Score:   1
Docket Number:   D-MD  1:17-cr-00655
Case Name:   USA v. Montillo et al
  Press Releases:
Baltimore, Maryland – U.S. District Judge Richard D. Bennett today sentenced Lauren Montillo, age 47, of Towson, Maryland, to eight years in federal prison, followed by five years of supervised release, for conspiracy to commit wire fraud and for tax evasion.   Judge Bennett also ordered Montillo to pay restitution of $4,060,284.79 to the victims of the scheme, and $276,240 to the Internal Revenue Service. 

Montillo admitted that from 2010 through 2015, she and her co-conspirators sought at least $8.7 million in advance fees from foreign and United States victims, purporting to offer access to exotic bank financial instruments.  Victims paid $4,342,540 in advance fees into Hong Kong bank accounts or attorney escrow accounts and received nothing in return.  For tax years 2012 through 2014, Montillo reported no income other than $100, evading a substantial amount of income taxes.  

The sentence was announced by United States Attorney for the District of Maryland Robert K. Hur; Acting Special Agent in Charge Jennifer L. Moore of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Baltimore Field Office; and Special Agent in Charge Kelly R. Jackson of the Internal Revenue Service - Criminal Investigation, Washington, D.C. Field Office.

According to her plea agreement and other court documents, Montillo and her co-conspirators created shell companies, with associated websites, email addresses, and bank accounts, which they used to perpetrate the fraud.   Specifically, in February 2010, Montillo opened an account with GoDaddy, which provides web-hosting services.  From 2010 to 2015, Montillo and other co-conspirators used GoDaddy to host websites for shell companies such as MLL Holdings, The Bussola Group, Worldwide Escrow Holdings, Ltd., International Insurance of Nebraska, Atlas Investment Bancorp, Entirety Capital, GPF Global, and Atlas-Gayle Trust.  Each of these shell companies had associated email addresses, which Montillo and her co-conspirators opened and used.

Also in 2010, Montillo's father incorporated "Worldwide Escrow Holdings Limited" ("Worldwide Escrow") in Hong Kong and opened a bank account for Worldwide Escrow at the Hong Kong Shanghai Bank (HSBC), Hong Kong with Montillo as a signatory.  Montillo’s father resigned from the company in April 2011.  In March 2011, Montillo and a co-conspirator opened two more bank accounts in Hong Kong, the MLL Holdings and the Skywall bank accounts, also at HSBC.  Montillo and her co-conspirators had on-line access to the Hong Kong bank accounts so that they could conduct banking transactions over the internet.  In 2012, Montillo’s father also opened an escrow account in the name of his mother-in-law, a licensed attorney in Maryland who had stopped practicing law in approximately 2007.  She was not aware that the escrow account had been opened in her name.  The conspirators directed victims to wire-transfer their advance fees into the HSBC, Hong Kong bank accounts or the attorney escrow account.

Montillo’s co-conspirator, Eric Becker, was her former fiancé.  Becker developed, and Montillo edited, websites for the various phony businesses, which purported to offer access to financial instruments, such as standby letters of credit, bank guarantees, bonds, or private placement trading platforms.  Montillo and her co-conspirators had no access to any financial instruments.  For example, Montillo and several co-conspirators obtained advance fee payments from a victim that would purportedly gain access to a private placement trading platform.  The co-conspirators persuaded the victim, through several broker intermediaries, to send $1.7 million to a BB&T bank account in Florida.  BB&T returned the funds to the victim.  The victim, a Mexican national, was told that the funds were returned because the window had closed on the investment opportunity.  Co-conspirators, including Montillo, then informed the victim, through his broker, that they could offer him a private placement trading platform in which he would receive profits and a charitable organization would use its portion of the profits to invest in its projects.  The conspirators directed the victim to send his money to the Worldwide Escrow account at HSBC, Hong Kong.  On May 8, 2012, the victim used his own and his family's funds to send $3,099,990 to the Worldwide Escrow Holdings account.  The conspirators, including Montillo, moved more than $2 million of the funds to a bank account opened at Choice Bank in Belize.

To conceal the fraud and to reassure the victim and his brokers, co-conspirators including Montillo, created an insurance policy for a non-existent insurance company called International Insurance of Nebraska, which was back-stopped with a website hosted through Montillo's GoDaddy account.  The insurance policy purported to show that the victim's investment funds would not be at risk because they were fully insured.  In addition, co-conspirators, including Montillo, used her GoDaddy account to host the website “wweholdingsltd.com” to add an air of legitimacy to Worldwide Escrow.  Both the insurance company and the private placement trading platform were bogus.

Over the next several years, Montillo and her co-conspirators continued with the advance fee scheme.  The scheme had both foreign and U.S. victims.  To protect her identity, Montillo frequently used the name “Kati Conti” in the frauds and used a “burner phone” so that after the scam was concluded, she could “go dark” and stop communicating with the victims.   In all, the scheme sought at least $8.7 million from victims, and actually obtained $4,342,540. 

For tax years 2012 through 2014, Montillo filed personal tax returns showing either no income or just $100 in income, and thus no income tax was owed.  Montillo admitted that she was the signatory on bank accounts in the names of limited liability corporations into which victims' funds were wire transferred from Hong Kong, Choice Bank in Belize, the attorney escrow account, and other accounts controlled by co-conspirators.  Montillo used the victim funds transferred to the limited liability accounts for living expenses.  Montillo had no accounts in her own name.  Montillo admitted that by failing to report her income for 2012 through 2014 to the Internal Revenue Service, she evaded a substantial amount of income taxes.

Three defendants were charged and sentenced in a related case in the Western District of Texas—James Edward Cox was sentenced to 78 months in prison and was ordered to pay $4,249,478 in restitution; and Kelly Ray Coronado and Gordon Richard Moscowitz were each sentenced to 46 months in prison sentence and were also ordered to pay restitution.  Becker was indicted with Montillo but has since died.  Montillo’s father died in 2016.          

United States Attorney Robert K. Hur commended the FBI and IRS-CI for their work in the investigation.  Mr. Hur thanked Assistant U.S. Attorneys Joyce K. McDonald and Sean Delaney, who prosecuted the case.

# # #

Baltimore, Maryland – Late on November 29, 2018—a few days before she was scheduled to go to trial—Lauren Montillo, age 47, of Owings Mills, Maryland, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud and to tax evasion.   According to her plea agreement, from 2010 through 2015, Montillo and her co-conspirators sought at least $8.7 million in advance fees from foreign and United States victims, purporting to offer access to exotic bank financial instruments.  Victims paid $4,342,540 in advance fees into Hong Kong bank accounts or attorney escrow accounts and received nothing in return.  For tax years 2012 through 2014, Montillo reported no income other than $100, evading a substantial amount of income taxes.  

The guilty plea was announced by United States Attorney for the District of Maryland Robert K. Hur; Special Agent in Charge Gordon B. Johnson of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Baltimore Field Office; and Special Agent in Charge Kelly R. Jackson of the Internal Revenue Service - Criminal Investigation, Washington, D.C. Field Office.

Montillo and her co-conspirators created shell companies, with associated websites, email addresses, and bank accounts, which they used to perpetrate the fraud.   Specifically, in February 2010, Montillo opened an account with GoDaddy, which provides web-hosting services.  From 2010 to 2015, Montillo and other co-conspirators used GoDaddy to host websites for shell companies such as MLL Holdings, The Bussola Group, Worldwide Escrow Holdings, Ltd., International Insurance of Nebraska, Atlas Investment Bancorp, Entirety Capital, GPF Global, and Atlas-Gayle Trust.  Each of these shell companies had associated email addresses, which Montillo and her co-conspirators opened and used.

Also in 2010, Montillo's father incorporated "Worldwide Escrow Holdings Limited" ("Worldwide Escrow") in Hong Kong and opened a bank account for Worldwide Escrow at the Hong Kong Shanghai Bank (HSBC), Hong Kong with Montillo as a signatory.  Montillo’s father resigned from the company in April 2011.  In March 2011, Montillo and a co-conspirator opened two more bank accounts in Hong Kong, the MLL Holdings and the Skywall bank accounts, also at HSBC.  Montillo and her co-conspirators had on-line access to the Hong Kong bank accounts so that they could conduct banking transactions over the internet.  In 2012, Montillo’s father also opened an escrow account in the name of his mother-in-law, a licensed attorney in Maryland who had stopped practicing law in approximately 2007.  She was not aware that the escrow account had been opened in her name.  The conspirators directed victims to wire-transfer their advance fees into the HSBC, Hong Kong bank accounts or the attorney escrow account.

Montillo’s co-conspirator, Eric Becker, was her former fiancé.  Becker developed, and Montillo edited, websites for the various phony businesses, which purported to offer access to financial instruments, such as standby letters of credit, bank guarantees, bonds, or private placement trading platforms.  Montillo and her co-conspirators had no access to any financial instruments.  For example, Montillo and several co-conspirators obtained advance fee payments from a victim that would purportedly gain access to a private placement trading platform.  The co-conspirators persuaded the victim, through several broker intermediaries, to send $1.7 million to a BB&T bank account in Florida.  BB&T returned the funds to the victim.  The victim, a Mexican national, was told that the funds were returned because the window had closed on the investment opportunity.  Co-conspirators, including Montillo, then informed the victim, through his broker, that they could offer him a private placement trading platform in which he would receive profits and a charitable organization would use its portion of the profits to invest in its projects.  The conspirators directed the victim to send his money to the Worldwide Escrow account at HSBC, Hong Kong.  On May 8, 2012, the victim used his own and his family's funds to send $3,099,990 to the Worldwide Escrow Holdings account.  The conspirators, including Montillo, moved over $2 million of the funds to a bank account opened at Choice Bank in Belize.

To conceal the fraud and to reassure the victim and his brokers, co-conspirators including Montillo, created an insurance policy for a non-existent insurance company called International Insurance of Nebraska, which was back-stopped with a website hosted through Montillo's GoDaddy account.  The insurance policy purported to show that the victim's investment funds would not be at risk because they were fully insured.  In addition, co-conspirators, including Montillo, used her GoDaddy account to host the website wweholdingsltd.com to add an air of legitimacy to Worldwide Escrow Both the insurance company and the private placement trading platform were bogus.

Over the next several years, Montillo and her co-conspirators continued with the advance fee scheme.  The scheme had both foreign and U.S. victims.  To protect her identity, Montillo frequently used the name “Kati Conti” in the frauds and used a “burner phone” so that after the scam was concluded, she could “go dark” and stop communicating with the victims.   In all, the scheme sought at least $8.7 million from victims, and actually obtained $4,342,540. 

For tax years 2012 through 2014, Montillo filed personal tax returns showing no income or $100 in income, and thus no income tax was owed.  Montillo admitted that she was the signatory on bank accounts in the names of limited liability corporations into which victims' funds were wire transferred from Hong Kong, Choice Bank in Belize, the attorney escrow account, and other accounts controlled by co-conspirators. Montillo used the victim funds transferred to the limited liability accounts for living expenses.  Montillo had no accounts in her own name.  Montillo admitted that by failing to report her income for 2012 through 2014 to the Internal Revenue Service, she evaded a substantial amount of income taxes.

As part of her plea agreement, Montillo will be required to forfeit a money judgment in the amount of $849,993.12 and to pay restitution in the full amount of the loss, which is at least $4,342,540.

Montillo faces a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison for the wire fraud conspiracy and 5 years in prison for tax evasion.  U.S. District Judge Richard D. Bennett has scheduled sentencing for April 12, 2019 at 10 a.m.

Three defendants were charged in a related case in the Western District of Texas, James Edward Cox, Kelly Ray Coronado, and Gordon Richard Moscowitz.  They have pled guilty to wire fraud conspiracy (Cox and Coronado) and money-laundering conspiracy (Moskowitz) and are scheduled for sentencing on February 6, 2019.  Becker was indicted with Montillo but has since died.  Montillo’s father died in 2016.          

United States Attorney Robert K. Hur commended the FBI and IRS-CI for their work in the investigation.  Mr. Hur thanked Assistant U.S. Attorneys Joyce K. McDonald and Sean Delaney, who are prosecuting the case.

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Description: The fiscal year of the data file obtained from the AOUSC
Format: YYYY

Description: The code of the federal judicial circuit where the case was located
Format: A2

Description: The code of the federal judicial district where the case was located
Format: A2

Description: The code of the district office where the case was located
Format: A2

Description: Docket number assigned by the district to the case
Format: A7

Description: A unique number assigned to each defendant in a case which cannot be modified by the court
Format: A3

Description: A unique number assigned to each defendant in a case which can be modified by the court
Format: A3

Description: A sequential number indicating whether a case is an original proceeding or a reopen
Format: N5

Description: Case type associated with the current defendant record
Format: A2

Description: A concatenation of district, office, docket number, case type, defendant number, and reopen sequence number
Format: A18

Description: A concatenation of district, office, docket number, case type, and reopen sequence number
Format: A15

Description: The status of the defendant as assigned by the AOUSC
Format: A2

Description: A code indicating the fugitive status of a defendant
Format: A1

Description: The date upon which a defendant became a fugitive
Format: YYYYMMDD

Description: The date upon which a fugitive defendant was taken into custody
Format: YYYYMMDD

Description: The date when a case was first docketed in the district court
Format: YYYYMMDD

Description: The date upon which proceedings in a case commenced on charges pending in the district court where the defendant appeared, or the date of the defendant’s felony-waiver of indictment
Format: YYYYMMDD

Description: A code used to identify the nature of the proceeding
Format: N2

Description: The date when a defendant first appeared before a judicial officer in the district court where a charge was pending
Format: YYYYMMDD

Description: A code indicating the event by which a defendant appeared before a judicial officer in the district court where a charge was pending
Format: A2

Description: A code indicating the type of legal counsel assigned to a defendant
Format: N2

Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense committed which carried the highest severity
Format: A20

Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with FTITLE1
Format: N2

Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with FTITLE1
Format: A4

Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with FTITLE1
Format: A4

Description: A code indicating the severity associated with FTITLE1
Format: A3

Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense committed which carried the second highest severity
Format: A20

Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with FTITLE2
Format: N2

Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with FTITLE2
Format: A4

Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with FTITLE2
Format: A4

Description: A code indicating the severity associated with FTITLE2
Format: A3

Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense committed which carried the third highest severity
Format: A20

Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with FTITLE3
Format: N2

Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with FTITLE3
Format: A4

Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with FTITLE3
Format: A4

Description: A code indicating the severity associated with FTITLE3
Format: A3

Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense committed which carried the fourth highest severity
Format: A20

Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with FTITLE4
Format: N2

Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with FTITLE4
Format: A4

Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with FTITLE4
Format: A4

Description: A code indicating the severity associated with FTITLE4
Format: A3

Description: The title and section of the U.S. Code applicable to the offense committed which carried the fifth highest severity
Format: A20

Description: A code indicating the level of offense associated with FTITLE5
Format: N2

Description: The four digit AO offense code associated with FTITLE5
Format: A4

Description: The four digit D2 offense code associated with FTITLE5
Format: A4

Description: A code indicating the severity associated with FTITLE5
Format: A3

Description: The FIPS code used to indicate the county or parish where an offense was committed
Format: A5

Description: The date of the last action taken on the record
Format: YYYYMMDD

Description: The date upon which judicial proceedings before the court concluded
Format: YYYYMMDD

Description: The date upon which the final sentence is recorded on the docket
Format: YYYYMMDD

Description: The date upon which the case was closed
Format: YYYYMMDD

Description: The total fine imposed at sentencing for all offenses of which the defendant was convicted and a fine was imposed
Format: N8

Description: A count of defendants filed including inter-district transfers
Format: N1

Description: A count of defendants filed excluding inter-district transfers
Format: N1

Description: A count of original proceedings commenced
Format: N1

Description: A count of defendants filed whose proceedings commenced by reopen, remand, appeal, or retrial
Format: N1

Description: A count of defendants terminated including interdistrict transfers
Format: N1

Description: A count of defendants terminated excluding interdistrict transfers
Format: N1

Description: A count of original proceedings terminated
Format: N1

Description: A count of defendants terminated whose proceedings commenced by reopen, remand, appeal, or retrial
Format: N1

Description: A count of defendants pending as of the last day of the period including long term fugitives
Format: N1

Description: A count of defendants pending as of the last day of the period excluding long term fugitives
Format: N1

Description: The source from which the data were loaded into the AOUSC’s NewSTATS database
Format: A10

Description: A sequential number indicating the iteration of the defendant record
Format: N2

Description: The date the record was loaded into the AOUSC’s NewSTATS database
Format: YYYYMMDD

Description: Statistical year ID label on data file obtained from the AOUSC which represents termination year
Format: YYYY

Data imported from FJC Integrated Database
F U C K I N G P E D O S R E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E