to work at the Company and did not have a formal title with the campaign, he had a campaign email address and, at various times, advised the campaign, including on matters of interest to the press, and made televised and media appearances on behalf of the campaign.
In August 2015, the Chairman and Chief Executive of Corporation-1, a media company that owns, among other things, a popular tabloid magazine (“Chairman-1” and “Magazine-1,” respectively”), in coordination with COHEN and one or more members of the campaign, offered to help deal with negative stories about Individual-1’s relationships with women by, among other things, assisting the campaign in identifying such stories so they could be purchased and their publication avoided. Chairman-1 agreed to keep COHEN apprised of any such negative stories.
Consistent with the agreement described above, Corporation-1 advised COHEN of negative stories during the course of the campaign, and COHEN, with the assistance of Corporation-1, was able to arrange for the purchase of two stories so as to suppress them and prevent them from influencing the election.
First, in June 2016, a model and actress (“Woman-1”) began attempting to sell her story of her alleged extramarital affair with Individual-1 that had taken place in 2006 and 2007, knowing the story would be of considerable value because of the election. Woman-1 retained an attorney (“Attorney-1”), who in turn contacted the editor-in-chief of Magazine-1 (“Editor-1”), and offered to sell Woman-1’s story to Magazine-1. Chairman-1 and Editor-1 informed COHEN of the story. At COHEN’s urging and subject to COHEN’s promise that Corporation-1 would be reimbursed, Editor-1 ultimately began negotiating for the purchase of the story.
On August 5, 2016, Corporation-1 entered into an agreement with Woman-1 to acquire her “limited life rights” to the story of her relationship with “any then-married man,” in exchange for $150,000 and a commitment to feature her on two magazine covers and publish more than 100 magazine articles authored by her. Despite the cover and article features to the agreement, its principal purpose, as understood by those involved, including COHEN, was to suppress Woman-1’s story so as to prevent it from influencing the election.
Between late August 2016 and September 2016, COHEN agreed with Chairman-1 to assign the rights to the non-disclosure portion of Corporation-1’s agreement with Woman-1 to COHEN for $125,000. COHEN incorporated a shell entity called “Resolution Consultants LLC” for use in the transaction. Both Chairman-1 and COHEN ultimately signed the agreement, and a consultant for Corporation-1, using his own shell entity, provided COHEN with an invoice for the payment of $125,000. However, in early October 2016, after the assignment agreement was signed but before COHEN had paid the $125,000, Chairman-1 contacted COHEN and told him, in substance, that the deal was off and that COHEN should tear up the assignment agreement.
Second, on October 8, 2016, an agent for an adult film actress (“Woman-2”) informed Editor-1 that Woman-2 was willing to make public statements and confirm on the record her alleged past affair with Individual-1. Chairman-1 and Editor-1 then contacted COHEN and put him in touch with Attorney-1, who was also representing Woman-2. Over the course of the next few days, COHEN negotiated a $130,000 agreement with Attorney-1 to himself purchase Woman-2’s silence, and received a signed confidential settlement agreement and a separate side letter agreement from Attorney-1.
COHEN did not immediately execute the agreement, nor did he pay Woman-2. On the evening of October 25, 2016, with no deal with Woman-2 finalized, Attorney-1 told Editor-1 that Woman-2 was close to completing a deal with another outlet to make her story public. Editor-1, in turn, texted COHEN that “[w]e have to coordinate something on the matter [Attorney-1 is] calling you about or it could look awfully bad for everyone.” Chairman-1 and Editor-1 then called COHEN through an encrypted telephone application. COHEN agreed to make the payment, and then called Attorney-1 to finalize the deal.
The next day, on October 26, 2016, COHEN emailed an incorporating service to obtain the corporate formation documents for another shell corporation, Essential Consultants LLC, which COHEN had incorporated a few days prior. Later that afternoon, COHEN drew down $131,000 from the fraudulently obtained HELOC and requested that it be deposited into a bank account COHEN had just opened in the name of Essential Consultants. The next morning, on October 27, 2016, COHEN went to Bank-3 and wired approximately $130,000 from Essential Consultants to Attorney-1. On the bank form to complete the wire, COHEN falsely indicated that the “purpose of wire being sent” was “retainer.” On November 1, 2016, COHEN received from Attorney-1 copies of the final, signed confidential settlement agreement and side letter agreement.
COHEN caused and made the payments described herein in order to influence the 2016 presidential election. In so doing, he coordinated with one or more members of the campaign, including through meetings and phone calls, about the fact, nature, and timing of the payments. As a result of the payments solicited and made by COHEN, neither Woman-1 nor Woman-2 spoke to the press prior to the election.
In January 2017, COHEN in seeking reimbursement for election-related expenses, presented executives of the Company with a copy of a bank statement from the Essential Consultants bank account, which reflected the $130,000 payment COHEN had made to the bank account of Attorney-1 in order to keep Woman-2 silent in advance of the election, plus a $35 wire fee, adding, in handwriting, an additional “$50,000.” The $50,000 represented a claimed payment for “tech services,” which in fact related to work COHEN had solicited from a technology company during and in connection with the campaign. COHEN added these amounts to a sum of $180,035. After receiving this document, executives of the Company “grossed up” for tax purposes COHEN’s requested reimbursement of $180,000 to $360,000, and then added a bonus of $60,000 so that COHEN would be paid $420,000 in total. Executives of the Company also determined that the $420,000 would be paid to COHEN in monthly amounts of $35,000 over the course of 12 months, and that COHEN should send invoices for these payments.
On February 14, 2017, COHEN sent an executive of the Company (“Executive-1”) the first of his monthly invoices, requesting “[p]ursuant to [a] retainer agreement, . . . payment for services rendered for the months of January and February, 2017.” The invoice listed $35,000 for each of those two months. Executive-1 forwarded the invoice to another executive of the Company (“Executive-2”) the same day by email, and it was approved. Executive-1 forwarded that email to another employee at the Company, stating: “Please pay from the Trust. Post to legal expenses. Put ‘retainer for the months of January and February 2017’ in the description.”
Throughout 2017, COHEN sent to one or more representatives of the Company monthly invoices, which stated, “Pursuant to the retainer agreement, kindly remit payment for services rendered for” the relevant month in 2017, and sought $35,000 per month. The Company accounted for these payments as legal expenses. In truth and in fact, there was no such retainer agreement, and the monthly invoices COHEN submitted were not in connection with any legal services he had provided in 2017.
During 2017, pursuant to the invoices described above, COHEN received monthly $35,000 reimbursement checks, totaling $420,000.
* * *
COHEN, 51, of NEW YORK, NEW YORK, pleaded guilty to five counts of willful tax evasion; one count of making false statements to a bank; one count of causing an unlawful campaign contribution; and one count of making an excessive campaign contribution.
COHEN’S sentencing is scheduled for December 12 at 11 a.m.
A chart identifying the charges and the maximum penalties applicable to COHEN is below.
Count
Charge
Maximum Penalty
1-5
Tax Evasion
5 years in prison
6
Making false statements to a federally insured bank
30 years in prison
7
Causing an unlawful corporate contribution
5 years in prison
8
Making an excessive campaign contribution
5 years in prison
The maximum potential sentences in this case are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencings of the defendant will be determined by the judge.
Mr. Khuzami praised the work of the FBI, the IRS, and the Special Agents of the U.S. Attorney’s Office.
This case is being handled by the Office’s Public Corruption Unit. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Andrea M. Griswold, Rachel Maimin, Thomas McKay, and Nicolas Roos are in charge of the prosecution.
Description: The fiscal year of the data file obtained from the AOUSC
Format: YYYY
Description: The code of the federal judicial circuit where the case was located
Format: A2
Description: The code of the federal judicial district where the case was located
Format: A2
Description: The code of the district office where the case was located
Format: A2
Description: Docket number assigned by the district to the case
Format: A7
Description: A unique number assigned to each defendant in a case which cannot be modified by the court
Format: A3
Description: A unique number assigned to each defendant in a case which can be modified by the court
Format: A3
Description: A sequential number indicating whether a case is an original proceeding or a reopen
Format: N5
Description: Case type associated with the current defendant record
Format: A2
Description: A concatenation of district, office, docket number, case type, defendant number, and reopen sequence number
Format: A18
Description: A concatenation of district, office, docket number, case type, and reopen sequence number
Format: A15
Description: The status of the defendant as assigned by the AOUSC
Format: A2
Description: A code indicating the fugitive status of a defendant
Format: A1
Description: The date upon which a defendant became a fugitive
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which a fugitive defendant was taken into custody
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date when a case was first docketed in the district court
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which proceedings in a case commenced on charges pending in the district court where the defendant appeared, or the date of the defendant’s felony-waiver of indictment
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: A code used to identify the nature of the proceeding
Format: N2
Description: The date when a defendant first appeared before a judicial officer in the district court where a charge was pending
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: A code indicating the event by which a defendant appeared before a judicial officer in the district court where a charge was pending
Format: A2
Description: A code indicating the type of legal counsel assigned to a defendant
Format: N2
Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense committed which carried the highest severity
Format: A20
Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with FTITLE1
Format: N2
Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with FTITLE1
Format: A4
Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with FTITLE1
Format: A4
Description: A code indicating the severity associated with FTITLE1
Format: A3
Description: The FIPS code used to indicate the county or parish where an offense was committed
Format: A5
Description: The date of the last action taken on the record
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which judicial proceedings before the court concluded
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which the final sentence is recorded on the docket
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which the case was closed
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The number of days from the earlier of filing date or first appearance date to proceeding date
Format: N3
Description: The number of days from proceeding date to disposition date
Format: N3
Description: The number of days from disposition date to sentencing date
Format: N3
Description: The code of the district office where the case was terminated
Format: A2
Description: A code indicating the type of legal counsel assigned to a defendant at the time the case was closed
Format: N2
Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense that carried the most severe disposition and penalty under which the defendant was disposed
Format: A20
Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with TTITLE1
Format: N2
Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with TTITLE1
Format: A4
Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with TTITLE1
Format: A4
Description: A code indicating the severity associated with TTITLE1
Format: A3
Description: The code indicating the nature or type of disposition associated with TTITLE1
Format: N2
Description: The number of months a defendant was sentenced to prison under TTITLE1
Format: N4
Description: A code indicating whether the prison sentence associated with TTITLE1 was concurrent or consecutive in relation to the other counts in the indictment or information or multiple counts of the same charge
Format: A4
Description: The number of months of probation imposed upon a defendant under TTITLE1
Format: N4
Description: A period of supervised release imposed upon a defendant under TTITLE1
Format: N3
Description: The fine imposed upon the defendant at sentencing under TTITLE1
Format: N8
Description: The total prison time for all offenses of which the defendant was convicted and prison time was imposed
Format: N4
Description: The total fine imposed at sentencing for all offenses of which the defendant was convicted and a fine was imposed
Format: N8
Description: A count of defendants filed including inter-district transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants filed excluding inter-district transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of original proceedings commenced
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants filed whose proceedings commenced by reopen, remand, appeal, or retrial
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants terminated including interdistrict transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants terminated excluding interdistrict transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of original proceedings terminated
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants terminated whose proceedings commenced by reopen, remand, appeal, or retrial
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants pending as of the last day of the period including long term fugitives
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants pending as of the last day of the period excluding long term fugitives
Format: N1
Description: The source from which the data were loaded into the AOUSC’s NewSTATS database
Format: A10
Description: A sequential number indicating the iteration of the defendant record
Format: N2
Description: The date the record was loaded into the AOUSC’s NewSTATS database
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: Statistical year ID label on data file obtained from the AOUSC which represents termination year
Damian Williams, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and Lisa F. Garcia, Regional Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), announced today that the United States has filed and simultaneously settled a counterclaim against TZUMI INNOVATIONS, LLC (“TZUMI”) for illegally distributing and selling millions of products claiming to have antimicrobial properties in violation of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”) during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. TZUMI sold these products without submitting them to EPA for registration, a mandatory process that allows EPA to assess the safety and effectiveness of the products. TZUMI specifically targeted lower-income customers for sale of one of its products, “Wipe Out! Wipes.”
The proposed stipulation and order of settlement (“settlement”) agreed to by TZUMI includes payment of a $1.5 million civil penalty, the largest FIFRA civil penalty ever obtained in a judicial settlement and one of the largest FIFRA penalties obtained by EPA in any context.
U.S. Attorney Damian Williams said: “At the height of the pandemic, Tzumi misled consumers and retailers and exposed the public to pesticide products that had not been found by EPA to be safe and effective. It compounded matters by targeting low-income customers, who face disproportionate environmental burdens. Today’s settlement ensures that Tzumi pays the price for its misconduct. We will continue to pursue justice in environmental enforcement matters.”
EPA Regional Administrator Lisa F. Garcia stated: “Consumers must be provided accurate information about pesticide products and merchandise such as those items involved in this case, which must be properly labeled and registered with EPA to protect public health. This settlement demonstrates EPA’s commitment to hold companies accountable that violate critical environmental laws and includes a provision where Tzumi Innovations, LLC will develop an extensive campaign to inform the public and retailers about the appropriate uses for the products in question.”
The counterclaim filed in Manhattan federal court today alleges that in 2020, TZUMI began to sell three product lines—Wipe Out! Wipes, Wipe Out! Multi-Surface Wipes, and Wipe Out! Multi-Surface Decontaminant Spray—in an effort to respond to the public’s increased demand for disinfectant products during the COVID-19 public health crisis. TZUMI expressly stated that it intended Wipe Out! Wipes to be sold to “lower income level customers.”
None of these supposedly antimicrobial products were registered with EPA under FIFRA. FIFRA prohibits the distribution or sale of pesticides—including products claiming to have antimicrobial properties intended to be used to disinfect surfaces—that are not registered under FIFRA, absent exceptions to registration not applicable here. Registration is a critical step in ensuring the efficacy and safety of antimicrobial pesticides: Among other things, during registration, EPA reviews the application information and performs a rigorous, comprehensive scientific assessment of the product, including the product’s active and inert ingredients and the proposed uses of the product, to ensure that the product is effective and has no unreasonable adverse effects on human health or the environment when used for its intended purpose and according to labeled directions.
TZUMI failed to register the Wipe Out! products with EPA, even though its labeling made antimicrobial pesticidal claims suggesting that these products were intended to be used to disinfect surfaces and TZUMI had knowledge that the products would be used as a pesticide, as that term is defined in FIFRA. Consistent with TZUMI’s claims, retailers then sold these products on their websites or in their physical stores in the same sections in which they included properly registered antimicrobial disinfectants, like Clorox and Lysol products. Reviews on retailers’ websites demonstrate that consumers in fact were misled into believing that Wipe Out! Wipes in particular could be used as an antimicrobial pesticide to disinfect surfaces.
TZUMI’s actions put the public—including the low-income consumers that TZUMI targeted—at risk of using products that failed to work as claimed or that were unsafe. Low-income communities in general bear a disproportionate burden of environmental exposures and public health risks, and selling unregistered pesticides to these communities raises particular concerns of environmental justice.
* * *
In the settlement lodged with the federal court today, TZUMI admits, acknowledges, and accepts responsibility for the following, among other things:
In 2020, Tzumi introduced new product lines to the domestic household market in an effort to respond to the public’s increased demand for disinfectant products during the COVID-19 public health crisis. The new products Tzumi distributed or sold included Wipe Out! Wipes, Wipe Out! Multi-Surface Wipes, and Wipe Out! Multi-Surface Decontaminant Spray.
Wipe Out! Wipes, Wipe Out! Multi-Surface Wipes, and Wipe Out! Multi-Surface Decontaminant Spray have never been registered as pesticides with EPA under Section 3 of FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136a.
From at least August through December 2020, Tzumi distributed 4,895,184 units of Wipe Out! Wipes to Home Depot bearing a label stating on the front in part “Wipe Out Antibacterial Wipes” and “KILLS GERMS FAST*” and on the back in part “To decrease bacteria on the skin that could cause disease”; “Cleans and sanitizes”; “KILLS 99.9% OF GERMS*”; “*Escherichia Coli (E. coli), Staphylococcus Aureus (Staph), Candida Albicans”; and “Use it Anytime, Anywhere.”
From October through November 2020, Tzumi sold 472,281 units of Wipe Out! Multi-Surface Wipes bearing a label that displayed the words “active ingredient” and “purpose: antibacterial” and graphics of household appliances, bathroom fixtures, and surfaces.
From February 2021 through April 2021, Tzumi sold 62,796 units of Wipe Out! Multi-Surface Decontaminant Spray that stated on its label “Controls Algae Harmful Bacteria” (sic) and “… spray directly on the surface and let stand … ten minutes for antimicrobial response.”
The settlement requires TZUMI to pay a $1.5 million civil penalty and to issue corrective statements advising consumers and retailers of the unregistered status and limited appropriate use of the Wipe Out! products. It also requires TZUMI not to distribute or sell such unregistered pesticide products in the future.
The settlement remains subject to a period of public comment and Court approval. Notice of the proposed settlement will be published in the Federal Register and the public will have the opportunity to submit comments on the proposed settlement for a period of at least 30 days before it is submitted for the Court’s approval.
U.S. Attorney Williams thanked EPA Region 2’s attorneys and program staff for their critical work on this case.
This case is being handled by the Environmental Protection Unit of the Office’s Civil Division. Assistant U.S. Attorney Allison Rovner is in charge of the case.
Damian Williams, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced that DJONIBEK RAHMANKULOV was sentenced today to 121 months in prison for laundering millions of dollars in criminal proceeds obtained from computer hacking, healthcare fraud, and Small Business Administration loan fraud, as well as operating an international unlicensed money transmitting business. The defendant was convicted at trial on September 1, 2022, of money laundering conspiracy, bank fraud, and conspiracy to operate an unlicensed money transmitting business. U.S. District Judge Ronnie Abrams imposed today’s sentence.
U.S. Attorney Damian Williams said: “Djonibek Rahmankulov laundered money for a living. He exploited the financial system to launder millions of dollars from multiple fraudulent schemes and repeatedly lied to banks to operate his illegal enterprise. Once caught — and even after he was convicted — the defendant continued to show that he believed he was above the law by threatening a witness and submitting false information to the Court. Today’s sentence reflects that this Office will find and prosecute those who seek to abuse the U.S. financial system to launder dirty money.”
According to the superseding Indictment, evidence at trial, and statements made in Court:
Between 2017 and September 2020, RAHMANKULOV operated a network of shell companies that were used to launder millions of dollars of criminal proceeds from multiple types of criminal activity. RAHMANKULOV worked with computer hackers who fraudulently gained control of the bank accounts of victims located throughout the United States and executed millions of dollars in fraudulent wire transfers into bank accounts opened by RAHMANKULOV and his co-conspirators. RAHMANKULOV received wire transfers into bank accounts he created and bank accounts he instructed others to create and laundered these proceeds through multiple additional bank accounts to prevent the victims and the banks from recovering the stolen funds.
In addition, RAHMANKULOV worked with a network of pharmacies engaged in Medicare and Medicaid fraud. These pharmacies submitted millions of dollars of fraudulent billing for HIV medications that they did not dispense or obtained illegally, including by repurchasing medications from HIV patients who were Medicaid recipients. RAHMANKULOV created companies to receive these criminal proceeds from the pharmacies and laundered them through a variety of means, including by using them to fund an unlicensed money transmitting business that illegally moved money to and from multiple countries, including Iran.
In 2020, when the COVID-19 pandemic began, RAHMANKULOV filed fraudulent applications for COVID relief loans from the Small Business Administration for multiple companies he controlled. He laundered the proceeds of loans and grants through these companies. RAHMANKULOV also made a number of materially false statements to financial institutions in connection with his money laundering schemes, both when opening bank accounts and when executing financial transactions with those bank accounts.
RAHMANKULOV sought to obstruct justice during the pendency of his case. In the months before trial, RAHMANKULOV instructed a witness to lie to law enforcement. When the witness later informed RAHMANKULOV that the witness would tell the truth to law enforcement, RAHMANKULOV threatened the witness, stating, among other things, that if he went to prison, “I will drag all of you with me, and once you are there, then I will have my revenge.” Nonetheless, the witness testified at trial. RAHMANKULOV continued seeking to obstruct justice after his conviction. In advance of his sentencing, he submitted multiple letters to the Court purporting to show support from members of the community, but two of these letters were in fact fraudulent and had not been written by the purported authors.
* * *
In addition to the prison term, RAHMANKULOV, 35, of Queens, New York, was sentenced to three years of supervised release. RAHMANKULOV was further ordered to pay a forfeiture of $5,413,278 and a $40,000 fine.
Mr. Williams praised the outstanding investigative work of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s New York Money Laundering Investigation Squad.
The prosecution is being handled by the Office’s Money Laundering and Transnational Criminal Enterprises Unit. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Cecilia Vogel, Thane Rehn, and Samuel Raymond, with the assistance of Paralegal Specialist Nerlande Pierre, are in charge of the prosecution.
Audrey Strauss, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced that RULESS PIERRE was convicted in Manhattan federal court today of securities fraud, wire fraud, and structuring charges. PIERRE was convicted after a trial before Judge Sidney Stein.
U.S. Attorney Audrey Strauss said: “Today, Ruless Pierre was brought to justice for callously lying to investors. Pierre told investors their investment returns were excellent, when in fact he failed to invest investor funds as promised, generated losses when he did invest, and diverted much of investor funds to his personal use and to repay investors in a Ponzi-like fashion. We will continue aggressively to pursue frauds like this one in order to protect investors.”
According to the allegations contained in the Complaint, Indictment, and the evidence presented at trial:
Investment Promissory Fraud
From at least November 2016 through October 2019, PIERRE solicited money from investors of Ruless Pierre Consulting Group (“RPCG”) by falsely promising them that he would earn a 20 percent return on their initial investment every 60 days through stock trading (hereinafter, the “Promissory Note Fraud”). The investments were memorialized in documents known as “Investment Promissory Notes.” These investment contracts generally promised that the investor would be paid 20 percent interest every 60 days and that the investor could withdraw all funds from the investment with 30 days’ notice. Based on these documents and the false representations of PIERRE, the investors understood that their principal and interest were guaranteed.
During the course of the investment fraud scheme, PIERRE fraudulently obtained over $2 million from nearly 100 investors. After receiving money from investors, PIERRE deposited the money into one of his personal bank accounts or bank accounts of RPCG. PIERRE then transferred the money to trading accounts, where he engaged in unprofitable day trading. Despite his trading losses, PIERRE repeatedly and falsely represented to investors, including in investment statements containing fictitious balances, that the trading was profitable and that their investments were growing as promised. In addition to losing their money, PIERRE also used investors’ funds to pay for personal expenses, including luxury vehicles. Additionally, PIERRE further concealed the truth from investors by using money obtained from new investors to make redemption payments to previous investors, in Ponzi-like fashion.
The Franchise Investment Fraud
Beginning in or about November 2018, PIERRE began to offer investors, including some individuals who invested in his Promissory Note Fraud, the opportunity to purchase partnership interests in a partnership that would run three fast-food franchise locations (hereinafter, the “Franchise Investment Fraud”). At the time, PIERRE did not own any of the fast-food franchises, but he was in discussions regarding purchasing them. Each investment was memorialized in a document entitled “Silent Partnership Agreement.”
The Silent Partnership Agreements promised the investors a 5 percent monthly return on the investment, in addition to a 40 percent pro rata share of the quarterly gross operating profit. The minimum investment was $5,000.
The Silent Partnership Agreements further provided that RULESS PIERRE was the General Partner, and that he was responsible “for the complete management, control, and policies related to the operation and conduct of the business.”
PIERRE received financial statements for the franchise locations, which showed minimal profits. Nonetheless, PIERRE promised investors an unrealistic 5 percent monthly return on their investment.
In or about April 2019, PIERRE purchased one fast food franchise for approximately $50,000. PIERRE did not purchase the other franchises.
PIERRE deposited the fast-food franchise investors’ money in various bank accounts, which commingled the funds from the Franchise Investment Fraud with the Promissory Note Fraud. In Ponzi-like fashion, PIERRE fraudulently misappropriated some of the fast-food franchise investors’ money to pay back investors in the Promissory Note Fraud.
In total, PIERRE raised at least $200,000 by selling the Silent Partnership Agreements to at least 18 investors. Some of the investors were paid their 5 percent monthly distribution, but the vast majority of the investors were not made whole. The fast-food franchise went out of business in December 2019.
The Embezzlement Fraud Scheme
In another scheme, PIERRE embezzled money from his former employers. From approximately 2007 until February 2016, PIERRE was the director of finance for two different hotels, which were owned by the same company (“Company-1”). One hotel was located in the Palisades, New York (“Hotel-1”), while the other was located in Armonk, New York (“Hotel-2”) (collectively, “the Hotels”). As the director of finance, PIERRE was the signatory on several bank accounts held in the name of the management companies that managed the Hotels (“Management Companies”).
After August 2018, PIERRE no longer worked at either Hotel-1 or Hotel-2, but he regularly wrote himself checks payable to cash from the Management Companies’ bank accounts. Specifically, from September 2018 through March 2019, PIERRE wrote over 70 checks to “cash” or “petty cash” from one of the bank accounts for Hotel-1, for over $300,000.
In addition, from March 2017 through 2019, PIERRE deposited large amounts of cash into his personal bank accounts in amounts that were generally less than $10,000. The deposits were conducted at various bank locations and typically took place on the same day, consecutive days, or within a short period of time. For example, in just seven months, from June 2018 through December 2018, PIERRE deposited approximately $225,612, through 138 cash deposits all under $10,000, into a bank account in the name of RPCG.
* * *
PIERRE, 51, of Nanuet, New York, was convicted of two counts of securities fraud, each of which carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison, one count of wire fraud, which carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison, and one count of structuring, which carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison. The maximum potential sentences in this case are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendant will be determined by the judge.
PIERRE is scheduled to be sentenced on September 9, 2021, at 2:30 p.m.
Ms. Strauss praised the investigative work of Homeland Security Investigations. Ms. Strauss also thanked the United States Postal Inspection Service, the United States Internal Revenue Service, the New York City Police Department, and the New York City Sherriff’s Office, which assisted in the investigation. Ms. Strauss also thanked the Securities and Exchange Commission, which has brought and filed a civil enforcement action against the defendant.
This case is being handled by the Office’s Securities and Commodities Fraud Task Force. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Robert L. Boone and Drew Skinner are in charge of the prosecution.
Damian Williams, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York; Christopher A. Scharf, the Special Agent in Charge of the Northeast Region of the U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of the Inspector General (“DOT-OIG”); and Daniel Cort, the Inspector General of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (“MTA-IG”), announced that international bus parts supplier CBM entered into a non-prosecution agreement (the “NPA”) with the U.S. Attorney’s Office. Under the NPA, CBM agreed to pay significant monetary penalties for engaging in a scheme to defraud U.S. transit authority customers through false and misleading statements about the sources of contracted-for bus parts during the period from approximately 2010 to April 2021. Specifically, the NPA requires CBM to forfeit $463,243.41 to the United States, representing its profits from the scheme, and pay a fine of $1,500,000. In addition, CBM has agreed to pay restitution to victims who submit claims and to revert unclaimed funds up to $438,859.52 to the Crime Victims Fund, administered by the Department of Justice’s Office for Victims of Crime. The NPA also requires that for at least two years from the date of the agreement, CBM will further cooperate with the United States, self-report any future violations of U.S. law, and continue its ongoing efforts to implement and maintain an adequate compliance program. In the event that CBM violates the NPA, the U.S. Attorney’s Office may prosecute CBM for any newly discovered criminal activity and for the conduct that gives rise to the NPA.
This corporate action reflects a careful weighing of factors relevant to the appropriate corporate resolution. The NPA recognizes that, although CBM’s serious misconduct was reported to the U.S. Attorney’s Office before CBM self-disclosed it, (i) CBM US cooperated extensively with the U.S. Attorney’s Office, including through detailed disclosures and accountings of conduct not already known when CBM’s cooperation began; (ii) the most serious wrongdoing at CBM was limited to two individuals, though they were at the highest levels of the company; (iii) CBM has no history of criminal conduct, including any resolved through prior NPAs or deferred prosecution agreements; (iv) CBM has undertaken extensive remedial measures to ensure that similar conduct does not occur or go undetected in the future; and (v) CBM has taken full responsibility and agreed to make full restitution to all victims that seek compensation.
U.S. Attorney Damian Williams said: “CBM, primarily through the actions of a limited number of managers outside of the United States, represented to U.S. transit authorities that CBM was providing bus parts from specific suppliers and under specific brand names. Fortunately, none of the transactions at issue involved parts that bear on the safety of any affected buses. Since this Office’s investigation came to CBM’s attention, the company has cooperated fully and taken significant and commendable steps to remediate the institutional failures that allowed this situation to occur in the first place. But this NPA also ensures that CBM is held financially accountable for its conduct and that victims will be made whole. It should serve as a reminder to all companies that it will lose its profits, and then some, when this Office becomes aware of business practices like CBM’s in this case.”
DOT-OIG Special Agent in Charge Christopher A. Scharf said: “This NPA is an important step in remedying the harm caused by CBM when it misled U.S. transit authority customers. DOT OIG remains committed to holding transportation industry suppliers accountable for their actions that compromise the integrity of contracted goods and services.”
MTA Inspector General Daniel Cort said: "The MTA must have faith in the integrity of its supply chain, and any breach of that trust is unacceptable. I thank our federal partners for holding vendors accountable for deceptive behavior."
As part of the NPA, CBM agreed to a statement of facts describing its conduct and the remedial measures that it took in response to learning of that conduct.
* * *
Mr. Williams praised the outstanding investigative work of the DOT-OIG and thanked the MTA-IG for its assistance.
This matter is being handled by the Office’s Public Corruption Unit. Assistant U.S. Attorney Frank Balsamello is in charge of the matter.
Geoffrey S. Berman, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced that ISAI SCHEINBERG, the founder and former executive of PokerStars, an online poker company, pled guilty today to running a multimillion-dollar unlawful internet gambling business. SCHEINBERG pled guilty before U.S. Magistrate Judge Sarah L. Cave.
Manhattan U.S. Attorney Geoffrey S. Berman said: “Ten years ago, this Office charged 11 defendants who operated, or provided fraudulent payment processing services to, three of the largest online poker companies then operating in the United States – PokerStars, Full Tilt Poker, and Absolute Poker – with operating illegal gambling businesses and other crimes. As Isai Scheinberg’s guilty plea today shows, the passage of time will not undermine this Office’s commitment to holding accountable individuals who violate U.S. law.”
As alleged in the Indictment filed in March 2011 in Manhattan federal court, PokerStars was founded in approximately 2001, with headquarters in the Isle of Man. PokerStars offered online poker games to players around the world, including in New York, New York. SCHEINBERG was PokerStars’ founder and principal. On October 13, 2006, the United States enacted the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (“UIGEA”), making it a federal crime for gambling businesses to “knowingly accept” most forms of payment “in connection with the participation of another person in unlawful Internet gambling.” With the enactment of UIGEA, leading internet gambling businesses – including the leading internet poker company doing business in the United States at that time – terminated their United States operations. However, PokerStars, along with Full Tilt Poker and Absolute Poker, continued illegally to make internet poker available to U.S. customers through March 2011.
In pleading guilty today, SCHEINBERG admitted that he knew operating a business that offered internet poker to New Yorkers violated state law, and that it was the clear position of the U.S. government that offering online poker in the United States violated federal law. Nonetheless, Scheinberg decided to continue running his multimillion-dollar online poker business in the United States.
In 2012, PokerStars and its related companies (the “PokerStars Companies”) agreed to settle a civil forfeiture and civil money laundering action brought by the Office. That settlement involved, among other things, the PokerStars Companies forfeiting $547 million to the United States and assuming approximately $184 million in foreign player liabilities of another online poker company subject to the settlement. Additionally, in June 2013, Mark Scheinberg, ISAI SCHEINBERG’s son, agreed to forfeit to the United States an additional $50 million of distributions he received from the operation of the PokerStars Companies.
* * *
SCHEINBERG, 73, a dual Canadian and Israeli national, was arrested in Switzerland on June 7, 2019, based on the U.S. charges. In early October 2019, SCHEINBERG was ordered to be extradited to the United States by the Swiss Federal Office of Justice, a decision he initially appealed. SCHEINBERG subsequently withdrew his appeal and surrendered to U.S. federal agents on January 17, 2020. He was arraigned before United States Magistrate Judge Katharine H. Parker on the same day.
SCHEINBERG pled guilty to one count of operating an illegal gambling business, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955. SCHEINBERG faces a maximum sentence of five years in prison. He is scheduled to be sentenced by United States District Judge Lewis A. Kaplan on a date to be determined.
The maximum sentence in this case is prescribed by Congress and is provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentence for the defendant will be determined by the judge.
Mr. Berman thanked the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Homeland Security Investigations for their outstanding work and perseverance in the investigation and prosecution of this case, and Swiss authorities and the Department of Justice Criminal Division’s Office of International Affairs for their assistance with SCHEINBERG’s arrest and extradition proceedings.
With SCHEINBERG’s guilty plea, all 11 defendants – including Raymond Bitar, Scott Tom, Brent Beckley, Nelson Burtnick, Paul Tate, Ryan Lang, Bradley Franzen, Ira Rubin, Chad Elie, and John Campos – originally charged in the Indictment have now pled guilty. All but SCHEINBERG have been sentenced.
This matter is being handled by the Office’s Complex Frauds and Cybercrime Unit. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Olga Zverovich, Sarah Lai, and Jason Cowley are in charge of the prosecution.
Damian Williams, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Thomas Fattorusso, Special Agent in Charge of the Internal Revenue Service, Criminal Investigation, New York Field Office (“IRS-CI”), and Jonathan Mellone, Special Agent-in-Charge of the New York Regional Office of the U.S. Department of Labor – Office of Inspector General (“DOL-OIG”), announced charges against GREGORY GUMUCIO, MICHAEL ANDERSON, and HAVEN SOLIMAN for participating in a conspiracy to commit tax fraud for at least seven years. The three defendants were longtime leaders at a prominent nationwide yoga business, Yoga to the People (“YTTP”), from which they all received a substantial amount of income, yet none of the three defendants filed individual or business tax returns – or paid any income taxes – from at least 2013 through 2020. GUMUCIO, ANDERSON, and SOLIMAN were arrested today in Washington State. GUMUCIO and SOLIMAN will be presented before Magistrate Judge David W. Christel in the Western District of Washington (Tacoma Division), and ANDERSON will be presented before Magistrate Judge Mary Alice Theiler in the Western District of Washington (Seattle Division).
U.S. Attorney Damian Williams said: “As alleged, the defendants operated a lucrative nationwide yoga business, which brought in over $20 million and netted them each substantial sums, permitting them to live lavish lifestyles. Yet the defendants chose not to file tax returns, or pay income taxes, for at least seven consecutive years. The defendants perpetrated their scheme in various ways, including paying employees in cash and off the books, refusing to provide employees with tax documentation, not maintaining books and records, paying personal expenses from business accounts, and using nominees to disguise their connection to various entities. At least two of the defendants even submitted fabricated tax returns to third parties when seeking a loan or an apartment, despite not filing any tax returns with the IRS. Thanks to dogged investigative work, the defendants now face serious charges for their alleged crimes.”
IRS-CI Special Agent in Charge Fattorusso said: “The defendants purported to create a donation-based exercise community to make yoga more accessible for their clients, when in reality, they allegedly ran a more than decade-long cash cow that relied on a sophisticated network of tens of millions of dollars in unreported income and free labor to fund the leaders’ lavish lifestyles. Today’s arrests and charges are the opening salvo against this years-long scam and the first step to holding these defendants accountable for their alleged crimes.”
DOL-OIG Special Agent-in-Charge Jonathan Mellone said: “An important part of the mission of the Office of Inspector General is ensuring that workers receive the wages that they are entitled to and that appropriate unemployment insurance taxes are withheld from their pay and remitted to the relevant tax authority. We will continue to work with our law enforcement partners to investigate these types of allegations."
According to the allegations contained in the Complaint:[1]
In or around 2006, GUMUCIO founded YTTP in New York, New York. YTTP was originally donation-based: YTTP requested, but did not require, payment from its yoga students. YTTP started with one yoga studio on the Lower East Side of Manhattan, and it became extremely popular. Over the ensuing years, YTTP opened at least approximately 20 yoga studios or affiliated entities throughout New York City and in various other places, including California, Colorado, Arizona, Florida, and Washington State. YTTP also had a teacher training program, which earned substantial income from aspiring yoga teachers. YTTP operated from at least approximately 2006 until 2020. From 2010 to 2020, YTTP and its affiliates generated gross receipts of more than $20 million. Yet YTTP never filed a corporate tax return with the IRS.
YTTP’s leadership included GUMUCIO, ANDERSON, and SOLIMAN. GUMUCIO was YTTP’s founder, principal owner, and functional chief executive officer, as he directed and made decisions for the YTTP enterprise. ANDERSON was an owner of YTTP and the functional chief financial officer; he was involved in, among other things, negotiating leases for YTTP entities, obtaining Employer Identification Numbers from the IRS, opening bank accounts, and working with GUMUCIO to expand YTTP. SOLIMAN was an owner of YTTP, its Chief Communications Officer, the Director of Education for YTTP’s Teacher Training (“TT”) Program, and was actively involved in YTTP’s efforts to expand internationally.
GUMUCIO, ANDERSON, and SOLIMAN each received a large volume of income from YTTP, yet none of the three defendants filed a personal tax return with the IRS for any calendar year from 2013 to 2020, inclusive. Using conservative figures, for calendar years 2015 to 2020, GUMUCIO had unreported income directly from YTTP exceeding $1.6 million and a tax due and owing to the IRS exceeding an estimated $431,000; ANDERSON had unreported income directly from YTTP exceeding $2.1 million and a tax due and owing to the IRS exceeding an estimated $603,000; and SOLIMAN had unreported income directly from YTTP exceeding $961,000 and a tax due and owing to the IRS exceeding an estimated $196,000. During the charged period, GUMUCIO, ANDERSON, and SOLIMAN each represented their annual income to be six figures to third parties not associated with the Government (e.g., in loan applications, rental applications, and/or bank documents), yet none of them filed an individual tax return.
During the charged period, despite not filing any tax returns and not paying any income taxes, GUMUCIO, ANDERSON, and SOLIMAN enjoyed extravagant lifestyles, which included frequent foreign travel; expensive meals and clothing; NFL season tickets; and horse lodging and horseback riding.
YTTP and its leaders, including GUMUCIO, ANDERSON, and SOLIMAN, used various methods to evade taxes, including, among others:
Accepting yoga students’ payments in cash (e.g., which was collected in tissue boxes that were passed around during yoga classes) and paying yoga teachers in cash and “off the books”;
Using nominees to disguise the defendants’ connection to various entities which, in fact, were part of the YTTP enterprise and from which GUMUCIO, ANDERSON, and SOLIMAN all received income; to that end, GUMUCIO targeted and groomed typically young women and others to become nominee “owners” of studios, luring them with the title of studio owner when, in fact, he generally controlled business decisions, took a cut of their proceeds, and the nominees generally took on meaningful financial risk;
Generally forbidding YTTP teachers from counting incoming cash that yoga students paid and requiring yoga studio managers to transport cash proceeds to GUMUCIO’s apartment on St. Marks Place in Manhattan, where those proceeds were “stacked” and counted during so-called “stacking parties”;
Failing to maintain a corporate headquarters or keep corporate books and records;
Using YTTP business accounts to pay the defendants’ personal expenses; and
Maximizing unreported income, as GUMUCIO manipulated subordinates into providing free labor (e.g., teaching unpaid classes, stacking cash, cleaning yoga studios, depositing cash into bank accounts, etc.).
* * *
GUMUCIO, 61, of Cathlamet, Washington; ANDERSON, 51, of Bellevue, Washington; and SOLIMAN, 33, of Cathlamet, Washington, are each charged with (i) one count of conspiracy to defraud the IRS, which carries a maximum penalty of five years in prison; and (ii) five counts of tax evasion, each of which carries a maximum penalty of five years in prison.
The statutory maximum sentences are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendants will be determined by the judge.
Mr. Williams praised the outstanding efforts of IRS-CI, DOL-OIG, and the Special Agents of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York. Mr. Williams also thanked the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Washington for its assistance.
Mr. Williams also noted that the investigation is ongoing. If you believe you have information about the defendants, this case, or if you believe you are a victim of any crimes related to YTTP, please email USANYS.YTTPcase@usdoj.gov.
This matter is being handled by the Office’s Complex Frauds and Cybercrime Unit. Assistant United States Attorney Michael D. Neff is in charge of the prosecution.
The charges contained in the Complaint are merely accusations, and the defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.
[1] As the introductory phrase signifies, the entirety of the text of the Complaint and the description of the Complaint set forth below constitute only allegations, and every fact described should be treated as an allegation.
Geoffrey S. Berman, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced today that ELIZABETH ANN PIERCE, the former chief executive officer (“CEO”) of Quintillion, a telecommunications company in Alaska, was sentenced today in Manhattan federal court to 60 months in prison for defrauding investors in New York of more than $270 million during her time as CEO. PIERCE previously pled guilty before U.S. District Judge Edgardo Ramos, who imposed today’s sentence.
U.S. Attorney Geoffrey S. Berman said: “Elizabeth Ann Pierce, the then-CEO of Quintillion, placed her ambition above the law. In order to raise over $270 million to build a fiber optic cable system in northern Alaska, she repeatedly lied to her investors and forged the signatures of her customers’ executives on fake revenue contracts. When her scheme started to unravel, she tried to delay exposure with yet more lies and forged documents. She will now serve five years in prison for her crime.”
According to the Complaint, the Indictment, statements made in court, and publicly available documents:
Until July 2017, PIERCE was the chief executive officer of Quintillion, a telecommunications company based in Anchorage, Alaska, that built, operates, and markets a high-speed fiber optic cable system (the “Quintillion System”). The Quintillion System consists of three segments: a subsea segment that spans the Alaskan Arctic, a terrestrial segment that runs north to south along the Dalton Highway, and a land-based network of fibers that connects the subsea and terrestrial segments. The Quintillion System is connected to the lower 48 states through other existing networks.
Between May 2015 and July 2017, PIERCE engaged in a scheme to induce two New York-based investment companies to provide more than $270 million to construct the Quintillion System by providing them with eight forged broadband capacity sales contracts and related order forms under which Quintillion would obtain guaranteed revenue once the Quintillion System was built (the “Fake Revenue Agreements”). Under the Fake Revenue Agreements, four telecommunications services companies appeared to have made binding commitments to purchase specific wholesale quantities of capacity from Quintillion at specified prices. The cumulative value of the Fake Revenue Agreements was approximately $1 billion over the life of the Fake Revenue Agreements. In reality, the Fake Revenue Agreements were completely worthless because PIERCE had forged the counterparties’ signatures.
Certain of the Fake Revenue Agreements never existed at all, while others were falsified versions of genuine revenue agreements. PIERCE fabricated the terms of the false versions of the agreements to make them more favorable to Quintillion and, therefore, more appealing to investors than the genuine agreements. For example, under one of the Fake Revenue Agreements, the customer purportedly agreed to buy from Quintillion increasing quantities of gigabits per second of capacity over a period of 20 years. That agreement, if genuine, would have assured Quintillion hundreds of millions of dollars in future revenue. In reality, negotiations over that deal had ended unsuccessfully, a fact that PIERCE never disclosed to the investors. Under another Fake Revenue Agreement, the customer purportedly agreed to buy a fixed, predetermined amount of capacity from Quintillion regardless of subsequent market conditions. In truth, that customer was not obligated to buy any capacity.
Over the course of the scheme, PIERCE tried to cover up her fraud, by continuing to negotiate with the telecommunications companies in hopes of reaching agreements identical to the ones she forged. Her efforts were mostly unsuccessful. PIERCE completely failed to secure any revenue contract with one of those telecommunications companies, and the agreements she reached with the other three companies contained less favorable terms for Quintillion than the Fake Revenue Agreements, such as a smaller mandatory capacity purchase commitment, or no commitment at all. PIERCE hid these genuine, but inferior, contracts from the investment companies and her own staff. When Quintillion and the investment companies ultimately discovered the fraud in mid-2017, they learned that the real contracts PIERCE actually negotiated would generate only a fraction of the anticipated guaranteed revenue of the Fake Revenue Agreements she forged.
As part of PIERCE’s overall scheme, she also swindled two individual investors (together, the “Individual Victims”) out of a total of $365,000. PIERCE led these individuals to believe that they would acquire ownership interests in Quintillion when, in fact, she used half of one victim’s money and all of the other victim’s investment for her own personal benefit. These individuals have received no shares and none of their money back from PIERCE.
After the terrestrial system was built, PIERCE attempted to prevent the discovery of the Fake Revenue Agreements by accelerating the timing of incoming payments under certain genuine agreements to make those payments appear to be based on the Fake Revenue Agreements. PIERCE also sought to prevent Quintillion from invoicing one of the customers that had no real contract with Quintillion by fabricating email correspondence that gave the impression she was terminating a contractual relationship, when in fact no such relationship existed. PIERCE’s scheme started to unravel when another customer disputed invoices that it received from Quintillion pursuant to one of the Fake Revenue Agreements. Shortly thereafter, in the midst of Quintillion’s internal investigation, PIERCE abruptly resigned. Quintillion self-reported PIERCE’s conduct to the Department of Justice.
* * *
In addition to her term of imprisonment, PIERCE, age 55, now of Austin, Texas, was sentenced to three years of supervised release, and was ordered to forfeit $896,698.00 and all of her interests in Quintillion and a property in Texas. PIERCE will also be subject to a restitution order to her victims to be entered at a later date.
Mr. Berman praised the outstanding work of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
This case is prosecuted by the Office’s Complex Frauds and Cybercrime Unit. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Sarah Lai and Vladislav Vainberg are in charge of the prosecution.
Geoffrey S. Berman, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced that ELIZABETH ANN PIERCE, the former Chief Executive Officer of a telecommunications company based in Anchorage, Alaska, pled guilty today in Manhattan federal court to wire fraud and aggravated identity theft in connection with a scheme to use forged guaranteed revenue contracts fraudulently to induce investors to invest more than $250 million into her company for the construction of a fiber optic cable network in Alaska. PIERCE pled guilty before U.S. District Judge Edgardo Ramos.
Manhattan U.S. Attorney Geoffrey S. Berman said: “As she admitted today, Elizabeth Ann Pierce engaged in a brazen, multi-year scheme to obtain over $250 million from investors by misrepresenting that she had guaranteed revenue contracts with multiple telecommunications services companies. But in fact, the defendant faked those contracts, forged other people’s signatures on them, and then lied to cover up her fraud. She abused her executive position and is now being held accountable for her crimes.”
According to the Complaint, the Indictment, statements made in court, and publicly available documents:
Until July 2017, PIERCE was the chief executive officer of Quintillion, a telecommunications company based in Anchorage, Alaska that built, operates, and markets a high-speed fiber optic cable system (the “Fiber Optic Cable System”). This System consists of three segments: a subsea segment that spans the Alaskan Arctic; a terrestrial segment that runs north to south along the Dalton Highway; and a land-based network of fibers that connects the subsea and terrestrial segments. The Fiber Optic Cable System is connected to the lower 48 states through other existing networks.
Between May 2015 and July 2017, PIERCE engaged in a scheme to induce two investment companies to provide more than $250 million to construct the Fiber Optic Cable System by providing them with eight forged broadband capacity sales contracts and related order forms under which Quintillion would obtain guaranteed revenue once the Fiber Optic Cable System was built (the “Fake Revenue Agreements”). Under the Fake Revenue Agreements, four telecommunications services companies appeared to have made binding commitments to purchase specific wholesale quantities of capacity from Quintillion at specified prices. The cumulative value of the Fake Revenue Agreements was more than $24 million during the first year of the subsea segment’s operation, approximately $10 million during the first year of the terrestrial segment’s operation, and approximately $1 billion over the life of the Fake Revenue Agreements. In reality, the Fake Revenue Agreements were completely worthless because PIERCE had forged the counterparties’ signatures.
Certain of the Fake Revenue Agreements never existed at all, while others were falsified versions of genuine revenue agreements. PIERCE fabricated the terms of the false versions of the agreements to make them more favorable to Quintillion and, therefore, more appealing to investors than the genuine agreements. For example, under one of the Fake Revenue Agreements, the customer purportedly agreed to buy increasing amounts of gigabits per second of capacity over a period of 20 years from Quintillion. That agreement, if genuine, would have assured Quintillion hundreds of millions of dollars in future revenue. In reality, negotiations over that deal had ended unsuccessfully, which fact PIERCE never disclosed to the investors. Under another Fake Revenue Agreement, the customer purportedly agreed to buy a fixed, predetermined amount of capacity from Quintillion regardless of subsequent market conditions. In truth, that customer was not obligated to buy any capacity.
After the terrestrial system was built, PIERCE attempted to prevent the discovery of the Fake Revenue Agreements by accelerating the timing of incoming payments under certain genuine agreements to make those payments appear to be based on the Fake Revenue Agreements. PIERCE also sought to prevent Quintillion and the investors from invoicing one of the customers that had no real contract with Quintillion by fabricating e-mail correspondence PIERCE purportedly had with that customer. PIERCE’s scheme started to unravel when a customer disputed invoices that it received from Quintillion pursuant to one of the Fake Revenue Agreements. Shortly thereafter, in the midst of Quintillion’s internal investigation, PIERCE abruptly resigned. Quintillion self-reported PIERCE’s conduct to the Department of Justice.
* * *
PIERCE, age 55, now of Austin, Texas, pled guilty to one count of wire fraud, which carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison, and eight counts of aggravated identity theft, each of which carries a mandatory 2-year term of imprisonment, of which at least 2 years must be consecutive to any term of imprisonment imposed on the wire fraud count.
PIERCE is scheduled to be sentenced by U.S. District Judge Edgardo Ramos on May 16, 2019, at 11:00 a.m.
The maximum potential sentences in this case are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendant will be determined by the judge.
Mr. Berman praised the outstanding investigative work of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
The prosecution of this case is being handled by the Office’s Complex Frauds and Cybercrime Unit. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Sarah Lai and Vladislav Vainberg are in charge of the prosecution.
Description: The fiscal year of the data file obtained from the AOUSC
Format: YYYY
Description: The code of the federal judicial circuit where the case was located
Format: A2
Description: The code of the federal judicial district where the case was located
Format: A2
Description: The code of the district office where the case was located
Format: A2
Description: Docket number assigned by the district to the case
Format: A7
Description: A unique number assigned to each defendant in a case which cannot be modified by the court
Format: A3
Description: A unique number assigned to each defendant in a case which can be modified by the court
Format: A3
Description: A sequential number indicating whether a case is an original proceeding or a reopen
Format: N5
Description: Case type associated with the current defendant record
Format: A2
Description: Case type associated with a magistrate case if the current case was merged from a magistrate case
Format: A2
Description: A concatenation of district, office, docket number, case type, defendant number, and reopen sequence number
Format: A18
Description: A concatenation of district, office, docket number, case type, and reopen sequence number
Format: A15
Description: The docket number originally given to a case assigned to a magistrate judge and subsequently merged into a criminal case
Format: A7
Description: A unique number assigned to each defendant in a magistrate case
Format: A3
Description: The status of the defendant as assigned by the AOUSC
Format: A2
Description: A code indicating the fugitive status of a defendant
Format: A1
Description: The date upon which a defendant became a fugitive
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which a fugitive defendant was taken into custody
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date when a case was first docketed in the district court
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which proceedings in a case commenced on charges pending in the district court where the defendant appeared, or the date of the defendant’s felony-waiver of indictment
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: A code used to identify the nature of the proceeding
Format: N2
Description: The date when a defendant first appeared before a judicial officer in the district court where a charge was pending
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: A code indicating the event by which a defendant appeared before a judicial officer in the district court where a charge was pending
Format: A2
Description: A code indicating the type of legal counsel assigned to a defendant
Format: N2
Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense committed which carried the highest severity
Format: A20
Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with FTITLE1
Format: N2
Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with FTITLE1
Format: A4
Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with FTITLE1
Format: A4
Description: A code indicating the severity associated with FTITLE1
Format: A3
Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense committed which carried the second highest severity
Format: A20
Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with FTITLE2
Format: N2
Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with FTITLE2
Format: A4
Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with FTITLE2
Format: A4
Description: A code indicating the severity associated with FTITLE2
Format: A3
Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense committed which carried the third highest severity
Format: A20
Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with FTITLE3
Format: N2
Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with FTITLE3
Format: A4
Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with FTITLE3
Format: A4
Description: A code indicating the severity associated with FTITLE3
Format: A3
Description: The FIPS code used to indicate the county or parish where an offense was committed
Format: A5
Description: The date of the last action taken on the record
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which judicial proceedings before the court concluded
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which the final sentence is recorded on the docket
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which the case was closed
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The total fine imposed at sentencing for all offenses of which the defendant was convicted and a fine was imposed
Format: N8
Description: A count of defendants filed including inter-district transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants filed excluding inter-district transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of original proceedings commenced
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants filed whose proceedings commenced by reopen, remand, appeal, or retrial
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants terminated including interdistrict transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants terminated excluding interdistrict transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of original proceedings terminated
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants terminated whose proceedings commenced by reopen, remand, appeal, or retrial
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants pending as of the last day of the period including long term fugitives
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants pending as of the last day of the period excluding long term fugitives
Format: N1
Description: The source from which the data were loaded into the AOUSC’s NewSTATS database
Format: A10
Description: A sequential number indicating the iteration of the defendant record
Format: N2
Description: The date the record was loaded into the AOUSC’s NewSTATS database
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: Statistical year ID label on data file obtained from the AOUSC which represents termination year
Description: The fiscal year of the data file obtained from the AOUSC
Format: YYYY
Description: The code of the federal judicial circuit where the case was located
Format: A2
Description: The code of the federal judicial district where the case was located
Format: A2
Description: The code of the district office where the case was located
Format: A2
Description: Docket number assigned by the district to the case
Format: A7
Description: A unique number assigned to each defendant in a case which cannot be modified by the court
Format: A3
Description: A unique number assigned to each defendant in a case which can be modified by the court
Format: A3
Description: A sequential number indicating whether a case is an original proceeding or a reopen
Format: N5
Description: Case type associated with the current defendant record
Format: A2
Description: Case type associated with a magistrate case if the current case was merged from a magistrate case
Format: A2
Description: A concatenation of district, office, docket number, case type, defendant number, and reopen sequence number
Format: A18
Description: A concatenation of district, office, docket number, case type, and reopen sequence number
Format: A15
Description: The docket number originally given to a case assigned to a magistrate judge and subsequently merged into a criminal case
Format: A7
Description: A unique number assigned to each defendant in a magistrate case
Format: A3
Description: The status of the defendant as assigned by the AOUSC
Format: A2
Description: A code indicating the fugitive status of a defendant
Format: A1
Description: The date upon which a defendant became a fugitive
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which a fugitive defendant was taken into custody
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date when a case was first docketed in the district court
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which proceedings in a case commenced on charges pending in the district court where the defendant appeared, or the date of the defendant’s felony-waiver of indictment
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: A code used to identify the nature of the proceeding
Format: N2
Description: The date when a defendant first appeared before a judicial officer in the district court where a charge was pending
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: A code indicating the event by which a defendant appeared before a judicial officer in the district court where a charge was pending
Format: A2
Description: A code indicating the type of legal counsel assigned to a defendant
Format: N2
Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense committed which carried the highest severity
Format: A20
Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with FTITLE1
Format: N2
Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with FTITLE1
Format: A4
Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with FTITLE1
Format: A4
Description: A code indicating the severity associated with FTITLE1
Format: A3
Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense committed which carried the second highest severity
Format: A20
Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with FTITLE2
Format: N2
Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with FTITLE2
Format: A4
Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with FTITLE2
Format: A4
Description: A code indicating the severity associated with FTITLE2
Format: A3
Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense committed which carried the third highest severity
Format: A20
Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with FTITLE3
Format: N2
Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with FTITLE3
Format: A4
Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with FTITLE3
Format: A4
Description: A code indicating the severity associated with FTITLE3
Format: A3
Description: The FIPS code used to indicate the county or parish where an offense was committed
Format: A5
Description: The date of the last action taken on the record
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which judicial proceedings before the court concluded
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which the final sentence is recorded on the docket
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which the case was closed
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The total fine imposed at sentencing for all offenses of which the defendant was convicted and a fine was imposed
Format: N8
Description: A count of defendants filed including inter-district transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants filed excluding inter-district transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of original proceedings commenced
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants filed whose proceedings commenced by reopen, remand, appeal, or retrial
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants terminated including interdistrict transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants terminated excluding interdistrict transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of original proceedings terminated
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants terminated whose proceedings commenced by reopen, remand, appeal, or retrial
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants pending as of the last day of the period including long term fugitives
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants pending as of the last day of the period excluding long term fugitives
Format: N1
Description: The source from which the data were loaded into the AOUSC’s NewSTATS database
Format: A10
Description: A sequential number indicating the iteration of the defendant record
Format: N2
Description: The date the record was loaded into the AOUSC’s NewSTATS database
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: Statistical year ID label on data file obtained from the AOUSC which represents termination year
Geoffrey S. Berman, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced today that KAM WONG, the former chief executive officer (“CEO”) of Municipal Credit Union (“MCU”), a non-profit financial institution, was sentenced today in Manhattan federal court to 66 months in prison for defrauding and embezzling millions of dollars from MCU during his time as CEO. WONG previously pled guilty to embezzlement from a federally insured credit union before U.S. District Judge John G. Koeltl, who imposed today’s sentence.
U.S. Attorney Geoffrey S. Berman said: “For years, Kam Wong, the then-CEO of New York’s oldest credit union, betrayed the credit union’s hard-working members from the perch of his executive suite by siphoning off millions of dollars in company money for his personal benefit. Wong then tried to cover up what he had done by making false statements to federal investigators and creating false and misleading documents. He will now serve a substantial prison sentence for his crime. I commend the Special Agents of the U.S. Attorney’s Office, and our law enforcement partners, for their tireless efforts to protect the credit union’s members and expose misconduct in this ongoing investigation.”
According to the Complaint, the Information, other filings in Manhattan federal court, statements made in court and publicly available documents:
WONG, from 2007 until shortly after his arrest in May 2018, was the CEO and president of MCU, a non-profit financial institution headquartered in New York, New York, which is federally insured by the National Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”). MCU is the oldest credit union in New York State and one of the oldest and largest in the country, providing banking services to more than 588,000 members, including municipal, state, and federal workers in New York City. MCU’s earnings are intended to be directed back to its members in the form of more favorable rates and fewer and lower fees for products and services.
During his tenure as CEO and president, despite publicly praising credit union values, WONG engaged in a long-running multi-faceted scheme to obtain money from MCU to which he knew he was not entitled, and took steps to seek to conceal what he had done. Among other things, WONG embezzled from and defrauded MCU by submitting sham invoices for dental work never performed on him or paid by him, and, as a result, obtained reimbursement for hundreds of thousands of dollars of such nonexistent dental work. In addition, WONG fraudulently caused MCU to pay him additional monies that he knew he was not entitled to receive, including millions of dollars of payments in lieu of purported long-term disability insurance, and for purported taxes owed on these and other employment benefits. In total, WONG defrauded MCU out of at least approximately $9.9 million.
WONG also repeatedly misapplied money and other things of value from MCU, with respect to, among other things, the purchase of a Mercedes-Benz for his personal use; the leasing of multiple luxury vehicles for his personal use at the same time; the purchase of electronic devices (including, iPhones, iPads, and laptops) for personal use by WONG and others; reimbursement, as business expenses, of personal expenses, including hotel stays and expensive meals; purported reimbursement payments for repairs to luxury vehicles MCU had leased for WONG, which repair work was already covered by MCU’s insurance; cash advances to which he was not entitled; educational, housing, and living expenses for two of WONG’s friend’s adult relatives, whom WONG caused MCU to hire; and payments for leave days that did not comply with and exceeded what was provided for under his employment contract. In addition, WONG caused MCU to pay hundreds of thousands of dollars to a former MCU Supervisory Committee member’s company, in violation of the MCU’s conflict of interest policy, so that the member would provide WONG with controlled substances for his personal use.
In January 2018, after WONG learned of the federal investigation, WONG sought to obstruct justice by making false statements to federal agents and creating false and misleading documents to try, after the fact, to explain and justify some of his illicit payments.
* * *
In addition to his prison term, WONG, 63, of Valley Stream, Long Island, was sentenced to three years of supervised release, and was ordered to forfeit $9,890,375 and to pay restitution in the same amount to MCU.
U.S. Attorney Berman praised the outstanding work of the Special Agents of the United States Attorney’s Office. Mr. Berman also thanked the New York County District Attorney’s Office, the New York State Department of Financial Services, and NCUA.
The case is being prosecuted by the Office’s Public Corruption Unit. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Eli J. Mark and Daniel C. Richenthal are in charge of the prosecution, with assistance of Special Assistant U.S. Attorney Alona Katz from the New York County District Attorney’s Office.
Geoffrey S. Berman, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced today that KAM WONG, the former chief executive officer (“CEO”) and president of the oldest New York credit union (the “Credit Union”), a non-profit financial institution, pled guilty in Manhattan federal court today to embezzling millions of dollars from the Credit Union. WONG pled guilty before U.S. District Judge John G. Koeltl.
U.S. Attorney Geoffrey S. Berman said: “As he admitted in court today, Kam Wong, the former CEO and president of New York’s oldest credit union, abused his position of trust as a guardian of municipal, state, and federal workers’ financial accounts to enrich himself. In so doing, Wong stole money from the credit union that could have gone to the credit union’s members, and tried to cover up what he had done by making false statements to federal investigators and creating false and misleading documents. I commend the Special Agents of the U.S. Attorney’s Office, and our law enforcement partners, for their tireless efforts in this ongoing investigation.”
According to the Complaint, the Information, statements made in court and publicly available documents:
WONG was the CEO and president of the Credit Union, a non-profit financial institution headquartered in New York, New York, which is federally insured by the National Credit Union Administration Board. The Credit Union is the oldest credit union in New York State and one of the oldest and largest in the country, providing banking services to more than 425,000 members, including municipal, state, and federal workers in New York City. The Credit Union’s earnings are intended to be directed back to its members in the form of more favorable rates and fewer and lower fees for products and services.
From 2013 through January 2018, WONG engaged in a long-running multi-faceted scheme to obtain money from the Credit Union to which he knew he was not entitled, and took steps to seek to conceal what he had done. Among other things, WONG embezzled from and defrauded the Credit Union by submitting sham invoices for dental work never performed on him or paid by him, and, as a result, fraudulently obtained reimbursement for hundreds of thousands of dollars of such nonexistent dental work. In addition, WONG fraudulently caused the Credit Union to pay him additional monies that he knew he was not entitled to receive, including millions of dollars of payments in lieu of purported long-term disability insurance, and for purported taxes owed on these and other employment benefits.
WONG also misapplied money and other things of value from the Credit Union, with respect to, among other things, reimbursement payments for repairs to luxury vehicles the Credit Union leased to WONG, which repair work was already covered by the Credit Union’s insurance; cash advances to which he was not entitled; educational, housing, and living expenses for two of WONG’s friend’s relatives; payments for his leave days that did not comply with and exceeded what was provided for under his employment contract; the purchase of a Mercedes-Benz automobile that was not provided for under his employment contract; the leasing of multiple luxury vehicles at the same time; electronic devices (including, iPhones, iPads, and laptops) for personal use by WONG and others; and reimbursement, as business expenses, of personal expenses, including hotel stays. In addition, WONG obtained controlled substances, for personal use, from a former Credit Union Supervisory Committee member.
In January 2018, after WONG learned about the investigation, WONG sought to obstruct justice by making false statements to federal investigators and creating false and misleading documents to try, after the fact, to explain and justify some of these payments.
* * *
WONG, 62, of Valley Stream, Long Island, pled guilty to one count of embezzlement from a federally insured credit union, which carries a maximum penalty of 30 years in prison. As a condition of his plea, WONG also agreed to forfeit at least $9,890,375 and to pay at least $9,890,375 in restitution to the Credit Union.
WONG is scheduled to be sentenced by Judge Koeltl on April 5, 2019, at 10:00 a.m.
The maximum potential sentence in this case is prescribed by Congress and is provided here for informational purposes only, as the sentencing of WONG will be determined by the judge.
U.S. Attorney Berman praised the outstanding work of the Special Agents of the United States Attorney’s Office. Mr. Berman also thanked the New York County District Attorney’s Office, the New York State Department of Financial Services, and the National Credit Union Administration.
The case is being prosecuted by the Office’s Public Corruption Unit. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Eli J. Mark and Daniel C. Richenthal are in charge of the prosecution, with assistance from Special Assistant U.S. Attorney Alona Katz from the New York County District Attorney’s Office.
Description: The fiscal year of the data file obtained from the AOUSC
Format: YYYY
Description: The code of the federal judicial circuit where the case was located
Format: A2
Description: The code of the federal judicial district where the case was located
Format: A2
Description: The code of the district office where the case was located
Format: A2
Description: Docket number assigned by the district to the case
Format: A7
Description: A unique number assigned to each defendant in a case which cannot be modified by the court
Format: A3
Description: A unique number assigned to each defendant in a case which can be modified by the court
Format: A3
Description: A sequential number indicating whether a case is an original proceeding or a reopen
Format: N5
Description: Case type associated with the current defendant record
Format: A2
Description: Case type associated with a magistrate case if the current case was merged from a magistrate case
Format: A2
Description: A concatenation of district, office, docket number, case type, defendant number, and reopen sequence number
Format: A18
Description: A concatenation of district, office, docket number, case type, and reopen sequence number
Format: A15
Description: The docket number originally given to a case assigned to a magistrate judge and subsequently merged into a criminal case
Format: A7
Description: A unique number assigned to each defendant in a magistrate case
Format: A3
Description: The status of the defendant as assigned by the AOUSC
Format: A2
Description: A code indicating the fugitive status of a defendant
Format: A1
Description: The date upon which a defendant became a fugitive
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which a fugitive defendant was taken into custody
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date when a case was first docketed in the district court
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which proceedings in a case commenced on charges pending in the district court where the defendant appeared, or the date of the defendant’s felony-waiver of indictment
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: A code used to identify the nature of the proceeding
Format: N2
Description: The date when a defendant first appeared before a judicial officer in the district court where a charge was pending
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: A code indicating the event by which a defendant appeared before a judicial officer in the district court where a charge was pending
Format: A2
Description: A code indicating the type of legal counsel assigned to a defendant
Format: N2
Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense committed which carried the highest severity
Format: A20
Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with FTITLE1
Format: N2
Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with FTITLE1
Format: A4
Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with FTITLE1
Format: A4
Description: A code indicating the severity associated with FTITLE1
Format: A3
Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense committed which carried the second highest severity
Format: A20
Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with FTITLE2
Format: N2
Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with FTITLE2
Format: A4
Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with FTITLE2
Format: A4
Description: A code indicating the severity associated with FTITLE2
Format: A3
Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense committed which carried the third highest severity
Format: A20
Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with FTITLE3
Format: N2
Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with FTITLE3
Format: A4
Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with FTITLE3
Format: A4
Description: A code indicating the severity associated with FTITLE3
Format: A3
Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense committed which carried the fourth highest severity
Format: A20
Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with FTITLE4
Format: N2
Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with FTITLE4
Format: A4
Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with FTITLE4
Format: A4
Description: A code indicating the severity associated with FTITLE4
Format: A3
Description: The FIPS code used to indicate the county or parish where an offense was committed
Format: A5
Description: The date of the last action taken on the record
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which judicial proceedings before the court concluded
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which the final sentence is recorded on the docket
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which the case was closed
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The number of days from the earlier of filing date or first appearance date to proceeding date
Format: N3
Description: The number of days from proceeding date to disposition date
Format: N3
Description: The number of days from disposition date to sentencing date
Format: N3
Description: The code of the district office where the case was terminated
Format: A2
Description: A code indicating the type of legal counsel assigned to a defendant at the time the case was closed
Format: N2
Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense that carried the most severe disposition and penalty under which the defendant was disposed
Format: A20
Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with TTITLE1
Format: N2
Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with TTITLE1
Format: A4
Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with TTITLE1
Format: A4
Description: A code indicating the severity associated with TTITLE1
Format: A3
Description: The code indicating the nature or type of disposition associated with TTITLE1
Format: N2
Description: The number of months a defendant was sentenced to prison under TTITLE1
Format: N4
Description: A code indicating whether the prison sentence associated with TTITLE1 was concurrent or consecutive in relation to the other counts in the indictment or information or multiple counts of the same charge
Format: A4
Description: The number of months of probation imposed upon a defendant under TTITLE1
Format: N4
Description: A period of supervised release imposed upon a defendant under TTITLE1
Format: N3
Description: The fine imposed upon the defendant at sentencing under TTITLE1
Format: N8
Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense under which the defendant was disposed that carried the second most severe disposition and penalty
Format: A20
Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with TTITLE2
Format: N2
Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with TTITLE2
Format: A4
Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with TTITLE2
Format: A4
Description: A code indicating the severity associated with TTITLE2
Format: A3
Description: The code indicating the nature or type of disposition associated with TTITLE2
Format: N2
Description: The number of months a defendant was sentenced to prison under TTITLE2
Format: N4
Description: The number of months of probation imposed upon a defendant under TTITLE2
Format: N4
Description: A period of supervised release imposed upon a defendant under TTITLE2
Format: N3
Description: The fine imposed upon the defendant at sentencing under TTITLE2
Format: N8
Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense under which the defendant was disposed that carried the third most severe
disposition and penalty
Format: A20
Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with TTITLE3
Format: N2
Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with TTITLE3
Format: A4
Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with TTITLE3
Format: A4
Description: A code indicating the severity associated with TTITLE3
Format: A3
Description: The code indicating the nature or type of disposition associated with TTITLE3
Format: N2
Description: The number of months a defendant was sentenced to prison under TTITLE3
Format: N4
Description: The number of months of probation imposed upon a defendant under TTITLE3
Format: N4
Description: A period of supervised release imposed upon a defendant under TTITLE3
Format: N3
Description: The fine imposed upon the defendant at sentencing under TTITLE3
Format: N8
Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense under which the defendant was disposed that
carried the fourth most
severe disposition and
Penalty
Format: A20
Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with TTITLE4
Format: N2
Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with TTITLE4
Format: A4
Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with TTITLE4
Format: A4
Description: A code indicating the severity associated with TTITLE4
Format: A3
Description: The code indicating the nature or type of disposition associated with TTITLE4
Format: N2
Description: The number of months a defendant was sentenced to prison under TTITLE4
Format: N4
Description: The number of months of probation imposed upon a defendant under TTITLE4
Format: N4
Description: A period of supervised release imposed upon a defendant under TTITLE4
Format: N3
Description: The fine imposed upon the defendant at sentencing under TTITLE4
Format: N8
Description: The total prison time for all offenses of which the defendant was convicted and prison time was imposed
Format: N4
Description: The total fine imposed at sentencing for all offenses of which the defendant was convicted and a fine was imposed
Format: N8
Description: A count of defendants filed including inter-district transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants filed excluding inter-district transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of original proceedings commenced
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants filed whose proceedings commenced by reopen, remand, appeal, or retrial
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants terminated including interdistrict transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants terminated excluding interdistrict transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of original proceedings terminated
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants terminated whose proceedings commenced by reopen, remand, appeal, or retrial
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants pending as of the last day of the period including long term fugitives
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants pending as of the last day of the period excluding long term fugitives
Format: N1
Description: The source from which the data were loaded into the AOUSC’s NewSTATS database
Format: A10
Description: A sequential number indicating the iteration of the defendant record
Format: N2
Description: The date the record was loaded into the AOUSC’s NewSTATS database
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: Statistical year ID label on data file obtained from the AOUSC which represents termination year
Geoffrey S. Berman, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced today that KAM WONG, the chief executive officer and president of the oldest New York credit union (the “Credit Union”), a non-profit financial institution, was charged in Manhattan federal court with fraud, embezzlement, and aggravated identity theft offenses related to defrauding the Credit Union in connection with hundreds of thousands of sham expense reimbursements. WONG was arrested this morning and is scheduled to appear before U.S. Magistrate Judge James L. Cott in Manhattan federal court later today.
U.S. Attorney Geoffrey S. Berman said: “As alleged, the CEO and president of New York’s oldest credit union abused his position of trust as a guardian of municipal, state, and federal workers’ financial accounts to enrich himself. Kam Wong allegedly stole money from the credit union’s earnings that were intended to reward the credit union’s members, not line Wong’s pockets. I want to thank my Office’s Special Agents for their dedicated efforts in this ongoing investigation.”
According to the allegations contained in the Complaint[1] unsealed today in Manhattan federal court and publicly available documents:
KAM WONG, the defendant, is the CEO and president of the Credit Union, a non-profit financial institution headquartered in New York, New York, which is federally insured. The Credit Union is the oldest credit union in New York State and one of the oldest and largest in the country, providing bank services to more than 425,000 members, including municipal, state, and federal workers in New York City. The Credit Union’s earnings are intended to be directed back to its members in the form of more favorable rates and fewer and lower fees for products and services.
From at least 2013 through January 2018, WONG engaged in a long-running multi-faceted scheme to obtain money from the Credit Union to which he was not entitled, and took steps to seek to conceal what he had done. Among other things, WONG allegedly embezzled from and defrauded the Credit Union by submitting sham invoices (the “Sham Invoices”) for dental work never performed on him or paid by him, and, as a result, obtained reimbursement for hundreds of thousands of dollars of such nonexistent dental work, as well as for his alleged personal tax liability for these and other payments or benefits.
In addition to the alleged fraud in connection with dental reimbursements, the ongoing investigation has revealed that WONG obtained numerous other payments from the Credit Union under suspicious or questionable circumstances. These include millions of dollars in cash payments in lieu of a long-term disability insurance policy, as well as millions more for taxes to cover those payments; reimbursement payments for repairs to a luxury vehicle the Credit Union leased to WONG, which repair work was already covered by insurance; cash withdrawals from a Credit Union business credit card for purportedly “testing” the Credit Union’s ATMs; substantial educational, housing, and living expenses for two of WONG’s friend’s relatives, whom the Credit Union hired at his direction to be interns; tens of thousands of dollars in annual cash advances, for which WONG provided no supporting documentation; and payments for 320 days of purportedly unused sick leave, in violation of WONG’s contract and the Credit Union’s policies.
WONG generally deposited the proceeds of his scheme into a Credit Union account, from which, between July 2013 and January 2018, he then withdrew approximately $1.9 million from ATMs, over the course of more than 2,500 transactions, an average of more than one-and-a-half transactions per day. From this account, WONG also spent at least approximately $3.55 million on New York State Lottery tickets.
In or about January 2018, after WONG learned about the investigation, WONG misled federal agents and Credit Union Board members in order to, after the fact, explain and justify some of these payments. On or about February 22, 2018, WONG was placed on leave by the Credit Union’s Board of Directors upon the recommendation of a Special Committee overseeing an internal investigation prompted by this criminal investigation.
* * *
WONG, 62, of Valley Stream, Long Island, is charged with one count of embezzlement from a federally insured credit union, one count of bank fraud, one count of wire fraud, each of which carries a maximum penalty of 30 years in prison, and one count of aggravated identify theft, which carries a mandatory two-year consecutive term in prison.
The maximum potential sentences in these cases are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendant will be determined by a judge.
Mr. Berman praised the work of the Special Agents of the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York.
The case is being prosecuted by the Office’s Public Corruption Unit. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Eli J. Mark and Daniel C. Richenthal are in charge of the prosecution.
The charges contained in the Complaint are merely accusations, and the defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.
[1] As the introductory phrase signifies, the entirety of the text of the Complaint and the description of the Complaint set forth below constitute only allegations, and every fact described should be treated as an allegation.
Description: The fiscal year of the data file obtained from the AOUSC
Format: YYYY
Description: The code of the federal judicial circuit where the case was located
Format: A2
Description: The code of the federal judicial district where the case was located
Format: A2
Description: The code of the district office where the case was located
Format: A2
Description: Docket number assigned by the district to the case
Format: A7
Description: A unique number assigned to each defendant in a case which cannot be modified by the court
Format: A3
Description: A unique number assigned to each defendant in a case which can be modified by the court
Format: A3
Description: A sequential number indicating whether a case is an original proceeding or a reopen
Format: N5
Description: Case type associated with the current defendant record
Format: A2
Description: Case type associated with a magistrate case if the current case was merged from a magistrate case
Format: A2
Description: A concatenation of district, office, docket number, case type, defendant number, and reopen sequence number
Format: A18
Description: A concatenation of district, office, docket number, case type, and reopen sequence number
Format: A15
Description: The docket number originally given to a case assigned to a magistrate judge and subsequently merged into a criminal case
Format: A7
Description: A unique number assigned to each defendant in a magistrate case
Format: A3
Description: The status of the defendant as assigned by the AOUSC
Format: A2
Description: A code indicating the fugitive status of a defendant
Format: A1
Description: The date upon which a defendant became a fugitive
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which a fugitive defendant was taken into custody
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date when a case was first docketed in the district court
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which proceedings in a case commenced on charges pending in the district court where the defendant appeared, or the date of the defendant’s felony-waiver of indictment
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: A code used to identify the nature of the proceeding
Format: N2
Description: The date when a defendant first appeared before a judicial officer in the district court where a charge was pending
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: A code indicating the event by which a defendant appeared before a judicial officer in the district court where a charge was pending
Format: A2
Description: A code indicating the type of legal counsel assigned to a defendant
Format: N2
Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense committed which carried the highest severity
Format: A20
Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with FTITLE1
Format: N2
Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with FTITLE1
Format: A4
Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with FTITLE1
Format: A4
Description: A code indicating the severity associated with FTITLE1
Format: A3
Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense committed which carried the second highest severity
Format: A20
Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with FTITLE2
Format: N2
Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with FTITLE2
Format: A4
Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with FTITLE2
Format: A4
Description: A code indicating the severity associated with FTITLE2
Format: A3
Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense committed which carried the third highest severity
Format: A20
Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with FTITLE3
Format: N2
Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with FTITLE3
Format: A4
Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with FTITLE3
Format: A4
Description: A code indicating the severity associated with FTITLE3
Format: A3
Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense committed which carried the fourth highest severity
Format: A20
Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with FTITLE4
Format: N2
Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with FTITLE4
Format: A4
Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with FTITLE4
Format: A4
Description: A code indicating the severity associated with FTITLE4
Format: A3
Description: The FIPS code used to indicate the county or parish where an offense was committed
Format: A5
Description: The date of the last action taken on the record
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which judicial proceedings before the court concluded
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which the final sentence is recorded on the docket
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which the case was closed
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The number of days from the earlier of filing date or first appearance date to proceeding date
Format: N3
Description: The number of days from proceeding date to disposition date
Format: N3
Description: The number of days from disposition date to sentencing date
Format: N3
Description: The code of the district office where the case was terminated
Format: A2
Description: A code indicating the type of legal counsel assigned to a defendant at the time the case was closed
Format: N2
Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense that carried the most severe disposition and penalty under which the defendant was disposed
Format: A20
Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with TTITLE1
Format: N2
Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with TTITLE1
Format: A4
Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with TTITLE1
Format: A4
Description: A code indicating the severity associated with TTITLE1
Format: A3
Description: The code indicating the nature or type of disposition associated with TTITLE1
Format: N2
Description: The number of months a defendant was sentenced to prison under TTITLE1
Format: N4
Description: A code indicating whether the prison sentence associated with TTITLE1 was concurrent or consecutive in relation to the other counts in the indictment or information or multiple counts of the same charge
Format: A4
Description: The number of months of probation imposed upon a defendant under TTITLE1
Format: N4
Description: A period of supervised release imposed upon a defendant under TTITLE1
Format: N3
Description: The fine imposed upon the defendant at sentencing under TTITLE1
Format: N8
Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense under which the defendant was disposed that carried the second most severe disposition and penalty
Format: A20
Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with TTITLE2
Format: N2
Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with TTITLE2
Format: A4
Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with TTITLE2
Format: A4
Description: A code indicating the severity associated with TTITLE2
Format: A3
Description: The code indicating the nature or type of disposition associated with TTITLE2
Format: N2
Description: The number of months a defendant was sentenced to prison under TTITLE2
Format: N4
Description: The number of months of probation imposed upon a defendant under TTITLE2
Format: N4
Description: A period of supervised release imposed upon a defendant under TTITLE2
Format: N3
Description: The fine imposed upon the defendant at sentencing under TTITLE2
Format: N8
Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense under which the defendant was disposed that carried the third most severe
disposition and penalty
Format: A20
Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with TTITLE3
Format: N2
Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with TTITLE3
Format: A4
Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with TTITLE3
Format: A4
Description: A code indicating the severity associated with TTITLE3
Format: A3
Description: The code indicating the nature or type of disposition associated with TTITLE3
Format: N2
Description: The number of months a defendant was sentenced to prison under TTITLE3
Format: N4
Description: The number of months of probation imposed upon a defendant under TTITLE3
Format: N4
Description: A period of supervised release imposed upon a defendant under TTITLE3
Format: N3
Description: The fine imposed upon the defendant at sentencing under TTITLE3
Format: N8
Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense under which the defendant was disposed that
carried the fourth most
severe disposition and
Penalty
Format: A20
Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with TTITLE4
Format: N2
Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with TTITLE4
Format: A4
Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with TTITLE4
Format: A4
Description: A code indicating the severity associated with TTITLE4
Format: A3
Description: The code indicating the nature or type of disposition associated with TTITLE4
Format: N2
Description: The number of months a defendant was sentenced to prison under TTITLE4
Format: N4
Description: The number of months of probation imposed upon a defendant under TTITLE4
Format: N4
Description: A period of supervised release imposed upon a defendant under TTITLE4
Format: N3
Description: The fine imposed upon the defendant at sentencing under TTITLE4
Format: N8
Description: The total prison time for all offenses of which the defendant was convicted and prison time was imposed
Format: N4
Description: The total fine imposed at sentencing for all offenses of which the defendant was convicted and a fine was imposed
Format: N8
Description: A count of defendants filed including inter-district transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants filed excluding inter-district transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of original proceedings commenced
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants filed whose proceedings commenced by reopen, remand, appeal, or retrial
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants terminated including interdistrict transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants terminated excluding interdistrict transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of original proceedings terminated
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants terminated whose proceedings commenced by reopen, remand, appeal, or retrial
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants pending as of the last day of the period including long term fugitives
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants pending as of the last day of the period excluding long term fugitives
Format: N1
Description: The source from which the data were loaded into the AOUSC’s NewSTATS database
Format: A10
Description: A sequential number indicating the iteration of the defendant record
Format: N2
Description: The date the record was loaded into the AOUSC’s NewSTATS database
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: Statistical year ID label on data file obtained from the AOUSC which represents termination year
Joon H. Kim, the Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and Mark G. Peters, Commissioner of the New York City Department of Investigation (“DOI”), announced today the arrest of DEREK BROOMES, the former president and chief executive officer of a nonprofit housing organization based in Harlem, New York (the “Housing Nonprofit”). BROOMES is charged with fraud, embezzlement, and misappropriating more than $800,000 from a federally funded program intended to provide housing to low-income individuals living with HIV and AIDS. BROOMES was arrested this morning in the Bronx, New York, and is scheduled to appear before U.S. Magistrate Judge Ronald L. Ellis in Manhattan federal court later today.
Acting U.S. Attorney Joon H. Kim said: “As alleged, Derek Broomes, the former president and CEO of a non-profit organization, abused his position to divert more than $800,000 in public funds designed to assist low-income citizens living with HIV/AIDS. By his scheme to enrich himself at the expense of the non-profit, Broomes allegedly jeopardized housing for dozens of vulnerable tenants. I thank our partner at the Department of Investigation for their work in rooting out fraud and corruption in New York City.”
Commissioner Mark G. Peters said: “This defendant saw more value in purchasing luxury items than in putting a roof over the heads of his clients, according to the charges. He not only defrauded the organization and the City out of hundreds of thousands of dollars, but callously stole precious resources allocated to pay the rent of some of the City’s neediest New Yorkers. DOI thanks the Office of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York for their partnership on this case.”
According to the allegations contained in the Complaint[1] unsealed today in Manhattan federal court and publicly-available documents:
The Housing Nonprofit is a faith-based, nonprofit organization located in New York, New York, that develops and provides low-income housing in Harlem to a variety of constituencies. In approximately 2002, DEREK BROOMES, the defendant, became the chief financial officer of the Housing Nonprofit and, in approximately 2011, became its president and CEO. Prior to joining the Housing Nonprofit, BROOMES worked as a Deputy Commissioner at the New York City Human Resources Administration (“HRA”) and, for three years at DOI in various capacities, including as an investigator and Deputy Inspector General.
Since at least 1999, the Housing Nonprofit has participated in the federally funded Scattered Site Housing Program (“SSHP” or the “Program”), through which the Housing Nonprofit receives federal funds that it uses to subsidize rents for low-income individuals who are living with HIV and/or AIDS. According to Program rules, SSHP funds are to be maintained in a segregated account and used exclusively for Program costs, including rental payments for residents covered by the Program. In fiscal year 2014, which ran from July 2013 through June 2014, the Housing Nonprofit received approximately $1,590,845.67 in SSHP funds. In fiscal year 2015, which ran from July 2014 through June 2015, the Housing Nonprofit received approximately $1,552,378.01 in SSHP funds from the City.
Beginning in at least 2013, BROOMES abused his position as president and CEO of the Housing Nonprofit to steal hundreds of thousands of dollars in funds from his employer by charging personal and unauthorized expenses to a corporate credit card issued in his name (the “Corporate Credit Card”). Using the Corporate Credit Card, BROOMES routinely paid for personal auto repairs, medical bills, electronics, clothing, and gifts. None of these charges were authorized by the Housing Nonprofit, which ultimately was required to pay the monthly bills on the Corporate Credit Card. In total, between approximately March 2013, when the Corporate Credit Card was issued, and March 2015, when it was cancelled, BROOMES charged $394,145.65 to the Corporate Credit Card. Of that, an analysis conducted by the Housing Nonprofit determined that at least $243,907.35 in charges were either personal or otherwise unauthorized.
To cover those expenditures and other operating expenses at the Housing Nonprofit, BROOMES misappropriated more than $800,000 in federal funds that were provided through the SSHP. Specifically, BROOMES diverted the SSHP funds, which were intended to be used to cover rent payments for residents covered by the Program, to the Housing Nonprofit’s operating account, where they were used to pay for unauthorized expenses, including the monthly Corporate Credit Card bills. For example, in July 2014, the Housing Nonprofit received a $284,000 advance from the SSHP intended to be used exclusively to cover Program expenses. Instead, that same day, BROOMES directed the transfer of approximately $200,000 of that advance into HCCI’s operating account, where it was used to pay various unauthorized expenses, including $64,875.29 in payments to the credit card company that issued the Corporate Credit Card.
As a result of BROOMES’s diversion of SSHP funds, the Housing Nonprofit was often unable to make rent payments for SSHP apartments on a timely basis. Instead, rent checks were written by the Housing Nonprofit and signed by BROOMES along with a member of the Housing Nonprofit’s Board, but then stored in a filing cabinet and held for several months prior to being mailed to landlords. As the Housing Nonprofit fell increasingly behind on its rent obligations due to a lack of sufficient SSHP funds in its accounts, tenants it sponsored in the SSHP began to receive threats of eviction by landlords who were owed months’ worth of back rent by the Housing Nonprofit. In a January 2, 2015, email to BROOMES, another Housing Nonprofit employee reported: “Attached, are some of the outstanding rent arrears for SSHP. Rental payment is a priority for our program. Consumers have been receiving 3 Day [Eviction] Notices and are very concerned of their housing status.”
Moreover, and despite the fact that the Housing Nonprofit was using SSHP funds for unauthorized purposes and thus not making rental payments for the SSHP units, in order to perpetuate his scheme and avoid detection, BROOMES submitted, and caused others to submit, false and fraudulent reimbursement requests to HRA, which administers the SSHP, in which BROOMES and others acting at his direction certified that the Housing Nonprofit had paid rent on the SSHP units. In truth and in fact, the Housing Nonprofit had not made those payments. BROOMES personally signed paperwork submitted to HRA as a part of the Housing Nonprofit’s monthly certifications and reimbursement requests on May 8, 2013, and July 19, 2013, and directed others to sign monthly certifications and related paperwork throughout the duration of the charged scheme.
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BROOMES, 71, of New York, New York, is charged in a complaint with one count of wire fraud and one count of embezzlement from a federally funded program, each of which carries a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison.
The maximum potential sentences in these cases are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendant will be determined by a judge.
Acting U.S. Attorney Kim praised the work of DOI and the Criminal Investigators of the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York.
The case is being prosecuted by the Office’s Public Corruption Unit. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Edward B. Diskant and Alison G. Moe are in charge of the prosecution.
The charges contained in the Complaint are merely accusations, and the defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.
[1] As the introductory phrase signifies, the entirety of the text of the Complaint, and the description of the Complaint set forth herein, constitute only allegations, and every fact described should be treated as an allegation.
Geoffrey S. Berman, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced that JASON GALANIS pled guilty today for his participation in multiple fraudulent schemes. In particular, GALANIS pled guilty for his role in a scheme to manipulate the market for Gerova Financial Group, Ltd. (“Gerova”), a publicly traded company listed on the New York Stock Exchange, and to defrauding the shareholders of that company (the “Gerova Scheme”), as well as to defraud the clients of an investment advisory firm. GALANIS also pled guilty today to defrauding a Native American tribal entity and the investing public of tens of millions of dollars in connection with the issuance of bonds by the tribal entity (the “Tribal Bond Scheme”). GALANIS pled guilty to three counts of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, two counts of securities fraud, one count of investment adviser fraud, and one count of conspiracy to commit investment adviser fraud before U.S. District Judge P. Kevin Castel. GALANIS had previously pled guilty, in July 2016, for his participation in the Gerova Scheme and, in January 2017, for his participation in the Tribal Bond Scheme, but those convictions were subsequently vacated.
U.S. Attorney Geoffrey S. Berman said: “As he admitted today, Jason Galanis orchestrated two multimillion-dollar fraud schemes, and put together a team of co-conspirators to carry them out. He and his codefendants engaged in market manipulation and the defrauding of shareholders, and they stole a large portion of the proceeds of tribal bonds that were intended to fund economic development projects. The overriding theme was victimizing others to enrich themselves. Now Jason Galanis awaits sentencing for his criminal greed.”
According to the allegations contained in the Information filed against GALANIS, charging documents filed against GALANIS’s co-conspirators, and statements made in related court filings and proceedings:
The Gerova Scheme
From 2009 to 2011, GALANIS, along with his co-conspirators John Galanis, Gary Hirst, Derek Galanis, Ymer Shahini, and Gavin Hamels, engaged in a scheme to defraud the shareholders of Gerova and the investing public, by effecting securities transactions in Gerova stock for the purpose of conferring millions of dollars of undisclosed remuneration to GALANIS and his co-conspirators, without adequate disclosure of GALANIS’s role in directing the transactions or the benefits received by GALANIS and his co-conspirators.
As a part of the scheme to defraud, GALANIS obtained sufficient control over Gerova so as to be able to cause Gerova to enter into transactions of his design, and for his benefit, including the issuance of Gerova stock. GALANIS obtained this control without causing himself to be identified as an officer or director of Gerova so as to purport to abide by an SEC-imposed bar that forbade him from holding such positions at publicly traded companies. Among other means and methods, GALANIS, with the assistance of Hirst, caused over 5,000,000 shares of Gerova stock, which represented nearly half the company’s public float and which were intended for GALANIS’s ultimate benefit, to be issued to and held in the name of Ymer Shahini, who knowingly served as a foreign nominee for GALANIS. GALANIS, John Galanis, Jared Galanis, Derek Galanis, Hirst, and Shahini understood that the purpose of the stock grant to Shahini was to disguise GALANIS’s ownership interest in the stock, and to evade the SEC’s regulations for issuing unregistered shares of stock.
At the same time, and as a further part of the scheme to defraud, GALANIS’s co-conspirators, with his knowledge and approval, opened and managed brokerage accounts in the name of Shahini (the “Shahini Accounts”), effected the sale of Gerova stock from the Shahini Accounts, and received and concealed the proceeds, knowing that this activity was designed to conceal from the investing public GALANIS’s ownership of and control over the Gerova stock.
GALANIS, among others, also fraudulently induced investment advisers, including Gavin Hamels, to purchase shares of Gerova stock in the investment advisers’ client accounts by offering compensation and/or other benefits to the respective investment adviser. By causing the purchase of Gerova stock at the time, quantity, and/or price of their choosing, GALANIS and others were able to, among other things, effectuate the sale of large quantities of Gerova stock from the Shahini Accounts that GALANIS controlled while artificially maintaining the price of Gerova stock through coordinated match trading. Such coordinated trading served to manipulate the market for Gerova stock and deceive the investing public. As a result, GALANIS and his co-conspirators reaped nearly $20 million in profits.
The Scheme to Defraud Clients of Investment Firm-1
From 2007 to 2010, GALANIS along with an investment adviser identified in the Information as “CC-2,” participated in a scheme to defraud the clients of CC-2’s investment advisory firm, identified in the Information as “Investment Firm-1.” Oftentimes in exchange for compensation from GALANIS, CC-2 caused Investment Firm-1 clients to invest in notes issued by entities associated with GALANIS.
When obligations owed by entities associated with GALANIS became due, CC-2 used client funds to purchase either notes issued by other entities associated with GALANIS or publicly traded shares held by such entities. The funds generated were then used to pay the original obligations owed to other Investment Firm-1 clients. Through these securities trades, funds in client accounts of one set of Investment Firm-1 investors were used to pay obligations owed to a different set of Investment Firm-1 investors by entities associated with GALANIS.
The Tribal Bond Scheme
From March 2014 through April 2016, GALANIS, along with his co-conspirators Gary Hirst, John Galanis, a/k/a “Yanni,” Hugh Dunkerley, Michelle Morton, Devon Archer, and Bevan Cooney, engaged in a fraudulent scheme to misappropriate the proceeds of bonds issued by the Wakpamni Lake Community Corporation (“WLCC”), a Native American tribal entity (the “Tribal Bonds”), and to use funds in the accounts of clients of asset management firms controlled by GALANIS and his codefendants to purchase the Tribal Bonds, which the clients were then unable to redeem or sell because the bonds were illiquid and lacked a ready secondary market.
Documents governing the Tribal Bonds specified that an investment manager would invest the proceeds of the Tribal Bonds in investments that would generate annuity payments sufficient to pay interest on the Tribal Bonds and provide funds to the WLCC to be used for tribal economic development purposes. In fact, none of the proceeds of the Tribal Bonds were turned over to the investment manager specified in the closing documents. Instead, significant portions of the proceeds were misappropriated by GALANIS and his codefendants for their own personal use.
Specifically, the proceeds of the Tribal Bonds were deposited into a bank account in the name of Wealth Assurance Private Client Corporation (“WAPCC”), an entity controlled by Dunkerley and Hirst. Dunkerley transferred more than $38 million from the WAPCC account to an account controlled by GALANIS, who then misappropriated more than $8.5 million of the proceeds for his personal use, including for expenses associated with his home, jewelry and clothing purchases, travel and entertainment, and restaurant meals.
There was no ready secondary market for the Tribal Bonds. Nonetheless, without prior notice to their clients, Morton and Hirst, acting at the direction of GALANIS, used funds belonging to clients of two related investment advisers, Hughes Capital Management, Inc. (“Hughes”), and Atlantic Asset Management, LLC (“Atlantic”), to purchase the Tribal Bonds, even though GALANIS, Hirst, and Morton were well aware that material facts about the Tribal Bonds had been withheld from clients in whose accounts they were placed, including the fact that the Tribal Bond purchases fell outside the investment parameters set forth in the investment advisory contracts of certain Hughes clients and of the Atlantic pooled investment vehicle in which the Tribal Bonds were purchased. When Hughes and Atlantic clients learned about the purchase of the Tribal Bonds in their accounts, several of them demanded that the Tribal Bonds be sold. However, because there was no ready secondary market for the Tribal Bonds, no Tribal Bonds have been sold from any Hughes or Atlantic client accounts. In addition, GALANIS and his codefendants failed to apprise clients of Hughes and Atlantic regarding substantial conflicts of interest with respect to the issuance and placement of the Tribal Bonds before the Tribal Bonds were purchased on these clients’ behalf.
In addition, a portion of the misappropriated proceeds was recycled and provided by GALANIS to entities affiliated with Archer and Cooney in order to enable Archer and Cooney to purchase subsequent Tribal Bonds issued by the WLCC. As a result of the use of recycled proceeds to purchase additional issuances of Tribal Bonds, the face amount of Tribal Bonds outstanding increased and the amount of interest payable by the WLCC increased, but the actual bond proceeds available for investment on behalf of the WLCC did not increase.
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GALANIS, 49, pled guilty to three counts of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, each carrying a maximum sentence of five years in prison and a maximum fine of $250,000 or twice the gross gain or loss from the offense; two counts of securities fraud, each of which carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison and a maximum fine of $5,000,000 or twice the gross gain or loss from the offense; one count of investment adviser fraud, which carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison and a maximum fine of $10,000 or twice the gross gain or loss from the offense; and one count of conspiracy to commit investment adviser fraud, which carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison and a maximum fine of $10,000 or twice the gross gain or loss from the offense. GALANIS will be sentenced by Judge Castel on May 12, 2020.
The maximum potential sentences in this case are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentence for the defendant will be determined by the judge.
Mr. Berman praised the work of the U.S. Postal Inspection Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and thanked the SEC.
This case is being handled by the Office’s Securities and Commodities Fraud Task Force. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Brian Blais, Rebecca Mermelstein, and Negar Tekeei are in charge of the prosecution.
Audrey Strauss, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced the conviction today of HAMID “Ray” AKHAVAN and RUBEN WEIGAND, following a four-week trial before the Honorable Jed S. Rakoff. AKHAVAN and WEIGAND devised a complex scheme involving fake companies, false websites, and fake “customer service centers,” to deceive U.S. issuing banks and credit unions into effectuating more than $150 million of credit and debit card purchases of marijuana by disguising those purchases as being for other kinds of goods, such as face creams and dog products. The defendants were each convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit bank fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1349.
Manhattan U.S. Attorney Audrey Strauss said: “As a jury has now found, Ray Akhavan and Ruben Weigand were in the business of selling lies. Under the radar of U.S. banks and credit card companies screening for suspicious and illegal activity, these men offered their services: creating fake companies and fake websites, and ginning up fake web traffic to those fake websites, all in the service of fraudulently moving money through the United States financial system. Today, a jury has seen through those lies and convicted Akhavan and Weigand of bank fraud.”
As reflected in the Indictment, public filings, and the evidence presented at trial:
From in or around 2016 through in or around 2019, AKHAVAN and WEIGAND, working with others, including principals from one of the leading on-demand marijuana delivery companies in the United States (the “Company”) planned and executed a scheme to deceive United States banks and other financial institutions into processing over $150 million in credit and debit card payments for the purchase and delivery of marijuana products (the “Scheme”).
The Scheme involved the deception of virtually all of the participants in the payment processing network, including issuing banks in the United States (the “Issuing Banks”) and Visa and MasterCard. The primary method used by AKHAVAN, WEIGAND, and other coconspirators to deceive the Issuing Banks involved the purchase and use of shell companies that were used to disguise the marijuana transactions through the use of phony merchants (the “Phony Merchants”). The shell companies were used to open offshore bank accounts with merchant acquiring banks and to initiate credit card charges for marijuana purchases made through the Company. AKHAVAN and WEIGAND worked with other co-conspirators to create these phony merchant accounts – including phony online merchants purportedly selling dog products, diving gear, carbonated drinks, green tea, and face creams – and established Visa and MasterCard merchant processing accounts with one or more offshore acquiring banks. They then arranged for more than a dozen Phony Merchants to be used by the Company to process debit and credit card purchases of marijuana products. Many of the Phony Merchants purported to be based in the United Kingdom, but, despite being based outside the United States, claimed to maintain U.S.-based customer service numbers.
To facilitate the Scheme, webpages were created and deployed to lend legitimacy to the Phony Merchants. The Phony Merchants typically had web pages suggesting that they were involved in selling legitimate goods, such as carbonated drinks, face cream, dog products, and diving gear. Yet these companies were actually being used to facilitate the approval and processing of marijuana transactions. The defendants’ scheme even involved fake visits to those websites to make it appear as though the websites had real customers and were operating legitimate online businesses.
The defendants’ scheme also involved the use of online tracking pixels. Because the descriptors listed on Company customers’ credit card statements often were the URLs for the Phony Merchant websites, Company customers were sometimes confused and did not recognize the transactions on their credit card statements. The defendants and their coconspirators were concerned that confused customers would call their Issuing Banks and inadvertently reveal the Scheme by indicating that they had purchased marijuana products and/or that they had made a purchase through the Company. To lessen the risk that customers would be confused, the defendants used a number of techniques, including online tracking pixels to track which users had visited the Company’s website. If a Company customer had visited the Company’s website and went to the URL listed on their credit card statement, they would automatically be re-routed to a webpage connected to the Company so that the customer would understand what the real purchase had been for (i.e., from the Company). However, in order to hide the Scheme, the defendants ensured that if a third party such as a bank or credit card company investigator visited a URL of a Phony Merchant, they would not be re-routed, and would therefore be unable to discern any connection between the Phony Merchant website and the Company and/or the sale of marijuana products.
Over $150 million in marijuana credit and debit card transactions were processed using the Phony Merchants. Some of the merchant websites listed for those transactions included: diverkingdom.com, desirescent.com, outdoormaxx.com, and happypuppybox.com. Moreover, none of the Phony Merchant website names listed for those transactions referred to the Company or to marijuana. AKHAVAN, WEIGAND, and others also worked with and directed others to apply incorrect merchant category codes (“MCCs”) to the marijuana transactions in order to disguise the nature of those transactions and create the false appearance that the transactions were completely unrelated to marijuana. Some of the MCCs/categories listed for the transactions included freight carrier, trucking; clock, jewelry, watch, and silverware; stenographic services; department stores; music stores/pianos; and cosmetic stores.
AKHAVAN was the leader of the transaction laundering scheme and WEIGAND was responsible for overseeing the acquiring bank accounts used by the Phony Merchants and sending the proceeds from the marijuana transactions back to bank accounts in the United States.
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AKHAVAN, 43, of, California, and WEIGAND, 38, of Germany, were each convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit bank fraud, which carries a maximum sentence of 30 years in prison. The maximum potential sentence is prescribed by Congress and is provided here for informational purposes only, as the sentencing of the defendants will be determined by the judge. Sentencing before Judge Rakoff is scheduled for June 25, 2021.
Ms. Strauss praised the work of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
The prosecution of this case is being handled by the Office’s Complex Frauds and Cybercrime Unit and the Money Laundering and Transnational Criminal Enterprises Unit. Assistant United States Attorneys Nicholas Folly, Tara La Morte, and Emily Deininger are in charge of the prosecution.
Damian Williams, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and Fernando P. McMillan, the Special Agent in Charge of the New York Field Office of the Office of Criminal Investigations of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), announced the unsealing of a criminal Complaint in Manhattan federal court charging ISIS NAVARRO REYES, a/k/a “Beraly Navarro,” with receipt of misbranded drugs in interstate commerce, dispensing misbranded drugs while held for sale, conspiracy to introduce and deliver for introduction misbranded drugs in interstate commerce, dispensing of misbranded drugs while held for sale, and smuggling. As alleged in the Complaint, from about November 2022 through about January 2024, REYES marketed, advertised, and sold various misbranded and adulterated weight loss drugs, including Ozempic, Mesofrance, and Axcion, to followers on social media. REYES, who is not licensed by law to administer prescription medication, obtained the weight loss drugs that she held for sale from Central and South America. None of the weight loss drugs that REYES sold were approved for sale or dispensing in the United States by the FDA. REYES was arrested this morning and will be presented in Manhattan federal court later today before U.S. Magistrate Judge Barbara Moses.
U.S. Attorney Damian Williams said: “As alleged, Isis Navarro Reyes used her social media following to sell weight loss drugs unapproved for distribution in the United States. Reyes’s alleged unlawful dispensing of these drugs caused significant, life-threatening injuries to some victims and put all of her victims in harm’s way. Recently, public interest in semaglutide and weight loss drugs has skyrocketed, and criminals have sought to take advantage of this interest for their ends. With this, the first misbranding and adulteration charges brought pertaining to semaglutide, Reyes will be held accountable for her conduct, and criminals should think twice before trying to sell weight loss drugs without a license to do so. This case makes clear that extreme caution and physician consultation should always be taken when purchasing medications, especially on social media.”
FDA Office of Criminal Investigations Special Agent in Charge Fernando P. McMillan said: “Selling misbranded prescription drugs, particularly injectable products that should be sterile, in the U.S. marketplace puts all consumers’ health at risk. We will continue to pursue and bring to justice those who jeopardize the public’s health by selling misbranded drugs.”
As alleged in the Complaint:[1]
From about November 2022 through about November 2023, ISIS NAVARRO REYES, using TikTok, posted dozens of videos about weight loss drugs including, but not limited to, Ozempic, Axcion, and Mesotherapy.
In her videos, REYES showcases the weight loss drugs, instructs viewers how frequently they should be used, describes how they should be taken or injected, and claims to describe her personal experiences — for example, side effects and effectiveness in causing weight loss — in detail. In several of these videos, REYES tells viewers that they can contact her via an encrypted messaging application on her cellphone (the “Cellphone”) if they would like to order the weight loss drugs that she is selling.
On about October 11, 2023, REYES posted a video pertaining to Ozempic. In this video, REYES demonstrates how to inject oneself with the medication and shares her experience using the drug. Toward the end of the video, REYES instructs viewers to contact her on the Cellphone if they are interested in having her obtain Ozempic for them. A screenshot from this TikTok post is below:
In about December 2023, a law enforcement officer acting in an undercover capacity (the “UC”) began messaging REYES on the Cellphone. From about December 2023 through about January 2024, the UC and REYES exchanged several messages concerning REYES’s supply of Ozempic and the UC’s interest in purchasing Ozempic from REYES. On about January 7, 2024, pursuant to instructions from REYES, the UC sent $375 to a Zelle account in the name of “Isis Reyes Navarro.” REYES did not ask the UC to provide a prescription, and the UC did not provide one. On about January 9, 2024, REYES dropped off a package intended for the UC at a post office located in or around Shirley, New York.
On about January 12, 2024, law enforcement received a package addressed to the UC from REYES (the “UC Parcel”) in Manhattan. The UC Parcel contained a box containing what purported to be Ozempic.[2] Photos of packaging containing the purported Ozempic that REYES mailed the UC are below:
All of the labeling accompanying the Ozempic in the UC Parcel was in Spanish, in violation of FDA regulations.
In about November 2022, a woman who had viewed content posted to REYES’s TikTok account (“Victim-1”) called the Cellphone for the purpose of ordering weight loss drugs. The individual who answered Victim‑1’s call identified herself as “Isis Navarro Reyes.” In about February 2023, Victim-1 purchased 30 injections of Mesofrance, an injectable weight loss drug, from REYES. REYES mailed the Mesofrance to Victim-1’s residence in White Plains, New York. REYES did not ask Victim-1 to provide a prescription, and Victim-1 did not provide one.
Between about February 2023 and about June 2023, Victim-1 self-administered 28 injections. In an audio message that she recorded and transmitted, REYES provided Victim-1 with instructions on how to administer the drug. REYES told Victim-1, among other things, to inject herself every three days. All of the labeling of the vials that contained the Mesofrance that Victim‑1 purchased from REYES were in a language other than English, in violation of FDA regulations.
On about July 13, 2023, Victim-1 began developing lesions from administering the Mesofrance. Victim-1 sent messages to REYES about her injuries and sent photos. In about October 2023, Victim-1’s physician diagnosed her with a mycobacterium abscessus infection, which is frequently caused by the contamination of medications, medical products, and medical devices with the mycobacterium abscessus bacterium. In about November 2023, the New York Department of Health tested one of the vials of Mesofrance that Victim-1 purchased from REYES. The substance tested positive for mycobacterium abscessus, a species of rapidly growing, multidrug-resistant, nontuberculous mycobacteria.
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REYES, 36, of Shirley, New York, is charged with one count of smuggling, which carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison; one count of receipt of misbranded drugs in interstate commerce, which carries a maximum sentence of one year in prison; one count of dispensing of a misbranded drug while held for sale, which carries a maximum sentence of one year in prison; one count of conspiracy to introduce and deliver for introduction a misbranded drug in interstate commerce, which carries a maximum sentence of one year in prison; and two counts of dispensing of misbranded drugs while held for sale, each of which carry a maximum sentence of one year in prison.
The maximum potential sentences are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendant would be determined by a judge.
Mr. Williams praised the outstanding investigative work of the FDA Office of Criminal Investigations, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, the New York City Police Department, the Customs and Border Protection Task Force Officers of the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Special Agents and Task Force Officers of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York.
This case is being handled by the Office’s Narcotics Unit. Assistant U.S. Attorney Brandon C. Thompson is in charge of the prosecution.
The charges contained in the Complaint are merely accusations, and the defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.
[1] As the introductory phrase signifies, the entirety of the text of the Complaint and the description of the Complaint set forth herein constitute only allegations, and every fact described herein should be treated as an allegation.
[2] To date, there is no evidence that the Ozempic that REYES sold the UC is not genuine.
Damian Williams, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced that RICHARD ZEITLIN, the owner of a telemarketing call center business, pled guilty today to conspiracy to commit wire fraud in connection with his participation in a scheme to use his call centers to defraud donors of certain political action committees (“PACs”) through false and misleading statements. ZEITLIN pled guilty before U.S. District Judge Lewis A. Kaplan.
U.S. Attorney Damian Williams said: “Richard Zeitlin used his telemarketing business to deceive donors into believing they were contributing to charitable causes when, in reality, their money was diverted to political action committees. Zeitlin’s fraudulent actions not only undermined the trust of donors but also exploited their goodwill for personal gain. Today’s announcement highlights this Office’s dedication to holding accountable those who misuse charitable and political organizations to defraud and mislead the public.”
According to the allegations in the Indictment, court filings, and statements made in Court:
PACs are entities registered with the Federal Election Commission that may be tax-exempt and collect money to advocate on behalf of or against certain causes and political candidates. By contrast, charities, unlike PACs, typically provide direct services to communities or causes.
From at least in or about 2017 up to and including in or about 2020, ZEITLIN used his telemarketing call center business and various associated entities to defraud numerous donors by providing misleading and false information about how the donors’ money would be spent and the nature of the organizations to which they were giving. Specifically, ZEITLIN directed his employees to alter the call scripts used when calling potential donors on behalf of certain PACs in order to mislead potential donors into believing that they would be giving to a direct-services organization (i.e., a charity), rather than to a political advocacy organization (i.e., a PAC). ZEITLIN directed that these lies, misleading statements, and misrepresentations be made so that donors would be more likely to give money, thereby increasing the funds raised and profits for his businesses – which typically received approximately 90% of the funds donated. In some instances, Zeitlin’s businesses retained 100% of the funds donated with none of the money going to the causes described in telemarketing calls to donors. When one PAC treasurer confronted ZEITLIN with complaints from donors that solicitation calls falsely represented a PAC as a charity, ZEITLIN falsely denied that the calls were being made, acknowledged that such calls would be inappropriate, and refused to give the treasurer any call recordings that would have revealed his fraud. In or about May 2022, after learning that ZEITLIN and his businesses were under federal investigation, ZEITLIN directed his employees to delete electronic messages relating to his businesses.
If you believe you are a victim of fraud perpetrated by ZEITLIN, please contact USANYS.PACFraud@usdoj.gov or the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) at 1-800-CALL-FBI or tips.fbi.gov, and find more information here: https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/united-states-v-richard-zeitlin.
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ZEITLIN, 54, of Las Vegas, Nevada, pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud in connection with telemarketing, which carries a maximum sentence of 25 years in prison.
The maximum potential sentence is prescribed by Congress and provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendant will be determined by the judge. ZEITLIN is scheduled to be sentenced by Judge Kaplan on December 10, 2024.
Mr. Williams praised the outstanding investigative work of the FBI.
This case is being handled by the Office’s Public Corruption Unit. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Jane Kim, Emily Deininger, and Rebecca T. Dell are in charge of the prosecution.
Damian Williams, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and Naomi Gruchacz, the Special Agent in Charge of the New York Regional Office of the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General (“HHS-OIG”), announced today that the United States has filed and simultaneously settled a civil fraud lawsuit against ORANGE MEDICAL CARE, P.C. (“ORANGE MEDICAL”) and its owners, ASHIKKUMAR A. RAVAL and MANISH A. RAVAL (together, the “RAVALS” and with ORANGE MEDICAL, the “Defendants”).
The RAVALS are physicians who own and operate ORANGE MEDICAL, a family medicine practice that provides primary care services to patients in Newburgh, New York. The settlement resolves claims that ORANGE MEDICAL and the RAVALS fraudulently billed Medicare and Medicaid by submitting claims for primary care services that were not rendered or supervised by the physician identified in the claim for payment and had, in fact, been rendered by non-credentialed providers.
Under the settlement approved Saturday, August 17, 2024, by U.S. District Judge Paul Gardephe, ORANGE MEDICAL and the RAVALS will pay $268,800 to the U.S. and have admitted and accepted responsibility for conduct alleged in the Complaint as further described below. ORANGE MEDICAL and the RAVALS have also agreed to pay $331,200 to the State of New York to resolve the State of New York’s claims, for a total recovery of $600,000. The settlement amount is based on the Office’s and the State of New York’s assessment of ORANGE MEDICAL’s and the RAVALS’ ability to pay based on the financial information they provided. The parties have also executed a Consent Judgment in the amount of $1,646,835, which may be enforced if the Defendants do not make the payments required under the settlement agreement.
U.S. Attorney Damian Williams said: “Orange Medical and the Ravals submitted false claims to Medicare and Medicaid, failing to accurately identify who was involved in their patients’ treatment. This Office is committed to ensuring that individuals and entities billing federal health care programs do so in an honest manner.”
HHS-OIG Special Agent in Charge Naomi Gruchacz said: “As a part of this settlement, the defendants acknowledged that Orange Medical obtained funds from the Medicare and Medicaid programs for claims that did not comply with those programs’ billing rules. Individuals and entities that participate in the federal health care system are required to obey the laws meant to preserve the integrity of program funds and the provision of appropriate, quality services to patients.”
As alleged in the Complaint filed in Manhattan federal court:
From November 2006 through December 2022, ORANGE MEDICAL and the RAVALS submitted claims to Medicare and Medicaid that listed one of the RAVALS as the rendering provider even though the services had been rendered by non-credentialed providers, without the direct supervision of the RAVALS. On many such occasions, the RAVALS were traveling outside of the U.S. at the time the patient received the treatment.
As part of the settlement, ORANGE MEDICAL and the RAVALS admitted and accepted responsibility for certain conduct alleged by the U.S., including the following:
ORANGE MEDICAL and the RAVALS understood that they were prohibited by relevant federal healthcare program rules from submitting claims for reimbursement to Medicaid in the State of New York for primary care services if the physician listed as the rendering provider on the claim for reimbursement had not actually rendered the services and, with respect to Medicare, if the services were not, at minimum, rendered “incident to” medical services actually provided by the physician listed on the claim. ORANGE MEDICAL and the RAVALS further understood that, in order to receive reimbursement from Medicaid, a healthcare provider must be enrolled as a provider in the Medicare or Medicaid program at the time the services are rendered.
Nonetheless, ORANGE MEDICAL and the RAVALS frequently submitted claims to Medicaid and Medicare for primary care services that listed Manish Raval or Ashikkumar Raval as the rendering provider, even though they had not rendered the services for which reimbursement had been sought. In fact, the services had been performed by providers who had not enrolled in the Medicare or Medicaid programs. Further, the providers that had rendered the services were often not physicians, but instead nurse practitioners or physician assistants. On many such occasions, the RAVALS had no personal involvement or supervision in the treatment of the patient and were traveling outside of the U.S. at the time that the services were furnished.
ORANGE MEDICAL and the RAVALS also altered patient records to reflect falsely that one of the RAVALS had seen a patient when, in fact, the patient had been seen by a different provider.
As a result of the conduct described above, ORANGE MEDICAL received reimbursements from Medicare and Medicaid for primary care claims that did not comply with those programs’ billing rules.
In connection with the filing of the lawsuit and settlement, the Government joined a private whistleblower lawsuit that had been filed under seal pursuant to the False Claims Act.
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Mr. Williams praised the outstanding investigative work of HHS-OIG, and he thanked the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit at the New York State Attorney General’s Office for its extensive collaboration in the investigation and resolution of this case.
The case is being handled by the Office’s Civil Frauds Unit. Assistant U.S. Attorney David E. Farber is in charge of the case.
Damian Williams, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Chad Plantz, the Special Agent in Charge of the San Diego Field Office of Homeland Security Investigations (“HSI”), and Tyler Hatcher, the Special Agent in Charge of the Los Angeles Field Office of the Internal Revenue Service - Criminal Investigation (“IRS-CI”), announced the unsealing of an Indictment charging SHAKEEB AHMED with wire fraud and money laundering in connection with his attack on a decentralized cryptocurrency exchange (the “Crypto Exchange”). AHMED was arrested this morning in New York, New York, and will be presented this afternoon before U.S. Magistrate Judge Robert W. Lehrburger.
U.S. Attorney Damian Williams said: “This is the second case we are announcing this week to shed light on fraud in the cryptocurrency and digital asset ecosystem. As alleged in the indictment, Shakeeb Ahmed, who was a senior security engineer at an international technology company, used his expertise to defraud the exchange and its users and steal approximately $9 million in cryptocurrency. We also allege that he then laundered the stolen funds through a series of complex transfers on the blockchain where he swapped cryptocurrencies, hopped across different crypto blockchains, and used overseas crypto exchanges. But none of those actions covered the defendant’s tracks or fooled law enforcement, and they certainly didn’t stop my Office or our law enforcement partners from following the money.”
HSI Special Agent in Charge Chad Plantz said: “Financial crime strikes at the core of our national and economic banking security. With an attack of this magnitude, it’s crucial we ensure continued consumer confidence in our financial system. Ruthless and reckless attempts aimed to sabotage legitimate commerce for greed must be stopped. It’s cases like these that demonstrate HSI’s commitment and ability to work with a coalition of the willing to dismantle these complicated and technical fraud schemes and identify those responsible regardless of where they operate.”
IRS-CI Special Agent in Charge Tyler Hatcher said: “As alleged, Mr. Ahmed used his skills as a computer security engineer to steal millions of dollars. He then allegedly tried to hide the stolen funds, but his skills were no match for IRS Criminal Investigation's Cyber Crimes Unit. We, along with our partners at HSI and the Department of Justice, are at the forefront of cyber investigations and will track these fraudsters anywhere they try to hide and hold them accountable.”
As alleged in the Indictment:[1]
The Crypto Exchange was incorporated overseas and operates on the Solana blockchain. At all relevant times, the Crypto Exchange allowed users to exchange different kinds of cryptocurrencies and paid fees to users who deposited cryptocurrency to provide liquidity on the Crypto Exchange.
In July 2022, AHMED carried out an attack on the Crypto Exchange by exploiting a vulnerability in one of the Crypto Exchange’s smart contracts and inserting fake pricing data to fraudulently cause that smart contract to generate approximately $9 million dollars’ worth of inflated fees that AHMED did not legitimately earn, which fees AHMED was able to withdraw from the Crypto Exchange in the form of cryptocurrency. This conduct defrauded the Crypto Exchange and its users, whose cryptocurrency AHMED had fraudulently obtained. Additional details regarding the attack, including AHMED’s use of cryptocurrency “flash loans” to further defraud the Crypto Exchange, are described in the Indictment publicly filed today.
After he stole the fees he never legitimately earned, AHMED had communications with the Crypto Exchange in which he decided to return all of the stolen funds except for $1.5 million if the Crypto Exchange agreed not to refer the attack to law enforcement.
At the time of the attack, AHMED was a senior security engineer for an international technology company whose resume reflected skills in, among other things, reverse engineering smart contracts and blockchain audits, which are some of the specialized skills AHMED used to execute the attack.
AHMED laundered the millions in fees that he stole from the Crypto Exchange to conceal their source and ownership, including through (i) conducting token-swap transactions, (ii) “bridging” fraud proceeds from the Solana blockchain over to the Ethereum blockchain, (iii) exchanging fraud proceeds into Monero, an anonymized and particularly difficult cryptocurrency to trace, and (iv) using overseas cryptocurrency exchanges.
After the attack, AHMED searched online for information about the attack, his own criminal liability, criminal defense attorneys with expertise in similar cases, law enforcement’s ability to successfully investigate the attack, and fleeing the United States to avoid criminal charges. For example, approximately two days after the attack, AHMED conducted an internet search for the term “defi hack,” read several news articles about the hack of the Crypto Exchange, and visited several pages on the Crypto Exchange’s website. As another example, AHMED conducted internet searches or visited websites related to the charges in the indictment, including by searching for the term “wire fraud” and for the term “evidence laundering.” Finally, AHMED also conducted internet searches or visited websites related to his ability to flee the United States, avoid extradition, and keep his stolen cryptocurrency: he searched for the terms “can I cross border with crypto,” “how to stop federal government from seizing assets,” and “buying citizenship”; and he visited a website titled “16 Countries Where Your Investments Can Buy Citizenship . . .”
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AHMED, 34, of New York, New York, is charged with wire fraud and money laundering, each of which carry a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison.
The maximum potential sentences are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendant will be determined by a judge.
Mr. Williams praised the outstanding work of HSI and IRS-CI. Mr. Williams also thanked the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of California for their assistance in the investigation.
The case is being prosecuted by the Office’s Money Laundering and Transnational Criminal Enterprises Unit and Complex Frauds and Cybercrime Unit. Assistant U.S. Attorneys David R. Felton and Kevin Mead are in charge of the prosecution.
The charges contained in the Indictment are merely accusations, and the defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.
[1] As the introductory phrase signifies, the entirety of the text of the Indictment and the description of the Indictment set forth herein constitute only allegations, and every fact described therein should be treated as an allegation.
Damian Williams, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced the conviction of KENNETH WYNDER Jr., a former New York State Trooper and the president of the Law Enforcement Employees Benevolent Association (“LEEBA”), a labor union for law enforcement officers employed by the City of New York (the “City”), and ANDREW BROWN, a/k/a “Drew Brown,” the former financial advisor for LEEBA, for defrauding union members by misappropriating money from LEEBA’s Annuity Fund. WYNDER was also convicted of personal income tax evasion and conspiring to evade federal taxes, including payroll taxes owed by LEEBA and its employees. Steven Whittick, LEEBA’s former treasurer and a former police officer for New York City’s Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”), previously pled guilty to conspiring to commit tax evasion and making false statements to law enforcement. WYNDER and BROWN were convicted after a five-day jury trial before U.S. District Judge P. Kevin Castel and are scheduled to be sentenced on October 18, 2023, by Judge Castel.
U.S. Attorney Damian William said: “As the jury unanimously found, Kenneth Wynder and Andrew Brown raided a union-sponsored retirement plan for years, placing their personal interest over the union members they were duty bound to look out for. The jury also found that Wynder then evaded taxes on income he obtained from the union, including as a product of their theft from the union members’ retirement accounts.”
According to the Indictment, Superseding Indictment, the underlying complaints filed in this case, as well as other publicly available information, prior court filings, and evidence presented during the trial in Manhattan federal court:
Law Enforcement Employees Benevolent Association and the Annuity Fund
LEEBA is a labor union that has acted as the collective bargaining representative principally for law enforcement personnel at various City agencies and has entered into agreements on behalf of those law enforcement employees, including agreements for insurance and retirement benefits. The City agencies whose employees LEEBA represented included, at various times, DEP, the Department of Sanitation (“Sanitation”), and the Department of Transportation (“Transportation”).
The Annuity Fund is a LEEBA fund that received monthly contributions from the City for the benefit of LEEBA’s members and maintained separate accounts for each fund member. These accounts were functionally similar to employer-sponsored 401(k) retirement accounts. WYNDER was a Trustee of the Annuity Fund and signatory to agreements that governed the fund, and BROWN was a Plan Administrator and Financial Advisor of the Annuity Fund. Under the relevant agreements and plans, the money in the Annuity Fund could be used for no purpose other than funding individual members’ retirement accounts and defraying reasonable administrative expenses of the Annuity Fund itself.
WYNDER
WYNDER, a former New York State Trooper, is the founder and former President of LEEBA and a former member of LEEBA’s board of directors. WYNDER also formerly served as the Fund Administrator of the Annuity Fund and as a member of the board of trustees of the Annuity Fund, pursuant to which he owed a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the Annuity Fund and its account holders. WYNDER also was on the board of trustees of the LEEBA Welfare Fund (the “Welfare Fund,” and collectively with the Annuity Fund, the “LEEBA Funds”), which provided supplemental insurance benefits to its members. While occupying those positions, WYNDER centralized and controlled major decision-making authority for LEEBA and the LEEBA Funds, often acting without the proper approval of their respective boards of directors or trustees. WYNDER’s de facto dominance of LEEBA and the LEEBA Funds enabled him to make decisions in his own self-interest and contrary to the interests of the Annuity Fund and individual members.
BROWN
BROWN, the founder of a Westchester-based financial services company, is the former Benefits Administrator and insurance broker for LEEBA and the LEEBA Funds. As a LEEBA Annuity Fund Plan Administrator and Financial Advisor, BROWN helped manage the investments in the Annuity Fund, receiving a commission for his services, and had a responsibility to act in the best interest of LEEBA’s members.
WYNDER’s and BROWN’s Fraud Scheme
From at least in or about 2012 up to and including 2020, WYNDER and BROWN participated in a scheme to steal, embezzle, and misappropriate money from the Annuity Fund and individual members’ retirement accounts. Specifically, WYNDER and BROWN made hundreds of thousands of dollars of fraudulent transfers from the Annuity Fund to LEEBA’s operating account, which WYNDER controlled, and WYNDER regularly used the funds, once transferred from the Annuity Fund, to enrich himself at union members’ expense, including through unauthorized and excessive checks to himself and cash withdrawals for his own benefit and to pay insurance benefits for which BROWN received commissions. In addition, WYNDER caused the union to pay for various personal expenses such as the purchase of a Lexus automobile, travel expenses to Dallas to watch a Dallas Cowboys football game, and a sailing trip, all paid for by the union, and none of which were contemporaneously reported to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), as required.
To accomplish this fraudulent scheme, WYNDER and BROWN, acting in their capacity as the Annuity Fund’s Plan Administrators, repeatedly made false and misleading statements to a third-party retirement plan manager that served as the custodian for the Annuity Fund and the retirement accounts of individual union members, including through emails and faxes that WYNDER and BROWN used to withdraw increasingly large sums of money from the Annuity Fund, effectively causing such withdrawals to be made from the retirement accounts of individual members. From in or about 2014 through in or about 2019, WYNDER and BROWN caused the withdrawal of more than $500,000 from the individual retirement accounts that constitute the Annuity Fund, thereby wiping out the entire balance of certain members’ accounts. Without these improper withdrawals from the Annuity Fund, the LEEBA operating account would have been insolvent and would have had insufficient funds to pay for WYNDER’s excessive checks to himself and cash withdrawals and the personal expenses he caused to be charged to that account, as well as to pay for benefits for which BROWN made commissions as an insurance broker.
In addition, throughout the duration of this scheme, WYNDER and BROWN repeatedly made and approved false and misleading statements to LEEBA’s members and prospective members about how they were purportedly using and protecting their retirement accounts and the LEEBA Annuity Fund. WYNDER further concealed the scheme by causing LEEBA to fail to timely file mandatory reports and financial disclosures with the City and public reports to the Annuity Fund’s members and by making false statements to the Annuity Fund’s auditors and accountants.
WYNDER’s Tax Evasion
From at least in or about 2015 through 2019 WYNDER participated in a conspiracy with LEEBA’s then-Treasurer, Steven Whittick, to cause LEEBA to make payments to WYNDER and Whittick, by check and in cash, and to conceal those payments from the IRS. WYNDER further conspired to ensure that such payments were made outside of LEEBA’s payroll processor. WYNDER then concealed these payments from the IRS — including off-the-books payments of more than $400,000 — in order to evade his own personal income taxes and to evade the payroll taxes that were owed by LEEBA and certain LEEBA employees.
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WYNDER, 59, of Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania, and BROWN, 55, of Putnam Valley, New York, were each convicted of one count of conspiracy of commit wire fraud and one count of wire fraud, each of which carry a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison. WYNDER was also convicted of one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States and four counts of tax evasion, each of which carry a maximum penalty of five years in prison.
On November 17, 2021, Whittick was sentenced to 28 months in prison for conspiring to commit tax evasion and making false statements and was ordered to pay $179,766.80 in restitution to the IRS.
Mr. Williams praised the outstanding work of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Labor Office of Labor-Management Standards, and IRS-Criminal Investigations. Mr. Williams also thanked the New York City Comptroller’s Office and the New York City Department of Investigation for their assistance.
The case is being prosecuted by the Office’s Public Corruption Unit. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Eli J. Mark, Kedar S. Bhatia, Andrew Rohrbach, and David R. Lewis were assigned to the prosecution, with the assistance of Paralegal Specialists Connor Hamill and Lauren Scarff.
Geoffrey S. Berman, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, William F. Sweeney Jr., the Assistant Director-in-Charge of the New York Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), and James P. O’Neill, the Commissioner of the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”), announced the unsealing of an indictment charging RUVIM KRUPKIN, a New York state-licensed doctor, with writing medically unnecessary prescriptions for oxycodone over at least an 11-year period. KRUPKIN is expected to be presented before U.S. Magistrate Judge Ona T. Wang later today. The case has been assigned to United States District Judge Analisa Torres.
Manhattan U.S. Attorney Geoffrey S. Berman said: “As alleged, for more than a decade, as the nationwide opioid crisis mushroomed and left death and destruction in its wake, Ruvim Krupkin wrote thousands of medically unnecessary prescriptions for oxycodone. He allegedly charged $200 per prescription. Now he will learn the true cost of his alleged crime.”
FBI Assistant Director William F. Sweeney said: “While society continues to grapple with a solution to end the plague of drug addiction throughout this country, Ruvim Krupkin, as alleged, was complicit in prescribing medically unnecessary doses of oxycodone pills to patients under his care. Those with access to a now-virtual prescription pad carry a heavy responsibility to uphold the ethics of their profession. Those who don’t will be held accountable.”
NYPD Commissioner James P. O’Neill said: “As alleged, the doctor who’s charged in this case not only broke the law, he betrayed his oath and his ethical obligations for millions in personal profit – and he did this at a time when the nation and our city was in the throes of an opioid epidemic. I want to thank the investigators who worked to bring federal charges in this case. Whether you purport to be a medical professional or you’re a street-level drug dealer, the NYPD and its law enforcement partners will find you and hold you accountable.”
According to the allegations in the Indictment unsealed today in federal court:[1]
From in or about 2006 up to and including July 2017, RUVIM KRUPKIN wrote prescriptions resulting in the unlawful distribution of more than four million oxycodone pills to individuals he knew had no legitimate medical need for this medication. In exchange for writing these medically unnecessary oxycodone prescriptions, KRUPKIN received over $3.8 million in cash payments.
During the time period charged in the Indictment, KRUPKIN was an internal medicine doctor with specialties in oncology and hematology. KRUPKIN practiced out of a medical office located in Coney Island, New York. As a hematologist, KRUPKIN treated patients who had, or claimed to have, sickle cell anemia – a medical condition that can cause pain for which oxycodone, in conjunction with other treatments – may be legitimately prescribed. However, KRUPKIN wrote thousands of prescriptions for large quantities of oxycodone to patients, knowing that they in fact had no legitimate medical need for the prescriptions. KRUPKIN generally performed little to no physical examination on these patients; indeed, the medical notes for each patient were largely the same from one visit to the next. KRUPKIN charged each patient $200 in cash for each visit, payable directly to him.
Notwithstanding having performed little to no physical examination of the patients, KRUPKIN typically issued them prescriptions for a large dose of oxycodone – typically 180 80-milligram pills, until approximately 2010, when the formula for oxycodone changed, reducing the street value of the 80-milligram pills. At that time, KRUPKIN began prescribing 180 or 240 30-milligram pills. KRUPKIN’s patients filled their prescriptions at pharmacies throughout New York, and in certain cases, sold the oxycodone pills they received to drug dealers, who in turn re-sold the pills at high value on the street. KRUPKIN knew that certain of his patients were diverting the oxycodone pills he was prescribing, but he nonetheless continued writing prescriptions of oxycodone for such individuals.
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KRUPKIN, 68, of Summit, New Jersey, is charged with one count of participating in a conspiracy to distribute narcotics, which carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison. The maximum potential penalty is prescribed by Congress and is provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendant would be determined by the judge.
Mr. Berman praised the outstanding investigative work of the FBI-NYPD Health Care Fraud Task Force. Mr. Berman also thanked the New York City Human Resources Administration for its work on the investigation.
This case is being handled by the Office’s Narcotics Unit. Assistant United States Attorneys Tara M. La Morte and Alexandra Rothman are in charge of the prosecution.
The charges contained in the Indictment are merely accusations, and the defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.
[1] As the introductory phrase signifies, the entirety of the text of the Indictment and the description of the Indictment set forth below constitute only allegations, and every fact described should be treated as an allegation.
Description: The fiscal year of the data file obtained from the AOUSC
Format: YYYY
Description: The code of the federal judicial circuit where the case was located
Format: A2
Description: The code of the federal judicial district where the case was located
Format: A2
Description: The code of the district office where the case was located
Format: A2
Description: Docket number assigned by the district to the case
Format: A7
Description: A unique number assigned to each defendant in a case which cannot be modified by the court
Format: A3
Description: A unique number assigned to each defendant in a case which can be modified by the court
Format: A3
Description: A sequential number indicating whether a case is an original proceeding or a reopen
Format: N5
Description: Case type associated with the current defendant record
Format: A2
Description: A concatenation of district, office, docket number, case type, defendant number, and reopen sequence number
Format: A18
Description: A concatenation of district, office, docket number, case type, and reopen sequence number
Format: A15
Description: The status of the defendant as assigned by the AOUSC
Format: A2
Description: A code indicating the fugitive status of a defendant
Format: A1
Description: The date upon which a defendant became a fugitive
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which a fugitive defendant was taken into custody
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Description: The date when a case was first docketed in the district court
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which proceedings in a case commenced on charges pending in the district court where the defendant appeared, or the date of the defendant’s felony-waiver of indictment
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: A code used to identify the nature of the proceeding
Format: N2
Description: The date when a defendant first appeared before a judicial officer in the district court where a charge was pending
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: A code indicating the event by which a defendant appeared before a judicial officer in the district court where a charge was pending
Format: A2
Description: A code indicating the type of legal counsel assigned to a defendant
Format: N2
Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense committed which carried the highest severity
Format: A20
Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with FTITLE1
Format: N2
Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with FTITLE1
Format: A4
Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with FTITLE1
Format: A4
Description: A code indicating the severity associated with FTITLE1
Format: A3
Description: The FIPS code used to indicate the county or parish where an offense was committed
Format: A5
Description: The date of the last action taken on the record
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which judicial proceedings before the court concluded
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which the final sentence is recorded on the docket
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The date upon which the case was closed
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: The total fine imposed at sentencing for all offenses of which the defendant was convicted and a fine was imposed
Format: N8
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Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants filed excluding inter-district transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of original proceedings commenced
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants filed whose proceedings commenced by reopen, remand, appeal, or retrial
Format: N1
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Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants terminated excluding interdistrict transfers
Format: N1
Description: A count of original proceedings terminated
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants terminated whose proceedings commenced by reopen, remand, appeal, or retrial
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Description: A count of defendants pending as of the last day of the period including long term fugitives
Format: N1
Description: A count of defendants pending as of the last day of the period excluding long term fugitives
Format: N1
Description: The source from which the data were loaded into the AOUSC’s NewSTATS database
Format: A10
Description: A sequential number indicating the iteration of the defendant record
Format: N2
Description: The date the record was loaded into the AOUSC’s NewSTATS database
Format: YYYYMMDD
Description: Statistical year ID label on data file obtained from the AOUSC which represents termination year
Geoffrey S. Berman, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced that ANTONIO DIMARCO was sentenced in Manhattan federal court today to 54 months in prison for participating in a conspiracy to commit wire fraud, based on his attempt to fraudulently acquire millions of dollars’ worth of artworks from art galleries, auction houses, and private collectors from around the world. U.S. District Judge Valerie E. Caproni presided over the defendant’s sentencing.
U.S. Attorney Geoffrey S. Berman said: “Antonio DiMarco was a serial conman and deceiver who stole people’s identities, placed winning bids on renowned artworks he couldn’t afford, and defrauded lenders and insurers with false claims of ownership. As the Court noted today, DiMarco would lie to anyone if it suited his interests. DiMarco received a prison sentence commensurate with the severity of his crimes.”
As alleged in the underlying Complaint, Indictment, public filings, and statements made in open court:
From at least as early as November 2017 through and including October 2018, DIMARCO and a co-conspirator attempted to acquire millions of dollars’ worth of artworks from around the world using a variety of methods, including through appropriating the identity and financial information of a particular victim, and creating and presenting a slew of fraudulent documents.
For example, in November 2017, DIMARCO attempted to purchase artworks by Mark Rothko and Ad Reinhardt at an auction house located in New York, New York. DIMARCO obtained access to the auction through the use of an elderly victim’s identity documents, including her passport, and bank account information showing that the victim held liquid assets in excess of $7 million. DIMARCO and his co-conspirator further presented false information indicating that the victim had authorized DIMARCO to bid on her behalf, when in reality, the victim knew nothing about DIMARCO’s plan to purchase artworks in her name. DIMARCO won the auction, bidding close to $6.5 million for the Rothko work, and $1,155,000 for the Reinhardt work. As DIMARCO in fact lacked funds to pay for the art, however, the auction house suffered a loss of close to $1.4 million.
Continuing throughout late 2017 through at least May 2018, DIMARCO and his co-conspirator attempted to purchase artworks from approximately 20 galleries and collectors throughout the world. Indeed, DIMARCO and his co-conspirator entered into completed sales agreements for more than 60 artworks totaling in excess of $150 million. Among other works, DIMARCO entered into a contract for a $16.5 million Matisse painting. None of these works was ever paid for, yet to entice the galleries and collectors to continue to hold the artwork for DIMARCO and his co-conspirator, they passed strings of false excuses for non-payment. This also caused galleries and collectors to suffer monetary losses.
Having failed to obtain valuable artworks that he had contracted to buy but never paid for, DIMARCO then began to seek out ways to monetize artworks that he had not acquired, by creating a series of false documents designed to deceive financiers and insurers into believing that in fact he owned the artworks. DIMARCO did this in hopes of obtaining funds based on the value of those artworks. DIMARCO was arrested in the course of executing this scheme, after having arranged a showing of high-value artwork he convinced others that he owned.
DIMARCO further orchestrated two additional frauds conducted in the midst of the art scheme: a ploy to deprive a victim of hundreds of thousands of dollars through false representations concerning the purposes for providing the funds, and a scheme to purchase a high-end property in Manhattan using a fraudulently altered bank statement.
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In addition to his prison term, DIMARCO was also sentenced to three years of supervised release and ordered to pay $2,384,050.00 in restitution.
Mr. Berman praised the outstanding investigative work of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Art Crime Team and encourages anyone with information relating to theft, looting, or fraud in the art market to contact the FBI’s Art Crime Team in New York at (212) 384-1000.
These cases are being handled by the Office’s Money Laundering and Transnational Criminal Enterprises Unit. Assistant United States Attorneys Tara M. La Morte and Abigail S. Kurland are in charge of the prosecution.
Preet Bharara, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and William F. Sweeney Jr., Assistant Director-in-Charge of the New York Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), announced the unsealing of an indictment charging GEORGE DOUMANIS, EMANUEL PANTELAKIS, a/k/a “Manny,” and DANNY PRATTE with orchestrating a scheme to defraud investors of at least approximately $5 million.
DOUMANIS and PANTELAKIS will be presented and arraigned later today before United States Magistrate Judge Gabriel W. Gorenstein. PRATTE is expected to surrender today to the FBI in Denver, Colorado. United States District Judge Andrew L. Carter Jr. will hold an initial conference in the case on March 6, 2017, at 1:00 pm.
Manhattan U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara said: “As alleged, George Doumanis, Emanuel Pantelakis, and Danny Pratte deceived investors with a fraudulent plan to invest in fuel cell technology. In reality, all they were allegedly fueling was their own greed-inspired scheme to bilk investors and use the money to pay credit card bills, for a Mercedes Benz, and a horse trainer. Doumanis and Pantelakis allegedly committed their fraud scheme after being banned for life from the securities industry by the SEC and FINRA.”
FBI Assistant Director-in-Charge William F. Sweeney Jr. said: “Doumanis, Pantelakis, and Pratte are charged with defrauding Terminus investors by selling them shares of a product that was, essentially, nonexistent. They allegedly did so while intentionally misrepresenting to investors the rate of commission individuals acting as broker-dealers would receive for Terminus stock sold. In the end, as alleged, nearly three quarters of the money obtained by investors was swindled for the collective benefit of those involved. Despite the fact that Doumanis and Pantelakis had been disciplined in the past for their role in other fraudulent securities-related activities, they allegedly participated in this scheme undeterred. Investors deserve to be told the truth, plain and simple, and we’re committed to uncovering it.”
According to the Indictment unsealed today in Manhattan federal court:[1]
In September 2003, DOUMANIS was convicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida of conspiring to commit securities fraud, wire fraud, and mail fraud. In addition, in or about June 2005, as a result of an action brought by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), DOUMANIS was permanently barred from, among other things, participating in any offering of any penny stock and from any association with any securities broker or dealer.
In March 2008, PANTELAKIS was permanently barred by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), a self-regulatory body for the securities industry, from association with any FINRA member in any capacity, following allegations that he “fraudulently misrepresented and omitted material facts to public customers in connection with the sale of securities.”
From at least in or about February 2008 through at least in or about 2014, DOUMANIS, PANTELAKIS, and PRATTE engaged in a fraudulent scheme to defraud investors by inducing them to purchase shares of Terminus Energy, Inc. (“Terminus”), through false and misleading representations and then misappropriating the victims’ funds for their own purposes. PRATTE was the Chief Executive Officer of Terminus, a company that was purportedly working to develop a “fuel cell,” a type of alternative energy source. As set forth in more detail below, contrary to representations made to potential investors, Terminus never had a working fuel cell prototype, was never close to manufacturing a commercially viable fuel cell, and never sold any fuel cells.
Between 2008 and 2011, Terminus entered into a number of contractual agreements with third parties, the stated purpose of which was to develop a fuel cell. In each and every case, however, Terminus made only one or two payments on these contracts before ceasing payments. As a result, the third parties ceased work pursuant to the contracts and terminated the agreements.
Notwithstanding the utter lack of progress and the cancellation of Terminus’s contractual relationships, DOUMANIS, PANTELAKIS, and PRATTE drafted and caused Terminus to distribute false and misleading press releases, private placement memorandums, business plans, and other documents that touted the existence of a fuel cell, the existence of Terminus’s contractual relationships, and the use of investor proceeds to make payments on the contracts.
In addition, DOUMANIS, PANTELAKIS, and PRATTE drafted and distributed private placement memorandums that falsely stated that registered broker-dealers would be paid no more than a 10 percent sales commission plus three percent unaccountable expenses for all Terminus shares sold through their efforts. In truth, unregistered salespeople sold Terminus shares in return for undisclosed commissions far in excess of 13 percent.
Rather than use investor funds as promised, DOUMANIS, PANTELAKIS, and PRATTE misappropriated the money for their own purposes. Of the more than approximately $5 million raised from investors: (a) PRATTE received at least $990,000; DOUMANIS, certain entities affiliated with DOUMANIS, and certain of his family members received at least $570,000, a portion of which was utilized for items such as making payments to various credit cards and payments toward DOUMANIS’s residential mortgage; (c) PANTELAKIS and certain of his family members received at least $420,000, a portion of which was utilized to make payments to various credit cards and for his wife’s Mercedes-Benz; (d) one unregistered salesperson (the “Salesperson”) received payments of at least $540,000, an entity associated with the Salesperson received at least $100,000, and a horse trainer working for the Salesperson received at least $132,000; and (e) other unregistered brokers selling Terminus shares collectively received payments of at least $1,019,624. Thus, in total more than 70% of the investor funds obtained by Terminus were misappropriated by DOUMANIS, PANTELAKIS, and PRATTE, the defendants, or used to pay commissions to unregistered salespeople.
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DOUMANIS, 58, of Rocky Point, New York, was arrested today in Suffolk County. PANTELAKIS, 42, of Flushing, New York, was arrested today in Queens. PRATTE, 62, of Columbia, Missouri, is expected to turn himself in to the FBI in Denver, Colorado, today. Each of the defendants are charged with one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, which carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison; and one count of securities fraud, one count of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, and one count of wire fraud, each of which carries a maximum sentence of 20 years. The charges also carry a maximum fine of $5 million, or twice the gross gain or loss from the offense. The statutory maximum sentences are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencings of the defendants would be determined by the judge.
Mr. Bharara praised the investigative work of the FBI, and thanked the SEC, which has filed civil charges in a separate action.
The charges were brought in connection with the President’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force. The task force was established to wage an aggressive, coordinated and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes. With more than 20 federal agencies, 94 U.S. attorneys’ offices, and state and local partners, it is the broadest coalition of law enforcement, investigatory and regulatory agencies ever assembled to combat fraud. Since its formation, the task force has made great strides in facilitating increased investigation and prosecution of financial crimes; enhancing coordination and cooperation among federal, state and local authorities; addressing discrimination in the lending and financial markets; and conducting outreach to the public, victims, financial institutions and other organizations. Since fiscal year 2009, the Justice Department has filed over 18,000 financial fraud cases against more than 25,000 defendants. For more information on the task force, please visit www.StopFraud.gov.
This case is being handled by the Office’s Securities and Commodities Fraud Task Force. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Rebecca G. Mermelstein and Christine I. Magdo are in charge of the prosecution.
The allegations contained in the Indictment are merely accusations, and the defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.
[1] As the introductory phrase signifies, the entirety of the text of the Indictment and the description of the Indictment set forth below constitute only allegations, and every fact described should be treated as an allegation.
Audrey Strauss, the Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced that RUVIM KRUPKIN, a New York state-licensed doctor, pled guilty today to conspiring to illegally distribute large quantities of oxycodone from a medical office in Brooklyn, New York. As part of his guilty plea, KRUPKIN also agreed to forfeit $124,000 in proceeds obtained through his illicit distribution of oxycodone. KRUPKIN pled guilty before United States District Judge Analisa Torres in Manhattan federal court.
Acting U.S. Attorney Audrey Strauss said: “As he admitted in court today, Ruvim Krupkin, for more than a decade, wrote thousands of medically unnecessary prescriptions for oxycodone, enriching himself at the expense of others, while the country suffered from a devastating opioid epidemic. He now awaits sentencing for his crime.”
According to the allegations contained in the Indictment and statements made during court proceedings:
KRUPKIN, a licensed internal medicine doctor with specialties in oncology and hematology, practiced at a medical office in Brooklyn. From 2006 to July 2017, KRUPKIN prescribed over four million oxycodone pills to individuals he knew had no legitimate medical need for the pills. KRUPKIN charged each patient $200 in cash for each visit, payable directly to him.
As a hematologist, KRUPKIN treated patients who had, or claimed to have, sickle cell anemia – a medical condition that can cause pain for which oxycodone, in conjunction with other treatments, may be legitimately prescribed. However, KRUPKIN wrote thousands of prescriptions for large quantities of oxycodone to patients, knowing that they in fact had no legitimate medical need for the prescriptions. KRUPKIN generally performed little to no physical examination on these patients; indeed, the medical notes for each patient were largely the same from one visit to the next.
In addition, KRUPKIN typically issued patients prescriptions for a large dose of oxycodone – typically 180 80-milligram pills, until approximately 2010, when the formula for oxycodone changed, reducing the street value of the 80-milligram pills. At that time, KRUPKIN began prescribing 180 or 240 30-milligram pills. KRUPKIN’s patients filled their prescriptions at pharmacies throughout New York, and in certain cases, sold the oxycodone pills they received to drug dealers, who in turn re-sold the pills at high value on the street. KRUPKIN knew that certain of his patients were diverting the oxycodone pills he was prescribing, but he nonetheless continued writing prescriptions of oxycodone for such individuals.
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KRUPKIN, 69, of Summit, New Jersey, pled guilty to one count of participating in a conspiracy to distribute narcotics, which carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison. The maximum potential sentence is prescribed by Congress and is provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentence for the defendant will be determined by the judge.
KRUPKIN is scheduled to be sentenced by Judge Torres on January 26, 2021, at 11:00 a.m.
Ms. Strauss praised the outstanding investigative work of the FBI-NYPD Health Care Fraud Task Force. Ms. Strauss also thanked the New York City Human Resources Administration for its work on the investigation.
This case is being handled by the Office’s Narcotics Unit. Assistant United States Attorneys Tara M. La Morte and Alexandra N. Rothman are in charge of the prosecution.
Damian Williams, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced that BRADLEY PIERRE pled guilty today to conspiracy to commit bribery and conspiracy to defraud the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) in connection with his orchestration of a $60 million fraud targeting No-Fault automobile insurance companies. PIERRE pled guilty before the Honorable Paul G. Gardephe and is scheduled to be sentenced on May 7, 2024.
U.S. Attorney Damian Williams said: “For over a decade, Bradley Pierre led one of the largest No-Fault insurance frauds in the history of New York, bribing medical professionals and others, scamming insurance companies, defrauding the IRS, and ultimately denying many accident victims fair and proper treatment because of his rigged system. But innocent victims will not stand alone. Those who seek to shamelessly reap the benefits of scams like this will be brought to justice.”
According to the Indictment, the plea agreement, and statements made in court:
New York and New Jersey No-Fault insurance laws require a driver’s automobile insurance company to pay automobile insurance claims automatically for certain types of motor vehicle accidents, provided that the claim is legitimate and below a particular monetary threshold. Pursuant to these requirements, insurance companies will often pay medical service providers directly for the treatment they provide to automobile accident victims without the need to bill the victims themselves. This process resolves automobile claims without apportioning blame or fault for the accident, thereby avoiding protracted disputes and the costs associated with an extended investigation of the accident.
From at least in or about 2008 through in or about 2021, PIERRE agreed with others (the “Clinic Controllers”) to unlawfully own and run medical clinics located in the New York area including, among others, Veda Medical, Sky Medical, Sun Medical, and Rutland Medical (the “Clinics”). PIERRE knew that clinics are unable to bill insurance companies for No-Fault benefits if the medical facilities are controlled by non-physicians. PIERRE nonetheless agreed with others, including doctors, to submit bills to insurance companies falsely representing that the Clinics were owned and operated by licensed doctors, and for doctors to lie under oath during Examinations under Oath (“EUOs”) about the ownership, control, and finances of the Clinics. PIERRE personally coached doctors to lie under oath in these EUOs.
PIERRE used his control of the Clinics for personal profit. Between 2008 and 2021, PIERRE took over $20,000,000 from the Clinics by either transferring the funds directly to bank accounts under his control or using the Clinics' bank accounts to pay his personal finances. PIERRE also used his control of the Clinics to steer prescriptions to pharmacies in return for over a million dollars in kickbacks and to steer patients to seek legal representation from his wife’s law firm, the Law Firm of Nonna Shikh (the“Shikh Firm”). The Shikh Firm then filed lawsuits against insurance companies on these patients’ behalf. PIERRE maintained an office at the Shikh Firm and was actively involved in the legal practice as a “manager.”
PIERRE used his control of the Clinics and his managerial role at the Shikh Firm to also steer patients to seek MRIs at a medical facility over which he exercised substantial control (the “MRI Facility”). PIERRE also agreed with the purported sole owner of the MRI Facility, who was a doctor, that the doctor would falsely report injuries in MRI reports. These falsified injuries allowed the Clinics to bill insurance companies for additional, unnecessary medical services and allowed attorneys to falsely claim injuries in lawsuits against insurance companies. PIERRE and the doctor agreed that the doctor would lie to insurance companies during EUOs about PIERRE’s role in the MRI Facility.
PIERRE hid his control over several of the Clinics and the MRI Facility using phony loan arrangements. These agreements claimed that PIERRE was making non-recourse loans to the Clinics and the MRI Facility, which would only have to be paid back if insurance companies paid the medical practices’ claims. The agreements also set PIERRE’s “fee” as twice the amount loaned to the practices. However, in reality, PIERRE took almost $10,000,000 in excess of what these purported loan agreements permitted.
PIERRE further agreed to pay bribes to fill the Clinics and the MRI Facility with patients. From at least in or about 2015 up to and including 2021, PIERRE agreed with others to pay bribes to hospital employees, 911 dispatchers, and other individuals (collectively, “lead sources”) for the confidential names and numbers of motor vehicle accident victims. PIERRE agreed that others, including Anthony Rose, a/k/a “Todd Chambers,” would then call victims and lie to them to induce victims to receive medical treatment at the Clinics and legal representation from the Shikh Firm. PIERRE helped Rose expand his bribery operation to New Jersey by recommending clinics and attorneys in the state that would pay kickbacks for referrals. PIERRE also recommended that Rose open a shell company to hide the illegality of the payments, which Rose in fact did. PIERRE paid Rose over $800,000 as part of the bribery scheme.
PIERRE further recruited his own lead sources to participate in the bribery scheme. For instance, in or about 2017, PIERRE recruited Andrew Prime, knowing that Prime was bribing 911 operators and a hospital employee for confidential information. PIERRE paid Prime over $800,000 as part of the bribery scheme. PIERRE also personally recruited and bribed several of his own lead sources, including 911 operators and a source in 2019 that PIERRE codenamed the “Motherload” or “ML.”
PIERRE also agreed to bribe medical offices to send patients to the MRI Facility for MRIs. These medical offices included, among others, Epione Medical Center and Modern Brooklyn Medical. PIERRE facilitated these bribe payments through several intermediaries, including Anthony Rose, Jelani Wray, and others. PIERRE paid Jelani Wray over $800,000 in connection with these bribes.
PIERRE then engaged in tax evasion. PIERRE utilized two companies in connection with the healthcare fraud and bribery schemes: Medical Reimbursement Consultants (“MRC”) and Marketing 4 You (“M4Y”). PIERRE hid income from the IRS by concealing multiple bank accounts for MRC and using a series of check cashers for checks made out to MRC and M4Y. PIERRE also paid personal expenses from MRC and M4Y’s bank accounts but improperly reported these payments as “business expenses.” These included payments for his wedding, home renovations, jewelry, furniture, luxury clothing, travel, and gifts. In total, PIERRE underreported income, falsely reported expenses of over $4 million, and deprived the IRS of approximately $1.5 million in taxes due.
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BRADLEY PIERRE, 41, of Closter, New Jersey, pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit bribery, which carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison, and one count of conspiracy to defraud the IRS, which carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison.
The maximum potential sentences are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendant will be determined by a judge.
Mr. Williams praised the work of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Internal Revenue Service.
This case is being handled by the Office’s Complex Frauds and Cybercrime Unit and the White Plains Division. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Mathew Andrews, Qais Ghafary, and Michael Lockard are in charge of the prosecution.
Geoffrey S. Berman, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced that Dr. EMMANUEL LAMBRAKIS, a state licensed doctor, pled guilty to conspiring to unlawfully distribute medically unnecessary oxycodone. LAMBRAKIS pled guilty on November 26, 2019 before U.S. District Judge William H. Pauley III, and will be sentenced by Judge Pauley on February 7, 2020. LAMBRAKIS previously pled guilty on March 1, 2018 before U.S. Magistrate Judge Gabriel W. Gorenstein, but later withdrew his plea. Trial against LAMBRAKIS had been scheduled to start on December 2, 2019.
According to the Complaint, the Indictment to which LAMBRAKIS pled guilty, and other court documents, as well as statements made in public court proceedings:
Oxycodone is a highly addictive, narcotic opioid that is used to treat severe and chronic pain conditions. Oxycodone prescriptions are in high demand and have significant cash value to drug dealers. In fact, oxycodone tablets can be resold on the street for thousands of dollars. For example, 30-milligram oxycodone tablets have a current street value of approximately $20 to $40 per tablet in New York City, with street prices even higher in other parts of the country. A single prescription for 120 30-milligram tablets of oxycodone can net an illicit distributor $2,400 in cash or more.
From at least approximately January 2011 until December 2016, LAMBRAKIS operated two medical clinics in Queens, New York, where LAMBRAKIS wrote numerous medically unnecessary prescriptions for large quantities of oxycodone in exchange for cash payments. LAMBRAKIS typically charged between $250 to $150 in cash for “patient visits,” and these visits often involved numerous “patients” being seen by LAMBRAKIS at the same time in the same examination room. During these “patient visits,” LAMBRAKIS would perform simple, perfunctory body manipulations (such as rotating the patient’s arm or leg) and engage in little or no conversation with the purported “patient.” Nonetheless, LAMBRAKIS would then issue to the patient a prescription for a large quantity of oxycodone, most often 120 30-milligram tablets or more.
Between January 2011 and December 2016, LAMBRAKIS wrote thousands of oxycodone prescriptions, resulting in the illicit distribution of more than two million oxycodone tablets, which have a street value in the tens of millions of dollars. On numerous occasions, LAMBRAKIS wrote 100 or more prescriptions for 30-milligram oxycodone pills in a single day. As a result of LAMBRAKIS’s actions, LAMBRAKIS collected approximately more than $2 million in fees from his “patients.”
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LAMBRAKIS, 72, of Manhattan, New York, pled guilty to one count of conspiring to unlawfully distribute and possess with intent to distribute oxycodone. This offense carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison. The maximum potential sentence is prescribed by Congress and is provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendant will be determined by the judge.
Mr. Berman praised the outstanding investigative work of the DEA’s Tactical Diversion Squad, which comprises agents and officers from the DEA, the NYPD, the New York State Police, Town of Orangetown Police Department, Rockland County Drug Task Force, Westchester County Police Department, and New York City Department of Investigation. He also acknowledged the assistance of the Department of Health & Human Services, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Homeland Security Investigations, the New York City Human Resources Administration, and the National Insurance Crime Bureau.
The case is being prosecuted by the Office’s Narcotics Unit. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Kimberly J. Ravener, Jessica K. Fender, Ryan Finkel, Sarah Mortazavi, and Joshua A. Naftalis are in charge of the prosecution.
Damian Williams, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and Michael J. Driscoll, the Assistant Director in Charge of the New York Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), announced the unsealing of a six-count Indictment charging DARRYL COHEN, BRIAN GILDER, CHARLES BRISCOE, and CALVIN DARDEN, JR. in connection with two schemes to defraud professional basketball players. COHEN and GILDER were arrested this morning in, respectively, Chatsworth, California, and North Ridge, California, and will be presented later today in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. BRISCOE was arrested this morning in Katy, Texas, and will be presented later today in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. DARDEN, JR. was arrested this morning in Atlanta, Georgia, and will be presented later today in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
U.S. Attorney Damian Williams said: “As alleged in the indictment, these defendants believed that defrauding their professional athlete clients of millions of dollars would be a layup. That was a huge mistake, and they now face serious criminal charges for their alleged crimes.”
FBI Assistant Director Michael J. Driscoll said: “As alleged, the defendants engaged in schemes to defraud four professional basketball players of more than $13 million. Today’s actions should serve as an example to others who engage in criminal activity to serve their own greedy financial desires at the expense of others – the FBI is committed to bringing you to justice.”
As alleged in the Indictment:[1]
COHEN and GILDER
From at least in or about 2017 through in or about 2020, COHEN, a registered investment adviser, orchestrated a scheme to defraud three different professional basketball player clients (“Athlete-1,” “Athlete-2,” and “Athlete-3,” respectively) of a total of over $5 million by taking advantage of his advisory and fiduciary relationships with those clients. COHEN conspired with BRIAN GILDER, an independent financial planner whom COHEN encouraged his clients to work with and who assisted in tax preparation for Athletes-1, -2, and -3.
First, COHEN and GILDER fraudulently induced Athletes-1, -2, and -3 to purchase viatical life insurance policies at massive markups. COHEN and GILDER did not disclose that GILDER had arranged for a purported law firm (“Law Firm-1”) that he controlled to purchase the polices and then to sell them to the athletes at markups of 222%, 310%, and 244%, respectively. Indeed, Law Firm-1 made approximately $4.5 million in profit from the sale of the policies to COHEN and GILDER’s athlete clients. COHEN and GILDER used a substantial portion of these illicit proceeds to pay their own personal expenses. In particular: (i) GILDER used approximately $257,479 of the funds to pay off a mortgage he owed; (ii) COHEN used approximately $178,462 of the funds to renovate his home and to perform work on his pool; (iii) COHEN used approximately $67,500 of the funds to pay off his personal credit card bill; and (iv) COHEN transferred approximately $200,000 of the funds to an individual with whom he was in a romantic relationship.
Second, COHEN directed that $500,000 be transferred from the accounts of Athletes-2 and -3 as purported donations to a non-profit organization. COHEN then used approximately $238,000 of the funds purportedly donated to the non-profit to build athletic training facilities in the backyard of his home. Athletes-2 and -3 never, in fact, authorized any transfers of their funds to the non-profit organization. When Athlete-2 confronted COHEN about the donations, COHEN told Athlete-2 in a text message, in substance and in part, that Athlete-2’s money had “[h]elped a lot of future prospects and a lot of underprivileged kids.” COHEN did not disclose to Athlete-2 that a substantial portion of Athlete-2’s donations had, in fact, been used to build an athletic training facility in COHEN’s backyard.
Third, COHEN and GILDER used a sports agency and another law firm to channel approximately $328,125 of Athlete-2’s money to repay a former professional baseball player (“Athlete-4”), who was a disgruntled client of COHEN’s. Athlete-4 had expressed concern to COHEN about investments and loans that COHEN made on Athlete‑4’s behalf and demanded to be repaid. On or about February 19, 2020, in the midst of making the payments of Athlete-2’s money to Athlete-4, COHEN messaged GILDER, “We gotta send [Athlete-4] more to get rid of him.” Athlete-2 did not authorize the use of funds from his account to repay debts owed by COHEN to Athlete-4.
BRISCOE and DARDEN, JR.
BRISCOE and DARDEN, JR. also defrauded professional basketball players. BRISCOE was an NBA agent, and DARDEN, JR. had previously pled guilty to wire fraud in the Southern District of New York.
BRISCOE served as the sports agent of a professional basketball player (“Athlete-5”). Athlete-5 began discussing the possibility of purchasing a professional women’s basketball team (“Team-1”), and BRISCOE introduced Athlete-5 to DARDEN, JR. Because Athlete-5 was not permitted to purchase Team-1 as an active professional basketball league player, BRISCOE, DARDEN, JR., and a relative of DARDEN, JR., who serves or has served on the boards of multiple public companies (“Relative-1”), discussed with Athlete-5 an arrangement in which Athlete-5 would indirectly purchase Team-1 through a company (“Company-1”) purportedly controlled by Relative-1. BRISCOE provided Athlete-5 with a slide deck outlining a “vision plan” for the purchase of Team-1 by Company-1. The “vision plan” claimed, among other things, that Company-1 was led by Relative-1 and was advised by a board including several prominent individuals in sports, entertainment, and corporate America. In truth and in fact, and as BRISCOE and DARDEN, JR. well knew, at least two of those individuals never served as advisors to Company-1.
Between in or about November 2020 and in or about December 2020, Athlete‑5 caused $7 million to be transferred to a bank account controlled by DARDEN, JR. Athlete-5 understood that these payments were in order for Athlete-5 to purchase and become full owner of Team-1. In truth and in fact, none of the money Athlete-5 sent went toward the purchase of Team-1, and Athete-5 did not become an owner of Team-1. Instead, from approximately November 2020 until approximately December 2021, DARDEN, JR. transferred more than $1 million of the funds to BRISCOE. In addition, DARDEN, JR. retained a substantial portion of the funds for himself and his relatives, sending more than $500,000 to a relative and more than $400,000 to a cryptocurrency exchange for his benefit. DARDEN, JR. also used some of the funds to pay for luxury goods for himself, including approximately $880,000 to luxury car companies, more than $300,000 to art galleries, and more than $100,000 to purchase a piano, among other things. DARDEN, JR. also spent in excess of approximately $1 million in connection with purchasing and making improvements to a residence, including, among other things, the addition of a koi pond.
BRISCOE and DARDEN, JR. also worked together to defraud Athlete-2. BRISCOE, in consultation with COHEN and GILDER, was purportedly building a new sports agency (“Agency-1”) funded by Athlete-2. BRISCOE convinced Athlete-2 that BRISCOE had signed, through Agency-1, a highly touted athlete preparing for a professional basketball draft (“Athlete-6”). In fact, Athlete-6 had not signed with BRISCOE or Agency-1. Rather, BRISCOE forged the signature of Athlete-6 and Athlete-6’s mother on a player-agent contract and sent that forged contract to Athlete-2. BRISCOE then directed Athlete-2 to transfer $1 million to BRISCOE as a “loan” to Athlete-6 while Athlete-6 prepared for the draft. In fact, Athlete-6 never had any conversations with BRISCOE or DARDEN, JR. about signing with BRISCOE or about receiving a $1 million loan, and Athlete-6 never received any part of the $1 million loan. Instead, BRISCOE used approximately $306,642 of the funds transferred by Athlete-2 to pay off a debt that BRISCOE had personally incurred and also transferred approximately $544,000 to a bank account controlled by DARDEN, JR.
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COHEN, 49, of Chatsworth, California, and Las Vegas, Nevada, GILDER, 49, of North Ridge, California, BRISCOE, 35, of Katy, Texas, and DARDEN, JR. 49, of Atlanta, Georgia, are each charged with one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and one count of wire fraud. Each count carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison. COHEN is also charged with one count of investment advisor fraud, which carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison, and BRISCOE is also charged with one count of aggravated identity theft, which carries a mandatory prison term of two years.
The maximum potential sentences are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendants will be determined by a judge.
Mr. Williams praised the outstanding work of the FBI. Mr. Williams also thanked the United States Attorney’s Offices for the Central District of California, the Northern District of Georgia, and the Southern District of Texas for their assistance in the investigation. Mr. Williams further thanked the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, which today filed a parallel civil action against COHEN, for its assistance and cooperation in this investigation.
The case is being prosecuted by the Office’s Complex Frauds and Cybercrime Unit. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Katherine Reilly and Kevin Mead are in charge of the prosecution.
The charges contained in the Indictment are merely accusations, and the defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.
[1] As the introductory phrase signifies, the entirety of the text of the Indictment and the description of the Indictment set forth herein constitute only allegations, and every fact described therein should be treated as an allegation.
Joon H. Kim, the Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced that DARYL CAMPBELL, a/k/a “Taxstone,” pled guilty yesterday to two federal weapons charges in connection with his possession of a semiautomatic handgun at Irving Plaza on May 25, 2016, the night a man was shot and killed there and three others were wounded.
Acting U.S. Attorney Joon H. Kim said: “As he has now admitted, Daryl Campbell illegally carried a semiautomatic handgun into the Irving Plaza music venue. That night Ronald McPhatter was shot and killed there, and three others were wounded. We will continue to work with the NYPD, the FBI, and all our partners in law enforcement to protect New Yorkers from gun violence.”
According to the Indictment, Complaint, other documents filed in the case, and statements made during the plea proceedings:
Sometime between October 2015 and May 25, 2016, CAMPBELL unlawfully received a Keltec 9mm semiautomatic handgun from outside the State of New York. Although his prior felony conviction made it a federal crime for CAMPBELL to possess firearms, CAMPBELL nonetheless carried that gun to the Irving Plaza music venue on May 25, 2016. At Irving Plaza, CAMPBELL confronted a rap music artist with whom CAMPBELL had been engaged in a long-running feud. After that confrontation, the rap artist’s bodyguard and friend, Ronald McPhatter, was shot and killed, and the rap artist and two innocent bystanders were wounded.
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CAMPBELL, 31, of Brooklyn, New York, was arrested on January 17, 2017, in Brooklyn, and has been in federal custody since. CAMPBELL pled guilty today to both counts of the Indictment, which charged him with receiving a firearm in interstate commerce with the intent to commit another felony, and possessing a firearm after having previously been convicted of a felony. The maximum sentence for each count is 10 years in prison. The maximum potential sentence in this case is prescribed by Congress and is provided here for informational purposes only, as the defendant’s sentence will be determined by the court.
Mr. Kim praised the outstanding work of the NYPD’s Manhattan South Homicide Squad and the 13th Precinct Detective Squad, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
This case is being handled by the Office’s Violent and Organized Crime Unit and the White Plains Division. Assistant United States Attorneys Hagan Scotten, Andrew Adams, and Christopher Clore are in charge of the prosecution.